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FOREWORD
This is Volume III of a four-volume report. Volumes I and II, which
were published on 15 April 1967 and reflect the results of the first six months
effort, reported the result of a manned planetary mission requirements
analysis. This Volume reflects the results of the subsystems requirements
analysis, with particular emphasis on the factors affecting crew safe return.
The material presented herein was developed under participating com-
pany funded effort. The intent was to determine the required subsystem con-
figuration necessary to achieve the mission objectives outlined in Volume I
of this report. Particular emphasis was placed on the analysis of potential
systems unreliability and the selection of a mission concept which, through
use of the availability concept, showed promise of achieving a safe and
effective planetary flyby and return.
The study was conducted parallel to the Manned Planetary Flyby
Mission Study, NAS8-18025 in order to use the mission and systems design
developed therein.
The study was conducted during CFY 1967 by the Systems Engineering
Management Division of the Space Division of the North American Rockwell
Corporation, under Research Authorization (RA) 02195-15400. Documenta-
tion of the study was contracted by the Mission Analysis Division, NASA/
OART, Ames Research Center, Moffett Fie!d, California under NAS2-42!4.
The work was performed under the direction of Roy B. Carpenter Jr.,
the Project Engineer/Program Manager, within the Systems Engineering
Management Group. Substantial contribution were made to this volume by
Mr. Charles Fritz, Peter Fono, J. Bell, and Howard Steverson, the follow-
ing companies and personnel thereof who provided the data at the respective
company expense:
1. A. C. Electronics - D.A. Zeimer, et al
2. Aerojet General - C. Teague, et al
3. Allison Division G.M. - J.C. Schmid
4. Bell Aerosystems - T.P. Glynn
5. Collins Radio - R. Zimmer, et al
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e
7.
8.
9.
i0.
Ii.
IZ.
13.
14.
Dalmo Victor Company
Eagle Pitcher Company
General Time Corporation
Hamilton Standard Inc. _:-"
Honeywell, Inc.
Marquardt Corporation
Motorola Inc.
Raytheon Company': `
Simmonds Prec. Prod.
R. L. Straley
J. R. Lucas, et al
Fred Schultz
J. 3. Holsing
E. L. Ingalls and
C. A. Moosbrugger, et al
J. B. Gibbs
R. Crouse
H. A. Prindle
W. E. Nelson and W. E. Dunn
' *Provided available data only.
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I. BACKGROUND TO SYSTEMS ANALYSIS
i. 1 OBJECTIVES OF THIS STUDY PHASE
This phase of the study effort was conducted to determine the ability
of contemporary hardware to meet the requirements and constraints imposed
on systems by long duration space missions utilizing the Availability Concept
as a design tool. Long duration space missions include both the extended
earth orbital, lunar, and planetary exploration, and is based on the premise
that if a planetary mission can be shown to be feasible and safe, then the near
earth missions will be at least as safe, or safer.
The Availability Concept has been developed for application to space
missions and is described in Section I of Volume I of this report. In summary,
it is a design or mission analysis technique that facilitiates the determination
of an optimum man-machine relationship. By proper application, mission
effectiveness and safety is maximized through establishment of a safe and
reasonable balance between systems and missions performance, reliability,
maintainability and operability.
It is a basic intent of this aspect of the study to demonstrate the
feasibility and desirability of using contemporary hardware, for these longer
space missions, which has been tried and demonstrated to a significant
level of reliability. The advantages of this _r_r_vc_rh _._ nh_r_,,_ _, _
reliability engineer who must achieve a significant level of confidence in the
reliability of the hardware to be used before the mission starts. The demon-
stration problem may be seen from Figure I. 1 where the assessed reliability
for a program hardware is presented as a function of the program progress.
The point to be observed is that the actual reliability of the given component
or system, is not known with any assurance until very late in the program --
well beyond the permissible time to introduce design changes. Further, with
the longer missions and the associated reliability requirements, there is not
enough time in a program life span to obtain adequate statistical data if no
data is available from previous programs.
The fact that deficiencies exist in component reliability need not be a
problem, provided they are known before the mission is initiated. This
merely results in the need to add a few spares to the list to compensate for
these potential weaknesses. The availability concept permits the mission
planner to compensate for potential inadequacies.
-I-
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Figure 1.1. Assessed Reliability for Program Hardware
as Function of Program Progress
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1. Z APPROACH TO THE SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS
The subsystem requirements and constraints were established through
the mission analysis recorded in Volume I of this report. A baseline
planetary flyby mission of a duration of 700 days was selected from the
alternatives presented under NAS8-180Z5 (Reference 1. 1). Selection was
based on the premise that the 1976 -- 700-day mission imposed both require-
ments and constraints equal to, or greater than those required for other
Mars and/or Venus missions as well as the extended lunar and earth orbital
missions. The earth orbital missions are much less severe in terms of
imposed requirements and constraints sinn_ hneh _,_+ =-_ ....... 1.... 1: _g
_- .............. _ _l.,_,_.y _J.J._4.
are both possible and planned.
The approach to this phase of the study is as reflected in the logic
of Figure 1. Z. The selected baseline mission provided the subsystem
functional requirements and projected duty cycles.
First, a subsystem configuration is evolved, which fulfills the functional
requirements, first using Apollo/Saturn hardware, then other contemporary
hardware where there was no Apollo equivalent. And finally, where no
space-rated hardware exists, new designs were selected with preference
being given to those concepts that were closest to the hardware state and
showed promise of being reliable.
Next, reliability and crew safety logic diagrams were prepared from
the system designs which reflected the critical components in each subsystem
function. To accomplish this it was necessary for the designers and relia-
h_l_tx .... 4..... +...... 1. ,-g--_ .............. ii i g
each system.
The reliability/safety model was then assessed for mission reliability
without consideration of maintenance or redundancy, and compared to the
mission objectives. Weak links were identified and listed in order of unre-
liability by system function. Subsequently, they were associated with
the prominent failure mode of the involved component and with a specific
level of assembly. The resultant was a classification of these problems
(weak links) by criticality, probable cause and location within the system.
The Availability Concept developed under Reference 1.2 was then
applied to the system and a detailed analysis, as reflected in the logic of
Figure 1. 3, was performed on each subsystem individually. Reference XXX
refers to each block in the system logic and specifically, each weak link,
XXX 1 through XXX n was analyzed in order of unreliability. A fix, or series
of fixes, were identified and the results assessed once more for each of the
potentially weak links until the probability of crew safe return (Ps) was
raised to at least 0. 999 for a crew critical system and the risk of failure
-3-
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(no remaining spares or alternate modes) was approximately equally dis-
tributed within the system. For additional details on the technique, see
Volume L
As a result of this analysis, the required spares complement was
identified and tabulated by system. Design changes were identified, both
for improvement of reliability/safety and to facilitate the required main-
tenance actions. In addition, the optimum operating mode was identified and
associated with the recommended mission/system design.
Subsequently, the design of the present system and components were
evaluated to determine the maintainability in its present form, and the
redesign requirements to facilitate the required maintenance actions. Many
required little or no redesign, or a slight change in the packaging concept.
Finally, each subsystem function was assessed to identify any problem
areas which would impose a requirement for further study and/or test
programs.
1.3 SUBCONTRACTOR PARTICIPATION
Midway through the study, it became apparent that, in order to perform
the proposed analysis to the level of depth necessary for meaningful results,
it would be necessary to define the systems design to the point where specific
hardware could be identified. To accomplish this task within the scope of
the study, it was decided that subcontractors who were known to be expert
in the individual fields should be solicited for support in the study. The
resuIts were gratifying since the following subcontractors agreed to partici-
pate by defining and analyzing to some degree, the system functions listed;
each was provided a suggested statement of work along the lines outlined in
paragraph 1.2, and performed the study at their expense:
I. A.C. Electronics Guidance and Navigation
Z. Aerojet General Propulsion Engines
3. AiResearch* Environment Control and
Life Support
4. Allison Div. G. M. Propellant Tankage
5. Atomic s International**- Electrical Power Source
*Taken from several studies, Reference 4. 1-1 and 4. 1-2, plus consultation.
**Taken from a former funded study, Reference 1.4.
-6-
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.
7.
.
.
12.
13.
14.
15.
Bell Aerosystems
Collins Radio
Dalmo Victor Corp.
Eagle -Pitcher
General Time Corp. -
Honeywell Corp.
Marquardt Corp.
Motorola Inc.
Raytheon Mfg.
Simmonds
Co.
Positive Expulsion Tankage
Communications, Voice and
Telemetry
Deep Space and Probe Com.
Antenna
Earth Entry and Peaking
Batte rie s
Central Timing Equipment
Attitude, Stability and
Spin/De spin Control
Reaction Control and
Spinup /De spin Engine s
Up Data Link
Guidance Computer
Propellant Gaging
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II. MISSION OPERATIONS AND CREW SAFE RETURN
2. 1 NAVIGATION- EARTH VERSUS ON-BOARD
Apparently there exists two basic modes of executing the navigation
function, particularly during the long transplanetary and transearth phases of
the mission. During these phases, it seems that it is only necessary to
determine the track or trajectory of the spacecraft with respect to that
projected for the trip. Where significant deviations are noted, a course or
velocity correction is required. These have been estimated to average about
44 meters per second for the Earth-Mars leg and 69 meters per second for
the Mars-Earth leg (Reference 1. 1). In addition, history from past lunar
and planetary programs has shown that these midcourse corrections required
were slight, and that the earth tracking capability for these functions was
more than adequate.
Assuming that the foregoing is true, transferring responsibility for
these functions to the earth complex reduces the operational requirements
imposed on such components as the stable platform (IMU) and Guidance
Computer (AGC) by thousands of hours. To be specific, for the selected
baseline mission, the duty cycle for the IMU (it exhibits the highest failure
hazard) drops from 16,800 hours down to amaximum of 825 hours - most
of which is during the planetary encounter. This alone results in an increase
failure, to only about one chance in ten of failure. In both cases, main-
tenance and repair was not considered. If repair were contemplated, and
the components were impractical to repair in flight, it would require about
6 spares to achieve the 0.99 Ps level for full-time operation, and only one
additional for the earth primary mode.
Clearly, since there is no assessible risk in navigation accuracy and a
significant improvement in safety, the earth primary mode for the transearth
and transplanet phases is the best alternative.
2. Z GRAVITY -- ARTIFICIAL VERSUS NONE
Two basic modes of operation are under consideration for the long
transplanetary and transearth mission phases which center around the need
for artificial gravity. Most of the arguments formulated to date have to do
• with the physiological aspects of the question. The only consideration given
to the operation aspect and its systems engineering aspects are the inference
to the "complex functions required to implement artificial gravity. " On the
-9-
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contrary, SD studies indicate that the operational and safety factors envolved
tend to favor the artificial gravity mode. The results of these analyses are
enlarged below.
2.2. 1 Improvements in Crew Safety (Ps)
These improvements are realized despite the increased system com-
plexity. See Figure Z. l where comparison of the logic diagrams for the
artificial gravity and zero gravity modes are presented. The artificial
gravity mode limits the use of the normal stability control functions and the
reaction control engines to the injection, a short zero-g coast phase and
planetary flyby phases which amount to a total of approximately 400 hours.
The retraction/extension system must operate in various modes for the total
time, but much of the system is structural and inherently very reliable. The
spin/despin control is avery simple control amplifier, less than i/I00 the
complexity of the zero-g stability control system, it also must function for
95 percent of the mission. The engines required to achieve the artificial
gravity function continuously for I. 2 hours on 4 different occasions, for a
total of 4. 8 hours. They are the same as the Marquardt Reaction Control
engines and have demonstrated a capability for even longer operation with-
out any failures (Section 4. 3).
None of these system functions required to achieve the artificial
gravity are complicated, yet their use reduces the duty cycle on more
complicated hardware by a factor of over 40. Typical of the uncomplicated
nature is the wabble damper which is simply a volume of fluid, the viscosity
of which is selected to provide the desired damping action.
For the zero-gravity mode alone, the total stability control functions
must operate all of the time, or 16,800 hours. The complexity of the
electronics alone assures many failures as demonstrated by the 0.0003
reliability estimate --and this does not take into account the control moment
gyro unreliability.
The contrast in effectiveness of the two modes of operation is unavoid-
able. The artificial gravity mode displays a potential reliability greater
than 0.89 without maintenance, where there is virtual certainty of failure in
the zero-g mode. Since both modes can be improved through application of
the availability concept, those results must also be considered. Through
maintenance and repair, both situations can achieve a l°s of over 0. 999.
However, the zero-g mode requires provisions for over 50 maintenance
{M&R)actions and a spare helium supply, where the artificial gravity mode
would require only 15 M&_R actions.
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2. Z. Z Other Advantages of Artificial Gravity
These include gravity control of fluids, improved working conditions
and efficiency for the crew, a lower electrical power drain and more satis-
factory spacecraft/subsystems temperature distribution.
Gravity Control
Fluids in the artificial gravity mode will eliminate the need for use
of positive expulsion devices for the major portion of the mission. This,
in turn, will substantially reduce the required pressurant and eliminate a
major failure mode associated with these systems.
Working Conditions and Efficiency
These factors are improved because man is used to working under a
gravitational force. The need for restraints are lessened or eliminated,
depending on the forces required. The crew ability to perform useful work
increases, as evidenced by the force curves of Volume I section 4.2. The
metabolic rates decrease, both in terms of 0Z consumed and CO? rejected,
as evidenced by SD studies recorded in Reference Z.l. These studies show
that the metabolic rates double under zero-g over 1 "G" for any given task.
The effect of an artificial gravity would include a reduction in 02 consumption
and a decrease in the CO Z system workload.
Electrical Power
The requirements for power are lower because of the reduced amount
of equipments that must be operated. These fall into two categories: those
associated with the attitude and stability control functions, which includes
part of the guidance functions; and those associated with the need to main-
tain a thermal balance in some areas, in the latter category it will be
necessary to use electrical heaters to maintain fuel temperatures to keep
them from freezing in areas not exposed to solar heat (aft sections). In
addition, areas of the spacecraft proper may require heating to maintain the
desired thermal balance and prevent undesirable stresses. A slow roll only
cures part of the problem, even as orientation parallel to the sun's rays only
cures part of the problem.
-12-
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2.3 PROFILE COMPLEXITY INFERENCES
The selected mission profile and its complexity can exercise a pro-
nounced influence on the mission success and safety; the more complex the
required series of operations, the less safe the mission will be or the more
opportunities for failure or error. This may be seen from a contrast in the
reliability expressions for the lunar or planetary flyby mission and the
landers. Some of the major operations are given in Figure 2.2; however, an
analysis of the associated profiles reveals that there are about 38 discrete
operations for the lander missions and only about 16 for the flyby missions.
A discrete operation is a point in the mission profile where status quo
must be changed; for example, make a velocity correction or conduct docking
operations. In each of these cases the number of spacecraft functions required
to accomplish the operation increases by factors of 25 or more. Where,for
a coast period, basically, the ECLSS functions affect crew safety, yet, during
a simple velocity change, many more system functions enter into the picture.
For more stringent activities, such as rendezvous or landing operations, the
required functions which influence crew safety proliferate to the point where,
for a one-hour operation, the hazard rate may be equal that of the long coast
periods.
Consider as an example the following:
Where N is the number of discrete operations required
-(kit, + k2t 2 +...+ t
if the failure hazard of the coast phase k
C
baseline then the Reliability (Rc) is:
was taken as the reference
-kt
C C
R =e
C
and using the simplifying assumption that 25 k c represents the approximate
failure hazard for the average discrete operation which is known to be
conservative, then the failure hazard for a 4-hour rendezvous operation
would be: 100 k c. The increase in failure hazard for the lander mission
would be: (100kc) (38 - 16) = 2200kc. Since the total failure hazard for the
transearth phase of the baseline mission is only 3300kc, it is evident that
the mission profile complexity should be held to a minimum to maximize
crew safe return (Ps).
- 13-
SD 67-478-3
SPACE DIVISION oF NORTH AMERICAN ROCKWELL CORPORATION
_,_ z _"
_o _ z _
S -
I o_, i o.z ,
1,,; oo
It/ _ /I I 0 za. IJt l>
/ //ll_Ii I >_Y--.. ' _ ,',
i# 0
I! --
" Z I
/ ,, --- _,
_-4t ,_ ','A I"
_ \ ,¢ I I
Z
<
_J
n_
k
0
o
o
r/l
0
_d
.rt
- 14-
SD 67-478-3
SPACE DIVISION OF NORTH AMERICAN ROCKWELL CORPORATION
Table 2. 1 shows in a relative sense the results of a comparison of the
various potential planetary mission modes and their respective effects on
both mission success and crew safe return. A third column has been added
to reflect the potential effects and relative hazard associated with partial
crew losses. The baseline planetary flyby mission was used as the reference
for the relative estimates.
Table Z.I. Relative Success/Safety of Potential Planetary Missions
Mission Class
i. Planetary flyby
2. Flyby with MSSR
3. Flyby with aerobraker ELF
4. Flyby with aerobraker EOF
5. Flyby with retrobraker ELF
6. Flyby with retrobraker EOF
7. Aerobraker with MEM
8. Aerobraker vehicle
t-, _ , I _ i . . i ......./ • _._.%9_ v _.,.t_J.%....I.E; VV .LI,,J.J.J.V,LJ,_a.LVI
xv, X%_ b J. U U .L"¢$1%_ _r V _[lICJ._
Relative
Failure
Hazard
Relative
Safety
Hazard
Relative Hazard
of
Partial Crew Loss
1
80
115
60
i00
5O
II0
3O
. ^-
_%Jj
_D
I
20
90
50
80
4O
9O
25
66
LU
1
6O
300
135
280
120
440
200
'_UD
i60
Z. 4 ABORT CAPABILITY AND CREW SAFETY
Use of injected weight in an optimum manner is a key factor in assuring
the safe return of a planetary exploration party. This is particularly true
since there is a very limited capability for missions through the 1970's. It
has been shown in former studies and others (References I. 1 and i. 2) that
the probability of safe return (Ps) for these missions is proportional to the
weight devoted to improving the system effectiveness through maintenance.
As an example, the Boeing study (Reference Z. 2) shows that Ps extends from
0. 90 to 0.99 with about 1800 kg or 818 pounds of spares; the SD study
(Reference l.Z) confirmed this, (Figure Z.4).
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Since optimum use of weight infers use where the most return in terms
of gain in Ps is possible, it seems evident that weight devoted to crew safety
functions should be carefully allocated. Since abort is provided to augment
crew safety, any capability devoted to this function should be evaluated
against other potential uses, as well as the requirement. Figure 2. 3 presents
the projected probability that abort is not required as a function of elapsed
time into the 1976 baseline mission. Note that if a spacecraft is injected
into the transplanetary phase on a mission designed for a 0. 99 probability
of safe return, the probability of having to abort is lowest just after injection.
Prior to injection abort from earth orbit is possible without penalty. In
contrast to the requirement, the abort capability is only useful for the first
few minutes. The results of NAS8-180Z5 suggests that only about 3 minutes
were practical; after that, the AV required and the associated transit time
were prohibitive. In a former SD study (NAS9-3499 reference I.Z) as shown
by Figure Z.4, the transit time was shown to be high (hundreds of days) even
if there was sufficient propellant on board. This all adds up to the fact that
the safest way home is via the planned trajectory.
Given that abort is a somewhat dubious picture, the question of most
effective use of that weight must be resolved. From Figure Z. 4, it can be
seen that using the weight allocated for a three-minute abort capability by
NAS8-180Z5 for improving crew safety through maintenance and repair (M&R)
can raise the probability of safe return (Ps) for the crew by one to two, or
more, orders of magnitude.
The results of this analysis indicates that more effective use of any
weight surplus can be used for improving Ps through M&I_ and design pre-
cautions rather than through provisions for post injection abort.
- 18-
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III. MAINTENANCE REQUIREMENTS ESTIMATION CONCEPT
3. 1 THE SPARES ALLOCATION PROCESS
It has been reasonably well established that maintainability will be a
key factor in the use of contemporary systems for long duration space
missions. Any realistic maintenance plan depends upon the provision of
standby spares for the replacement or repair of failed equipment items. For
a maintenance plan to be effective, the number and levels of spares provided
must be logically developed from characteristics of the system au_ sub-
systems involved, and requirements of the mission which they are to perform.
The "Availability Concept, " as described and discussed in Volume i. 0 of
this report and reference i. 2, is a procedure or methodology specifically
developed to determine subsystem maintainability requirements for long
duration space missions.
This section will concern itself primarily with the derivation of main-
tainability requirements and the development of a preliminary mission
maintenance plan designed to improve the probabilities of safe return (Ps)
and mission success to acceptable levels on the basis of a balanced or
equalized risk throughout a given criticality class.
Assuming that reliability logic diagrams, equipment failure rates,
equipment duty cycles, etc., are available as results of the first steps in the
availability analysis, the accomplishment of the maintenance requirements
analysis depends upon the ability to evaluate the effects of providing different
numbers and levels of spares for the various potentially weak equipments.
The system confiKuration which i_ Ip_+ rt_¢¢_,-.,,1_-4- c cvz'_u_t_, "_ tl..... c iLL
which the total reliability logic diagram consists of single equipment items
in series as indicated in Figure 3. i. For purposes of illustration let there
be ten equipment items, each with a failure rate, ki, of i. 0 failures/106 hours
of operation; and a duty cycle, ti, of 104 hours/mission. The total system
reliability for such a system-mission combination may be determined by use
of the general Equation 3. 1 which is Ps-
N
Ps = /7 (Ri) = R A xR Bx R C x... x R N (3,1)
i=l
It is generally accepted that if an equipment item is operating within its
normal operating life, i.e., equipment failures will be random in nature and
not due to deterioration of components, then the mean-time-between-failures,
MTBFi, and thus the random failure rate, k i = 1/MTBFi, will remain
constant and the probability of occurrence, Px, of x number of failures may
be determined from Equation 3.2.
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i °
Px = (ki ti)3 (e" X iti)
j:
j=l
(3.2)
If no sparing capability has been provided for any of the items, x, in each
case becomes zero and the reliabilities become
-k i ti
Ri=e (3.3)
The mission system Ps for this first illustrative example as computed by
use of _q11_n*_= 2 I _..A _ 3 "'-_ _I__................. ... L,_ Lx_ v_iues given is:
P
N 10
= II (Ri)= H (e-kiti)
i=l i=l
i0
= (e-0.01) = (0. 9900) I0
= 0. 9045
The effect of providing a single spare unit for Item A, as indicated in
Figure 3.2, would be that of replacing Item A with some equivalent, Item AI,
with the same failure rate and duty cycle, but which had the characteristic of
not affecting the performance of the total system until it experienced a
second failure. For such an equivalent item, the x of Equation 3.2 becomes
i, and the reliability for Item A1 may be determined from Equation 3.4.
.... _A', tA (e- l (3.4)
Using both Equations 3.3 and 3.4 with Equation 3. 1 and the values given, the
mission system Ps2 becomes:
N
Ps2 = RAI x H (Ki)
i=2
= [e-XA1 tA1 +KA1 tAl(e -KA1 tA1)J (e-ki ti)9
= [0. 9900 + 0. 00995] (0. 9900) 9
= [0. 99995] (0. 9136)
= 0. 91355
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From this it can be seen that adding the capability to nullify the first
failure of Item A would increase the reliability of Item A from 0. 9900 to
0. 99995 and the reliability of the total system from 0. 9045 to 0. 91355.
In a similar manner, providing the same single spare unit to Item B
would increase the mission system Ps3 to:
[ -XAItAI (e-hAl tAl) 3Ps3 = e + kAl tAl
X e + kB1 tB1 x H (e tx)
i=3
= [0.99995] [0. 999953 {0. 9900} 8
= 0.999278
The ultimate effect of providing "first failure nullification" capability
to this system would obviously be providing it for all ten items. In such a
case, the Ps would be raised to:
= H e -kil til + kil til
P 4 i=l _
=[0.9900 + 0.00995] 10
= [0.99995] 10
= 0. 99950
It is is desirable to improve the ultimate Ps to some higher level, a
second standby spare or "second failure nullification" capability for some or
all of the other items may be added. Providing such a capability to the first
item, for example, and extending Equation 3.2 to Equation 3.5
(
- kA2 tA2
RA2 = e + kA2 tA2 (e- kA2 tA2) +( kA2 tA2}2 (e- XA2 tA2) (3. 5)
2
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the mission system Ps is increased to:
Ps5 = RA2 x 1o[ iltil( )]/7 e + kil til e -ki til
i=2
= [0. 9900 + 0. 00995 + 0. 0000499] (0. 99995) 9
= [0. 9999999] (0.99995}9
= 0.99955
Continuing as before, if the "second failure nullification" capability is
added to all ten items, the mission system Ps is improved to:
N[:n  i2ti + i2tiz(e i2tiZ)+Ps6 i=l e 2 )](kiz tiZ) <e-kiz tizZ
= [0.9900 + 0.00995 + 0.0000499] 10
= [0. 9999999] 10
= 0.999999
In practice it may not be possible or desirable to pro;ide the same
number of spare units to all items of a system. The same general
Equation 3. 1 continues to apply with the individual factors being the sums
of an appropriate number of terms of Equation 3.2. As a final version of
this first illustrative example, assume that odd-numbered items are provided
with one spare, while the even-numbered items are provided with two spares;
then the mission system Ps becomes:
Ps7 = (0. 99995) 5 x (0. 9999999) 5
= 0.99975
It was stated at the beginning of the first illustrative example that it
represented the least difficult configuration to evaluate. The most frequently
occurring complication to this initial simple series configuration is the
- Z3 -
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duplication of items in the logic diagram as shown in Figure 3.3. In this
second illustrative example, there are two of each of the ten difficult equip-
ment items. If no sparing capability is provided, the expression for mission
system Ps, 3. IA, is merely an extension of the original general expres-
sion 3. 1.
NN
PsA = /7 (Ri) = RA x RAA x R B XRBB x ... xR N XRNN (3. IA)
i=l
Carrying forward the same equipment item performance values, ki = 1.0 x 10 6
and ti = 10 4 hours, the mission system Ps is:
NN
PsA = H
i= 1
(Ri) = (0.9900) 20
= 0. 8181
In this example the general Item I and Item II are identical. Therefore,
any spares of this type could be used for either item. Specifically, if a
single spare for the item A- Item AA combination were provided, the logic
diagram would appear as in Figure 3.4. The analytic approach which appears
to be most convenient to use in this sort of situation is to replace the Item A-
Item AA combination with an equivalent Item AA1 which has the same duty
cycle as Item A or Item A_A, but has a failure rate, kAAI, equal to the sum
of the failure rates of Items A and AA, or k A + kAA. With the proper
substitutions, the estimate of mission system Ps becomes:
NN [  AAltAA1/  AA1Ps7 = RAA1 x H (Ri) = e x AA1 tAA1 e
i=3
e
(o. : [o. (o. : o.
0.8Z + 0. 1625]
Rather than follow through with a numerical computation with each
variation of this example as was done in the first example, it seems appro-
priate to attempt to generalize and, if possible, develop a general expression
which can be used to analyze systems with this type of logic diagram and
with any combination of sparing provisions. Considering again the general
- 24 -
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item I of the basic series system diagram, there may be any number 1
througha i of these identical items operating as a series subset with any num-
ber of spares, 0 through bi, as represented in Figure 3.5. This situation
presents a rather complex derivation, based upon an analysis of possible
operating combinations and requires the development of Markov probability
matrices which results in the general Equation 3.6.
b°
1
R= I 'ai iti"(o-i ito 136,
j!j=O
The details of this derivation are available in the literature. If this general
expression for item I is applied to basic Equation 3. I, it can be stated in
terms of ai, bi, ki, ti, and N as follows:
i (a. kiti)J -a. kit i
p = H 1 1
s i=l j=0 J! e
(3.7)
There must be a further refinement of Equation 3.7 making it applicable
to general item I subsets which normally function with a i items operating,
but which can function at some reduced but stilI acceptable capacity with as
few as c i items operating. An exact expression for this situation is beyond
the present state of the art. However, an approximation which is as good as
the data base, is possible if this characteristic of the subset is interpreted in
terms of effective spares, d i. This abstract quantity is:
d-1 = b. + ..{ai-ci} = b. + a - c.1 1 i 1
The incorporation of this parameter into the general expression adapts it to
those subsets which will continue to function for {al- c) failures after the
actual supply of b i spares have been exhausted. Fo thLer purposes of Ps esti-
mates, there are effectively di spares. Equation 3.7 modified to include
this parameter is
d 0
N _-'i (aikiti)J (e - aikiti) (3.8)
P = t7 j/,s i=l =0 jT.
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Figure 3.5. Any Number of Identical Items Operating as a Series Subset
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The reason that Equation 3.8 is an approximation and not a mathe-
matical exactitude is associated with (aikit i) product. After the b i actual
spares have been used this product should be successively decreased to:
[(ai_l)kiti], [(ai_2 )kiti], ... [(ai-ci)kiti] as the number of items operating
in the subset is being reduced by the (ai-c i) failures and the probability of
occurrence of additional failures is correspondingly reduced. The amount of
error introduced into the Ps estimates by the use of this approximation
appears to be negligible. Importantly, the error will always be conservative;
that is, the computed Ps estimates will always be slightly lower than a more
exact estimate computed with a mathematically exact version of Equation 3.8,
yet to be derived.
The concept of a normal operation of ai items with the possibility of a
backup, or minimum operation of ci items, eliminates the usual distinction
between series subsets and parallel subsets when the condition of minimal
operation is any ci items of the normally operating a i items. In terms of
logic diagrams, Figure 3.6 and Figure 3.7 are equivalent under this condi-
tion. Such a condition exists when "cannibalism" or the interchange of a
failed item with a like operating item in the subset is permitted. This has
been found to be the case in a large proportion of the anticipated long dura-
tion mission subsystems.
Estimates of safety/success improvements involving the use of Equa-
tion 3.8 can quickly become arduous. A graphic aid to facilitate the use of
this and similar expressions has been developed under this study and is pre-
sented in Figure 3.8. This plot is based upon the Equation:
P
S
k
 (rJ)= -- ej=O j,
This family of curves relates the values of R and r of integer values of j
from 0 to Z0 on special log coordinates. The correspondence of k to di and r
to (aikiti) is clear.
3. Z EQUALIZING RISK WITHIN A FUNCTION
Given that Equation 3.8 provides a means of assessing the effects of
sparing weak links within a subsystem function, it yet remains to identify the
individual requirements. That is, it must be determined the required level
of reliability for each component within a function which, when achieved, will
assure meeting the required contribution to the mission Ps. Ideally, each
item in a subsystem, with its provided maintenance capability, should pre-
sent the same "risk" or probability of causing the subsystem to become
- Z8 -
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t_ D
NORMAL OPERATION = a i ITEMS
MINIMUM OPERATION = cl ITEMS
STANDBY SPARES = bi ITEMS
Figure 3.6. Concept of Normal Operation With Backup
NORMAL OPERATION = a_ ITEMS
MINIMUM OPERATION = c i ITEMS
STANDBY SPARES = bl ITEMS
|
!
Figure 3.7. Concept When Interchange of
Failed Item With Similar Item
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non-functional by virtue of its lack of supporting spares. The "equalized
risk" concept was developed in an attempt to provide a means to establish
a reasonable reliability requirement for components at a given level, with
equal risk within the criticality class.
To illustrate, consider the example subsystem of four different kinds
of items, A, B, C and D, shown in Figure 3.9. This configuration, in
which item A appears twice and item B three times, will.have a subsystem
contribution to Ps, that is a function of the reliabilities of the four items as
shown in Equation 3.9.
Ps =RAXRB {I - [I- RAXRc XRDI [I- (I- RB)Zll
= _ + )3RAR B 2RA(RB )2 2(RA)ZRcRD - RA(R B
+ (RA)2 (RB)3 RcR D
(3.9)
If the concept of equalized risk is applied, the reliabilities of items will be
made equal by design and maintenance capability provided.
R. = R A = R B = R C = R DI
In which case, Equation 3.9 reduces to expression 3. I0.
Ps = (Ri)2 - Z(Ri)3 - (Ri)4 + 2(Ri )6 + (Ri)7 (3. I0)
For a given subsystem Ps of: Ps = 0.8636, the item contributions must be
R i = 0. 9870 or better.
To determine the maintenance requirements involved in providing this
item a reliability of R i = 0. 9870, some maintenance logic diagrams of the
type shown in Figure 3. 10 are helpful. Care must be taken to assure that
such a diagram accurately represents the operational limitations and relia-
bility characteristics of the subsystem. In the case of this example, the
assumptions upon which Equation 3.9 is based require that each application
of each item, that is, both A items and all three B items, as well as the
single C and D items, must be provided with maintenance capability to bring
them individually up to the allocated R i = 0. 9870 level. Figure 3. 10 reflects
this in that all seven item applications are shown. It is possible to make
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A2 C1 D1
A1 B1
Figure 3.9. Example Subsystem of Four Different Items, A, B, C, D
L-! B3i ic, t ! o, _
Figure 3. i0. Maintenance Logic Diagram
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some simplification of this diagram by the following reasoning. Since itemAl
and item A2 are physically identical by definition their failure rates are
identical, k A. Their applications may not necessarily be identical so their
duty cycles, or operating times tAl and tAZ, must be assumed to be different.
If they are physically identical, any A type spare provided may be used in
either application and only one store of A type spares need be provided as
indicated in Figure 3. II. It is most convenient to determine A type spares
requirement if the item AI-A2 combination can be replaced by some analyt-
ically equivalent item AA. Item AA will be equivalent to the A1-A2 com-
bination only if it exhibits the same failure probability of occurrence char-
acteristics. This will be true if the below relationship exists.
 AAtAA= kltAl+ XAztA2
Failure rates of identical item and their spares must be equal, therefore
×AAtAA = ×AItAI+ tAZ)
by a similar line of reasoning,
kBBtBB = kB(tB1 + tB2 + tB3)
f
From the above, Figure 3-I0 may be simplified to Figure 3. 12. One
of the purposes of this example was to illustrate how a purely series main-
tenance logic diagram such as Figure 3. 12 may be developed to correspond
to the series --parallel reliability logic diagram of Figure 3.9. Once a
purely series logic has been developed, Equation 3.8 and Figure 3.8 may be
employed to determine the spares requirements.
To carry this example to completion, let the following parameter
values be assumed:
Item Failure Rate Duty Cycle
A1 19.6x10 -6 104
A2 19.6x10 -6 i0 Z
B1 30.0xl0 -6 104
-6
B2 30.0xl0 I0
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Figure 3. Ii. Use of an A Type Spare
SPARES SPARES
Figure 3. 12. Series Maintenance Logic Diagram
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Item Failure Rate Duty Cycle
B3 30.0xl0 -6 10
C 90.0xl0 "6 10 z
D 80.0xl0 "6 I02
(
Interpreted in terms of Figure 3. 13, this data becomes
Item k t kt
-6
AA 19.6x10 10,200 0. 200
-6
BIB 30.0xl0 I0,020 0.300
-6
C 90.0xl0 100 0. 009
-6
D 80.0xl0 100 0. 008
The allocated reliability for all was R i = 0.9870, which can be repre-
sented by the dash horizontal line in Figure 3. 13, which is a reproduction of
Figure 3.8, and is to be used as an aid in the solution of this example. The
kt products for each item are plotted as vertical lines in Figure 3. 13 and
are appropriately labeled. Inspection of this plot reveals that the vertical
item AA line and the horizontal allocated reliability intersect between the
one-spare-provided and the two-spares-provided curves. The intersection
the vertical item AA line with the one-spare-provided curve occurs at a
reliability level of about 0. 9989. Since it is not possible to provide a fraction
of a spare, a choice between providing one spare to the item AI-A2 combina-
tion for a reliability slightly less than the allocated level, 0.9823 vs. 0.9870;
or providing two spares to the combination for a considerably higher relia-
bility of 0.9987 must be made. If the same procedure be followed for the
remaining items and the results summarized in a tabular form.
Re suiting
Item Spare s Req't. Contribution
Combination Bracket To Ps
A I-A2 i or 2 0. 9823 or 0. 9989
BI-B2-B3 I or Z 0.965 or 0.9967
C 0 or 1 0.914 or 0.9963
D 0 or 1 0.924 or 0. 9969
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This section by no means represents a complete investigation into the
problems of Ps estimation for systems requiring maintenance. The intent is
to establish a general case starting point upon which the specific subsystem
cases in later sections may be based and to augment the available literature
where weaknesses precluded application to this study.
- 38-
SD 67-478-3
SPACEDIVISION oFNORTHAMERICANROCKWELLCORPORATION
IV. CREW CRITICAL (CRITICALITY I) SUBSYSTEMS ANALYSES
The subsystems functions required to assure crew safe return,
Criticality I, are anaIyzed individualiy in the subsequent paragraphs. The
availability analysis has been applied to those required to iower the individual
subsystem contribution to the probability of safe return (Pcs) to 0. 999 or
less.
4. 1 THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL AND LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEMS
Note: The information used herein was derived through
NAR/SD in-house studies performed under the basic
technology research program and conducted with the
use of contributions from AiResearch Division of
Garrett Corporation in Reference 4. 1 and 4. 2.
A detailed analysis of the baseline mission Environmental Control and
Life Support System ECLSS is presented in this section of the report to
demonstrate application of the availability concept on a system design, and
to demonstrate the scope and effectiveness of the analysis. The baseline
system used herein was developed as a part of the system engineering activ-
ity and as a necessary prerequisite to the study objectives. It represents
the most detailed design yet accomplished of an ECLSS for extended missions.
The hardware was derived from Apollo components and other contemporary
space programs. Very few new items of hardware were required and none
are considered marginal in relation to the state-of-the-art; most have already
been demonstrated as reliable processes.
4. 1. 1 The ECLSS Functional Requirements
Basically, the ECLSS must support both men and equipment for the
700-day baseline mission by providing the required environmental charac-
teristics. It must provide the four-man crew with an atmosphere controlled
in terms of both content, temperature and pressure for both the mission
module (MM) and the earth entry module (EEM). It must provide tempera-
ture control for all temperature sensitive systems in both modules.
In addition, the mission spacecraft will have a probe compartment (PC)
which will house the planetary probes. No EC/LSS functions are expected to
be provided to this compartment. Temperature control may be a future
requirement but that should have a negligible effect on this study since they
are Criticality iII. The EEM will be occupied by the crew only during ascent,
docking and velocity changes. The PC will be entered for a maximum spo-
radic occupancy of about two weeks for the checkout of scientific equipment.
For the purposes of total mission availability support requirements
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determination, the MM may be considered to be the module requiring a
detailed analysis of the EC/LSS support requirements. The system must
provide its functions for the full 16800 hours of flight time, with off time
only for maintenance and repair.
The MM is itself divided into two main compartments or equipment
floor levels. Equipment floor A is the primary crew compartment having
maximum radiation and meteroid protection, and the one containing the
displays and controls necessary for the operation of the EC/LSS. Equipment
floor B contains approximately half of the EC/LSS equipment items which, to
some degree, may be considered the "slave" half that backs up the "master"
half if equipment floor A. However, this is not a standby backup relation-
ship. Generally, both sets of equipment will be in operation at less than
full capacity and sharing equally in the total load. The system layout diagram
is presented in Figure 4. 1. It illustrates the concept of two equipment floors,
each containing approximately half the EC/LSS equipment.
There are six fundamental subsystem functions with the basic inter-
relationships which are shown in Figure 4. 2. Because of the interrelation-
ships and equipment operational interdependencies, these functions have
been arbitrarily divided into thirteen EC/LSS functional equipment groups as
identified in Figure 4. 3. These have been further expanded into a total sub-
system flow schematic showing the individual items of equipment in
Figure 4.4, which forms the basis of subsequent analysis. These functions
work together as related in Figure 4. 1 and 4. 2, as follows:
Four equipment groups are necessary for the spacecraft thermal
control function. Of these, equipment group 1.0 is the radiator circuit whose
functional purpose is the rejection of unwanted heat energy into space by pure
radiation. This group is thermodynamically connected to equipment group
2.0, the refrigerant circuit, by means of a refrigerant fluid such as Freon.
The functional purpose of group 2.0 is to accept unwanted heat energy from
the atmosphere circuit, group 3.0, and the equipment coolant circuit, group
4.0, and transfer it to the refrigerant fluid from which it will be rejected to
space. It may also transfer heat from the coolant circuit to the atmosphere
circuit if the crew compartments require heating rather than cooling. The
cabins are insulated for a thermal balance so that with normal equipment
loads the temperature is as required. The purpose of group 3.0, the atmos-
phere circuit, will be the circulation of a breatheable atmosphere through
the crew compartments and a set of refrigerant circuit heat exchangers.
Group 4.0, the coolant circuit, performs a comparable purpose in the cir-
culation of a collant fluid through the condensers, evaporators, cold plates,
etc. , of other equipment groups from which unwanted heat energy must be
removed and finally through another set of refrigerant circuit heat exchangers.
The major subsystem functions are as follows.
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1. The functions of humidity control and contaminant removal
are performed by one equipment group, the humidity cir-
cuit, 5.0. Excess humidity is removed from the crew
compartment atmosphere and transferred as waste water to
waste-water storage. Harmful contaminants will then be
removed from the atmosphere by means of a series of
filters and a catalytic burner function.
The water management function is performed by three
equipment groups; the water reclamation group, 6.0, the
potable water storage group, 7.0, and the waste water
storage group, 8.0. The purposes of these groups are
clearly implied by their titles. The waste-water storage
group stores waste water until enough has been accumulated
to make up a batch which is then reclaimed by the water
reclamation group. The pure water is then stored by the
potable water storage group until needed. A detailed
description of the reclamation process is included.
This system recovers water by evaporating it from waste water and
urine at 100 F. Each man will require 9.75 pounds of water per day for
drinking and food preparation. There will be a requirement for makeup
water of 1.27 pound per man, per day. For a four-man crew and 700-day
mission, the water weight at launch must exceed 3550 pounds with a water
recovery system. Without it, it must exceed 27,300 pounds. Obviousiy, a
water recovery system is essential. The urine vapor with oxygen added is
passed through a high-temperature catalyst bed to oxidize trace contaminants.
Evaporation is controlled at 100 F and 0. 6 psi in the evaporator to
minimize hydrolysis of urea in the urine. The water vapor and added oxygen
are heated in the recuperator by the vapor leaving the catalyst bed which
bed will be heated by an electrical heater. In the catalyst bed, the oxides,
and CO2 are removed. The product flows through the recuperator into the
condenser, where water is condensed and removed. The trace gases are
periodically vented to vacuum.
The recuperator, heat source, and catalyst are combined into a singIe
integrated unit. The evaporator is designed as a plastic bag with bonded
absorbent surfaces for wicking and evaporation. When the wicking becomes
saturated with salts, the bag is replaced.
. The removal of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere is to be
accomplished by the carbonation cell, group 9.0. Under
normal operation CO 2 removed from the atmosphere will be
dumped overboard into space. In the event of loss of access
to the 02 source or an inadequate remaining supply, the
- 44 -
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cabin CO 2 will then become an input to the oxygen regeneration
function. A description is included herein because it is a new
process, not described in the references.
The carbonation cell, CO 2 concentrator, is an electrochemical
device capable of removing CO 2 from cabin atmosphere. When
selected electrodes and electrolytes are combined in an electro-
chemical cell and a voltage potential is impressed on the cell,
concentration gradients and migration of ionic species are induced
at the electrodes. The CO 2 concentration setup consists of three
cells. In the first stage, CO 2 and oxygen are removed from the
cabin process gas and transferred from cathode to anode through
the electrolyte K 2 CO 3 as carbonate, bicarbonate, and hydroxyl
ions. At the anode, CO 2 and oxygen are reformed and discharged.
This gas mixture, substantially enriched in COz, enters the
second stage. There the process is repeated. However, because
of the CO2-rich feed gas, most of the CO 2 transfer occurs through
formation of the bicarbonate ion and results in transfer of pro-
portionally more CO 2 than oxygen. The second stage gas enters
the third stage for final processing. The third stage differs from
the first two stages in that is selectively removes oxygen from the
feed gas to produce a mixture of greater than 90 percent COz,
ready for further processing or disposal.
The system is cooled by evaporation of water and by the process
gas stream. Power requirements have been estimated as
157 watts per man. It is a continuous system, having minimal
moving parts (blowers, fan) and is simple in operation.
. Atmosphere supply, will be accomplished by two equipment groups:
cryogenic oxygen supply, i0.0, and high-pressure oxygen supply,
ii.0. The basic source of supply is the cryogenically stored
oxygen with the high-pressure oxygen supply being necessary
only to provide emergency repressurization capability which the
relatively slow gas flow characteristics of cryogenic supply does
not provide. Included as part of the cryogenic oxygen supply
equipment group, i0.0, are the sensors, regulators, etc.,
necessary for the proper oxygen pressurization of the crew
compartments.
As a partial backup to the cryogenic oxygen storage, a Bosch
reactor group, 12.0, and an electrolysis cell group, 13.0, are
included to recover metabolic oxygen from atmosphere CO 2
- 49 -
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Figure 4.7. Radiator Tube Logic
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exchangers, etc. , are in full operation. Therefore, the
operating relationships, as depicted by a reliability logic
diagram, are best represented by Figure 4.7 for these
tube sets.
The remaining three equipment items in the radiator circuit
group have no unusual characteristics or operational constraints
and will operate, one each in series, with any of the radiator
tube sets. Since these are interchangeable, one form of main-
tenance action which can be performed is the interchange of a
failed item with a like item operating elsewhere in the group
(cannibalism) to reestablish a functional combination within
the group. The resultant reliability logic diagram from the
radiator circuit with items exhibiting the described character-
istics is shown in Figure 4.8.
2of4
, 1.1.2 ] 1.2.2I-1
t
4of4 4of4
t '-'.q-
Figure 4.8. Radiator Circuit Logic
Applying the values in Table 4. 1:
Ps (I. I)= 1- l-(e-kiti) z2
= I- I-(e-.00168_ 22
%,,
Ps (1. 1) = 0.999989
which appears in column 9 of the Table.
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The recommended contribution to Ps for this system should be not
less than 0.999 since this is the most crew sensitive system. To meet the
objective all of the 13 subsystems must be improved considerably. Since
each subsystem is, or contains weak links, all were evaluated individually
in an availability analysis.
4. I. 3 Availability Analysis, ECLSS
To decrease the failure hazard to the acceptable level 1 x 10 -3, and
to achieve the equalized risk objectives established for this study, the
allowable unreliability should be allocated as in Section 3. Z of this report.
However, an effective approximation can be made by counting the number of
sparing possibilities within the ECLSS and allocating the requirement over
this number of instances in which maintenance capability may be provided.
The results can then be checked after the sparing or maintenance require-
ments analysis has been completed, then adjustments made when required.
The functional groups of the eleven ECLSS subsystems were counted
and found to be about 85 of approximately equal complexity. Each represented
a weak-link possibility, and therefore, a candidate for an M and R action.
All were not realistically sparing possibilities. For instance, the radiator
tube sets and external storage tanks are known to be inaccessible for repair
or replacement. However, let the "first cut" goal be taken as the 85 root of
0. 9990 and the resulting first cut maintenance requirements analysis be
evaluated and modified as necessary. The 85th root of 0. 9990 is 0. 9999882,
or 11 failures in 106 missions which will be taken as the equal risk reliability
level desired for each sparable weak link.
Each of the eleven subsystems or groups were then analyzed for
requirements to meet or surpass the required Ps. The results are described
in the following paragraphs.
. Radiator Circuit. There are four different kinds of equip-
ment items in the radiator circuit, 1.0, as indicated in the
first two columns of Table 4. 1. This group includes four
space radiator tube sets which are potentially weak links,
physically contained in two radiators of two tube sets each,
as diagrammed in Figure 4. 6. Any two tube sets, not in
the same radiator, are required to dissipate the expected
normal heat load. On this basis, the four acceptable oper-
ating combinations of radiator tube sets would be: I. i. 1
with I. I. 3, i. I. i with 1. 1.4, I. I. 2 with i. i. 3, and 1. i. 2
with 1. i.4. A further operating limitation exists in that
the 1. i. 1 with the i. 1.4 and the I. 1.2 with I. I. 3 combina-
tions may be used only if the refrigerant circuit is operating
in the primary mode, i. e. , both pumps, all four heat
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4. I.2 Reliability Assessment, EC/LSS
For the preponderance of the ECLSS, the requirements associated
crew safe return, Ps, or Criticality I, include most of the functions. The
system reliability logic diagram is presented in Figure 4-5.
A reliability estimate of the system was made using the Apollo failure
rate data as reflected in References 4. 1-2 and 4. 1-3. The results are as
reflected in Table 4.0; the system reliability is estimated to be only 0. 104.
This means that only a 10-percent chance exists that there will not be a loss
of some critical function. Obviously, the risk is too high and the weak links
must be corrected.
Table 4.0. EC/LSS Reliability Estimates, Subsystem Level
Logic
Code
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
7.0
8.0
9.0
i0.0
II. 0
12.0
13.0
Sub systems
Radiator circuit
Refrigerant circuit
Atmospheric circuit
Coolant circuit
Humidity circuit
Water reclamation
Potable water
Waste water
Carbonation cell
Cryogenic supply
High-pressure 02
Bosch reactor*
Electrolysis*
Duty Cycle
(hours)
16,800
16,800
16,800
16,800
16,800
16,800
16,800
16,800
16,800
16,800
16,800
1680
1680
E stimated
Reliability
0.9316
O. 7756
O. 6149
O. 8658
O. 9243
O. 8929
O. 9838
O. 9773
0.8612
0. 4583
0. 8560
0.9174
0. 9809
System O. 1041
*Required only in case of loss of some cryogenic storage capability
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collected by the carbonation cells. Leakage 0 2 must still be
made up from one of the forms of storage.
Metabolic oxygen can be cycled and recycled for reuse.
During the metabolic process, oxygen is consumed by the
body and then discharged in soiid, liquid, and gaseous wastes.
The greatest part of this oxygen is used in oxidation of organic
components and is expired as carbon dioxide, with most of the
remainder appearing as metabolic water. Of the numerous
possible means by which oxygen may be recovered from CO2,
the Bosch reaction system was selected as candidate for Mars
flyby appiication. It is based on the principle of hydrogenera-
tion of CO 2 to C and H20 , followed by electrolysis of the product
water to obtain oxygen.
.
The reduction of CO 2 with hydrogen to carbon and water in a
one-step process has been investigated, and engineering
models have been built and tested. Investigators have found
that carbon monoxide and methane are formed in the reactor
over iron catalysts, and that the presence of methane is neces-
sary to improve efficiency. One-cycle conversion is of low
efficiency; hence, recycIing of the product gas is required.
The rate of water formation is sensitive to the presence of
water in the inlet stream, so the product gases must be
dried to low dew points before recycling. System power
requirements are intimately related to reactor size, insu-
lation, and effectiveness of the thermal generation process
between the cool reactants and the hot product gases.
The nitrogen supply is a desirable item but not truly
necessary to crew safe return. Under normal conditions,
a two-gas atmosphere of about 50/50 oxygen and nitrogen
will be supplied to the crew compartments. If the nitrogen
supply becomes non-functional, a pure oxygen atmosphere
at a reduced pressure will continue to provide a safe
environment from the oxygen supply. Since the function of
nitrogen supply is not considered to be criticaI to crew
survival and therefore will not have a significant effect
upon the Ps, it could be considered a Criticality II func-
tion and impose no decrements on the assessment of crew
safe return.
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Table 4. 1. Radiator Circuit Analysis
Logic
Block
Number
i.i, i-4
i.2, i-4
i.3, i-4
1.4, i-4
Component
Radiator tube set
Radiator flow control
Isolation valves
Check valves
Totals
Duty Cycle
(hours)
16,800
Failure
Rate
x 106
0.10
lO.O *
0.10"
0.50*
*More than one required; 2 for 1.2.1, and 4 for others
Reliability
O.999989
O.97
O.9932
0.967
o.932
Number
of
Spares
Contribution
to Ps
0.999989
0.999993
0.999999
0.999994
0.99998
Spares
Weight (- lbs)
o
8.0
0.4
0.4
8.8
Equipment items 1.2. 1-4, 1.3. 1-4 and 1.4. 1-4 all have an "any-two-
of-four" operating relationship. Using Figure 3-8 as described in
Section 3.0, the inherent reliabilities of these items are computed as
R 1.2 = 0.97, R 1. 3 = 0.9932 and R 1.4 = 0.967. The total group inherent
reliability when computed as the product of these four factors -- the total
group operating relationship indicated by Figure 4. 8 is as follows:
R 1.0 = 0.999989 x 0.97 x 0.999954 x 0.999940 = 0.9316
The flow control valves are obviously the weak links and the item
requiring the most attention. The space radiator tube sets are not amenable
to sparing or repair provisions. Their inherent reliability of 0. 999989 does
exceed the equal risk Ievel requirement of 0.9999885 or, no more than 11
failures in 10 6 missions.
The second subgroup consists of four radiator flow controls which are
interchangeable. These flow control valves work in conjunction with the
tube sets that will be used two at a time. All four flow control valves will
be maintained in operation, that is, as soon as one fails it will be replaced
by a spare so long as spares are available. By taking advantage of the
interchangeability characteristic, the flow control function can still continue
after all spares have been used and two of the last four valves to be put in
operation have failed. This assumes perfect interchangeability and the time
required is less than the downtime constraint, up to the last failure. As a
result, "any-two-of-four" situation exists for this item. The exposure to
failure of four items, each with failure rates of 10.0 failure/10 6 hours, for
a 16,800 hour duty cycle is; a ktl. 2 = 4 x 10.0 x 10 -6 x 16, 800 = 0.672.
As sparing capability is provided for this subgroup the reIiability will
increase as follows, from Figure 3.8.
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Spa r e s Sub g r oup
Provided Reliability
0 - 0.97
1 - 0. 995
2 - 0.99935
3 - 0.999927
4 - 0.9999934
Since a fraction of a spare can not be provided, the initial maintenance plan
for this subgroup should call for provisions for a four-spare capability
which slightly exceed the 0. 9999885 goai.
The remaining two subgroups of the radiator circuit group are "four-
of-four" situations on the slightly conservative basis that any failed isolation
or check valve in a subgroup will cause it to become non-functional unless
the failed valve is replaced or repaired. Again using Figure 3. 8 and infor-
mation from Table 4. 1, both subgroup will require provisions for two spares
and the reliabilities will be upgraded to 0. 9999999 and 0. 9999939.
These four subgroups are in series so the provisions for a total of
eight spares for the group - no spare radiator tube sets possible, four
spare radiator flow control valves, and two each isolation and check valves -
wiii upgrade the group reliability to 0. 9999762. The singie item goal of
0. 9999882 applied to a series of four subgroups results in a 0. 9999528 group
goal, indicating that the upgraded 0. 9999762 will be satisfactory when the
total subsystem is evaluated.
1 Refrigerant Circuit. There will be thirty equipment items
normally operating in the refrigerant circuit, this total
being made up of eleven pairs and two quadruples of the
thirteen different kinds of equipment (Tabie 4. 2). This
thirty-item group is functionally two fifteen-item groups
operating in parallel. The two groups are physically
located, one each on the two equipment floors of the mission
module. Each are capable of carrying the full load in the
event of an equipment failure on the other floor. Since
interchangeability exists between like items in the different
areas, and in cases of the shutoff and check valves, between
like items in the same area, the reliability logic diagram
takes the form shown in Figure 4.9.
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o
The inherent reliability of the refrigerant circuit group is
estimated to be 0.7756, as shown in Table 4.2. This depends
on the possibility of cannibalizing systems. The weakest link
being the pair of heat exchanger diverters whose combined
reliability is only 0. 946. However, since more than half of
the remaining equipment item subgroups have reliabilities of
less than 0. 990, the function is obviously not reliable enough
in its present form.
A total of nineteen spares, allocated as shown in Table 4.2,
will bring the subsystem contribution to Ps to over 0. 9997, and,
since the equal risk requirement for a group of fourteen is
0. 99983, this function will be close enough. Despite the com-
paratively large number of spares required because of the
several weak links (all with approximately the same failure
hazard) only about 22 pounds were added to the spares weight.
Atmosphere Circuit. The atmosphere circuit is a relatively
simple equipment group, made up of twelve applications of
three different kinds of items listed in Table 4.3. The cabin
blower items 3. I. i-4, will be installed in parallel sets of two --
one set on each equipment floor. Normally, one blower on each
floor will be in operation. Thus, each blower may be expected
to have a duty cycle of about half the total mission hours. On
occasions of scheduled, or unscheduled maintenance involving an
equipment item failure in this or any of the interdependent groups,
neither blower on one floor and both blowers on the other floor
will be in operation. Since the blowers are physically identical
and interchangeability between floors will exist, an "any-two-of-
four" situation is acceptable. Both of the selector valves and all
six shutoff valves will be required to operate for the entire
mission as represented by the reliability logic diagram of
Figure 4. I0.
The group reliability was found to be quite low for the mission
0. 6149. Again, this low group reliability is due to relatively low
and somewhat evenly distributed failure hazard of all the sub-
groups as shown in Table 4.3. Improvements are required in this
system. There are three subgroups in which components are
expected to be interchangeable, thus enhancing Ps. The analysis
indicated that eleven spares were required to elevate Ps to over
0, 99999, which is well above the equal risk level. These
components will require a proper packaging concept.
- 59 -
SD 67-478-3
SPACE DIVISION oF NORTH AMERICAN ROCKWELL CORPORATION
oel
.=-4
°P4
t9
°r-_
L)
09
O
4
.---4
o
°_
4-_
0
G
4.a
°,.4
,.Q
t_
°r4
O
o
Cr- Cr', O', o',
O', O', O" Cr,
O', t:r, O', O"
O', O', O', Cr-
c; c; c;
t'- t_
O0 O O',
O', l"- o0 ,,D
c; c; _ c;
O "_ "_
O O O
O O O
O0 O_ O0
,-=4 _ 1=....4
o _ _"
"_ _ 0
I I I
_4 _4 _4
r/l
,.-t
0
_d
°r.,I
_4
0
0
0
0
0
- 60 -
SD 67-478-3
SPACE DIVISION oF NORTH AMERICAN ROCKWELL CORPORATION
2of4 6 of 6 2 of 2
_mlb .,J _..
--.13.2.. C
3 of 6
Figure 4. i0. Atmospheric Circuit Logic
, Coolant Circuit. The coolant circuit performs a function for
certain kinds of equipment that is very comparable to the function
which the atmosphere circuit performs for the crew. This equip-
ment group has seven functional applications of four different
kinds of items, as indicated in Figure 4. II and Table 4.4.
As indicated by Table 4.4, the overall coolant circuit group
reliability is 0. 8658. The weak link among equipment items is
a fluid pump. In this case it is clearly the least reliable item
in the group and will require provisions for M and R actions.
Figure 4. 1 I. Coolant Circuit Logic
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.
Figure 4. II shows the reliability logic diagram for the coolant
circuit group which shows that there are no non-interchangeable
subgroups. Table 4.4 indicates that if a total of eight spares is
provided and proportioned among the subgroups as listed, this
will upgrade the group reliability to 0. 9999820. The group adds
only six pounds to the spares complement.
Humidity Circuit. The humidity circuit is an eighteen-item group
that forms nine interchangeable, "one-of-two, " two-item sub-
groups, as indicated in Figure 4.12 and Table 4.5. The inherent
reliability of this group is 0. 9243, and this must also be upgraded.
In addition, such components as the wicks will have to be replaced
periodically to prevent clogging and other resultant damage. The
eighteen items form nine interchangeable subgroups of two items
each, "one-of-two" situations, each requiring one to three spares
to upgrade the group reliability to 0.9998871. This group relia-
bility of 0.9998871 is very slightly less than the group equal risk
level of 0. 9998930, but is sufficiently close at this point in the
analysis.
This group adds only 31 pounds of spares to the ECLSS Comple-
ment. Most of that is created by the catalytic burner, the weight
of which is expected to be less in a production system. All
components requiring replacement can be exchanged with
comparative ease.
Water Reclamation. The twenty-item water reclamation equip-
ment group is very similar to the humidity group, in many
respects. However, such factors as duty cycle and downtime
constraints present a more attractive picture. The system
can be down for long periods of time. To maintain conservation,
the duty cycles were assumed to be full time, and the reliability
was assessed for the function as presented in Table 4. 6, from
the reliability logic of Figure 4. 13; component interchangeable
is as indicated. The resultant function reliability was also too
low at 0. 924. The two weakest links are the catalytic burner
control and the pump.
The water reclamation group is the first in which the maintenance
logic diagram differs significantly from the standard reliability
logic diagram by virtue of a non-interchangeable subgroup.
Items 6. I. i, 6.2. I, 6. 3. 1 and 6.4. 1 form an interdependent
subgroup on equipment floor A while items 6. i. 2, 6.2.2, 6.3.2
and 6.4. 2 form a similar subgroup on equipment floor B.
Physical limitations dictate then that within this subgroup, items
cannot be interchanged between floors. If these four items are
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considered separately, as in Figure 4. 21, a beginning upon a
maintenance logic diagram can be made. For crew safety and
mission success, at least one of these subgroups must be
operative; conversely, one may be allowed to fail. This condi-
tion is met if no naore than one of the eight items is allowed to
run out of spares. It follows that one of the four kinds of items
may be a "one-of-two" situation, but the other three must be
"two-of-two" situations.
Inspection of columns three through eight of Table 4. 6 reveals
that of these four items, 6. 3. I and 6. 3. 2 clearly presents the
greatest exposure to failure. Therefore it should be the one
assigned the "one-of-two" classification. Th_ remaining four
kinds of items in the group form three interchangeable subgroups
of two items, and one of six items, and will appear in the group
maintenance logic diagram in Figure 4. 13. Based upon this
diagram, group reliability of 0.9999056 can be obtained by
providing thirteen spares, as listed in column eleven of Table 4. 6.
Note that this is slightly above the group equal risk level of
0.9999882 = 0.9999001. This added 24 pounds to the spares
complement.
7. Potable Water Storage
.
The potable water storage equipment group includes items not on
either equipment floor. In this preliminary design concept, the
two potable water storage tanks are not expected to be accessible
for repair, or require replacement. There will be two tanks,
either of which could provide the minimum storage requirements
necessary to achieve the 0.99 Ps for the mission. There are no
unusual limitations or characteristics associated with the
remaining items in this group. The reliability logic and asso-
ciated data is presented in Figure 4. 14 and Table 4. 7, respectively.
The reliability without repair will exceed 0.98. However,
improvements are desirable. The water tanks are inaccessible
and are not amenable to sparing. Providing one spare each to the
other three kinds of items will improve the group reliability to an
acceptable 0. 9999958 - 0. 9999958 vs (0. 9999916) 4 = 0. 9999664.
The added weight is just over one pound.
Waste Water Storage
The waste water storage group is very similar to the potable water
storage group since the water tanks are not expected to be accessi-
ble for repair or replacement. It differs from the potable water
storage group in that no water outlets exist for crew use, or
-68 -
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NO SPARES 5 OF 6 1 OF 2
--J 7.3.4 J---
---J 7.3.5 k
Figure 4. 14.
_-J 7.3.6 k
Potable Water Storage Logic
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associated valves. The reliability logic and associated information
for this group is presented in Figure 4. 15 and Table 4. 8. It also
requires some improvement since the overall reliability is a little
better than 0. 977.
This group represents the minimum in maintenance plan com-
plexity. As in the case of the last group, water storage tanks
are not amenable to maintenance. One spare check valve and
two spare shutoff valves, as listed in Table 4. 8, will upgrade the
reliability of this group to 0.9999966. Less than one pound is
added to the spares list.
Carbonization Cell. The carbonization cell equipment group is
the largest in terms of number of items -- there are a total of
seventy-one applications of nineteen different kinds of items.
Four interchangeable subgroups of two, one of six, one of sixteen,
one of eighteen, and a subgroup of one (a single item serving both
floors) operate in series with the two non-interchangeable sub-
groups. Figure 4. 16 and Table 4.9 show the reliability logic
diagram and associated data. These relationships and the equip-
ment item information for this group. This function reliability
is only rated at 0.86 and must operate full time with limited time
down for M &R.
While the carbonation cell group has a greater variety of equipment
items than most other groups, it does not present the greatest
spares requirement, either in terms of number of spares or total
weight of spares. Table 4.9 shows that providing twelve spares
will result in a group reliability of 0. 999731 which is sufficiently
close to the group equal risk level of 0.9997994. Almost 28 pounds
of spares were added to the list, most of which is attributable to
the CO 2 pump.
No Spares
Figure 4. 15.
8.3.1 I
Waste Water Logic
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10. Cryogenic Oxygen Supply. Figure 4. 17 and Table 4. i0 present the
reliability logic information for the cryogenic oxygen supply equip-
ment group. There are no non-interchangeable subgroups, eight
interchangeable subgroups of two, one of four, one of six and one
subgroup of eight. A partial backup to the function of this group is
provided by groups 12.0 and 13.0 where 0 2 recovery is possible
and will relieve the emergency. The basic reliability is expected
to be very low, 0. 459, because of the long list of weak links.
The cryogenic oxygen supply group has only one equipment item limita-
tion which might require special consideration in the development of a main-
tenance plan, the inaccessibility of the cryogenic storage tanks. The tanks
proper have so low a failure rate -- 0. 000001 failures/106 hours - as to have
effectively no exposure to failure. However, the pressure transducers,
which are often physically located at the tanks, have the highest failure rate
of the group - 23.2 failures/10 6 hours. This is an example of a situation in
which "provision of spares" must be taken in the broad sense, and provisions
made for sparing action. Also location in an accessible area must be con-
sidered and the necessary isolation valves, etc., must be designed into the
subsystem as well as actually providing the appropriate number of spares
for replacement of failed items. Table 4. i0 indicates that providing a total
of twenty-three spares will upgrade the group reliability to 0. 99996836 which
is comfortably above the 0.9999882 = 0.9998702 equal risk level, 22 pounds
of spares were added.
ii. High Pressure Oxygen Supply. The high-pressure oxygen supply
equipment group has thirty-one applications of eight different kinds
of equipment items. All are in interchangeable subgroups, one of
fourteen items, one of six, /xve of two, and one group of one or a
single item serving both floors. The reliability logic diagram and
equipment item information are presented in Figures 4. 18 and
Table 4. II. The reliability os 0.856 is considered inadequate and
M and i_ is recommended.
Some similari£y exists between the high pressure and cryogenic
oxygen supply groups since both have two inaccessible storage
tanks, but a basic difference also exists in terms of the criticality
of these tanks. It is assumed that although considerable incon-
venience might be involved, one of the two high pressure oxygen
storage tanks would provide for crew safe return with reduced
activity. Table 4. II indicates that provision of thirteen spares,
as listed in column eleven, will upgrade the group reliability to
0. 9999709 which is acceptable when compared to the goal
0. 9999882, the equal risk level for the group.
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IOF2
NO SPARES 6OF6
-t
14 OF 14 2OF 2
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q 11.2.5 k
--J 11.2.6 J---
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IOFI
Figure 4.18. High-Pressure Oxygen Supply Logic
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12. Bosch Reactor. In terms of EC/LSS functions, the Bosch reactor
equipment group is only half of the oxygen regeneration functional
groups because it must operate in conjunction with an electrolysis
cell functional group. However, for ease of analysis, the two are
considered as separate groups. There exist fifty-one applications
of seventeen different kinds of items, no non-interchangeable sub-
groups, ten subgroups of two interchangeable items, six sub-
groups of four interchangeable items, and one subgroup of seven
interchangeable items. The reliability logic diagram and the
equipment item information are presented in Figure 4. 19 and
Table 4. 12. Since the system operates only as a backup to the
crogenic storage, the 02 regenerator was assumed to require
about a 10-percent duty cycle, or 1680 hours. Since Ps is to be
calculated without the capabilities of this system, a lower relia-
bility could be tolerated; but, 0.92 was considered too low and
spares are recommended. Therefore, on the basis of the
assumed duty cycle, the ten spares weighingalmost 24 pounds
were required to achieve Ps = 0.99952. With a reasonable design,
all of the components requiring a maintenance action are expected
to be within the work envelope of the crew.
13. Electrolysis Cell. The final functional equipment group into
which the EC/LSS has been divided is the electrolysis cell group.
There are 117 applications of 17 different kinds of equipment
items. No subgroups of non-interchangeable items are formed,
one subgroup of 40 interchangeable items, one subgroup of 36
interchangeable items, two subgroups of 8, twelvesubgroups of 2,
and one subgroup of one are formed. The reliability logic dia-
gram and equipment information are presented in Figure 4.20 and
Table 4. 13. This function is also part of the 02 recovery system
not included in Ps" The reliability of 0.981 is not considered
adequate without some form of M and R. Based upon the same
arbitrary 1680-hour duty cycle as the Bosch Reactor with which
it works, the total spares required is 8, proportioned as listed
in Table 4. 13. When provided with these eight spares, the group
is upgraded to about 0.9998, a figure well above the 0.9990
requirement for a complete subsystem. This also adds about
25 pounds to the spares complement. Thusthe design can be con-
figured to accommodate easily the M and R requirements within
any time constraints.
4. 1.4 Alternate Operational Modes for the EGLSS
Because of the criticality of the ECLSS, it is necessary to provide the
crew with every assurance of safe return; in particular, provide adequate
backup modes for the ECLSS to satisfy all reasonable contingencies. Such is
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the case with the recommended system concept. There are three operational
modes possible, primary, backup and emergency (Reference 4.3). These
are presented in tabular form in Table 4. 14 in logic form in Figures 4. Z0
through 4.22; a description of each follows:
Table 4. 14. Selected EC/LSS Operating Configurations
Ope rating Configuration
Primary Backup EmergencySubsystem
Coolant loop and
radiators. One
pump operating
Thermal control
Humidity control
and air tempera-
ture control
CO2 Removal
Molecular sieve
or carbonation
cell.
Contaminant
burner
Water manage-
ment, (vacuum
di stillation /
pyrolysis)
recovery
Atmo sphe ric
supply
Both air circu-
lation loops
operating. One
blower in each
redundant unit
running
Both CO2
removal units
operating at
less than maxi-
mum capacity
Two units oper-
ate at reduced
capacity
Two reclamation
units operating
at reduced
capacity
Cryogenic storage
for metabolic and
leakage. High-
pressure storage
for repressuri-
zation
Redundant loop
plus spares.
One pump
ope rating
One redundant
unit only oper-
ating; both cir-
culation blowers
ope rating ; one
humidity con-
trol blower only
running
One redundant
unit operating
at maximum
capacity
One unit
operating
One Reclama-
tion unit oper-
ating at maxi-
mum capacity
Two O2 recovery
units operating
at less than max-
imum capacity
(Bosch system)
Water Boiling.
One pump
ope rating
Allow environ-
mental maximum
for short periods
of time
One redundant
unit operating
Cabin venting
and monitoring
Use stored water
at reduced rate
One O 2 recovery
unit operating or
high pressure
storage
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Mode A -- Primary Operation Mode
The system configuration for the primary operation mode is shown in
Figure 4.20. The function of the atmospheric supply system is to provide two
types of gas flow. One flow demands a relatively constant, low-quantity rate
for the total mission. The second one is the high-volume flow of gases for
short periods of time to meet repressurization requirements. The subcritical
cryogenic storage concept meets the constant-flow situation with minimum
weight and volume requirements. To satisfy the high-volume gas flow demand
for repressurization, a high-pressure gas storage is also required. Hence,
both means of storage are shown in the chart. As a backup source of meto-
bolic oxygen, in the event of a primary system shutdown (Mode B), oxygen
recovery by the Bosch process is recommended for Mars flyby missions.
The water management system is designed to collect, store, distribute,
and reclaim (though not from feces) H20 for crew support and mission module
operation. Redundant water recovery circuit design with parallel water dis-
tillation units equipped with vapor pyrolysis, to minimize the contamination
and bacterial growth, has been recommended.
The atmospheric composition and temperature control system is based,
at this time, on the selection of N2 over He as a second constituent of atmos-
pheric gas, although the He approach would have saved some weight. The 0 2
and total pressure regulation subsystem is based on the priority scheme
(Reference 1-2). Humidity--air temperature control functions are accom-
plished by two identical loops, with both loops operating in the primary mode.
Also, two carbon dioxide removal units (carbonation ceils) are provided, with
both cells operating in the primary mode below maximum capacity.
The thermal control is designed to compensate vehicle heat losses up
to 10,000 Btu/hour as well as vehicle heat gains up to 4000 Btu/hour. A
relatively simple EC/LSS radiator concept is utilized. The design recom-
mendation is for dual coolant loops and radiators, with one pump operating
and a second one in standby condition. The balance of the EC/LSS, as shown
in Figure 4.20, is self-explanatory. No redundancy has been recommended
for any of these subsystems.
Mode B -- Backup Operating Mode
The system configuration for the backup operating mode is shown in
Figure 4.21. The function of the atmospheric supply system is shown
degraded in its capability for high-fIow, short-period requirements (repres-
surization of cabin). In this mode, the high flow rate is dependent on the dual
O2 recovery unit capability. Otherwise, the system functions as it should in
the primary mode.
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The function of the water management system remains more or less
unchanged, although only one of the two water reclamation units is in the loop,
and it must work at full capacity.
Similarly, the atmospheric composition and temperature control sys-
tem continues to function in a normal manner, with redundancy removed
except for the humidity and air temperature control function.
The thermal control system is switched to the backup radiator and
coolant loop and backup pump in order to afford possible maintenance and
repair of the primary radiator and coolant loop and main pump. This too will
not cause a degradation of performance.
The balance of the system functions continue in the same manner as
designed for the primary operating mode.
Mode C- Emergency Operating Mode
The system configuration for the emergency operating mode is shown
in Figure 4. ZZ. It is designed to afford minimum crew life support require-
ments for 24-hour periods only. The atmospheric gas is supplied from one
of the high-pressure storage tanks, provided that such a supply is available.
If this should not be the case, one of the two OZ recovery units would be
operated at full capacity.
The water management system provides stored water at reduced pres-
sure, and the water distribution is limited to restricted areas (example:
command capsule).
Only one atmospheric composition and temperature control subsystem,
with humidity air temperature control lacking redundancy, continues to
operate. Oz pressure is regulated by a single blower and may fall temporar-
ily below nominal levels.
The thermal control unit capacity may be exceeded for short periods
of time, with radiators and coolant loop water reaching the boiling point.
The food management system may loose the capacity for food prepa-
ration (heating). The waste management system function may be restricted
to collection of waste within restricted areas only (example: command cap-
sule). The crew supply subsystem function is reduced to storage only.
4. 1.5 Conclusions and Recommendations on ECLSS
The results of the ECLSS indicate the feasibility and reason associated
with the application of contemporary hardware to the extended space missions.
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The results of the analysis are summarized in Table 4. 14 which indicates
that the system contribution to Ps can be raised from about 0. 104 to over
0. 999 with 146 spares. Table 4. 15 presents support requirements and shows
that only 213.6 pounds was required for the whole system.
This means that with the 146 M and R actions identified, there is less
than one chance in one thousand that a spare may not be available if the
ECLSS fails. This estimate is pessimistic in the sense that it does not con-
sider the potential repair capability of the failed parts. Very few cases
required redundancy to improve Ps either the component was satisfactory or
it could be made so.
All of the identified M and R actions could be performed by a crewman
either in zero or artificial gravity. None required use of a space suit. Many
system design constraints were evolved since the identified M and R actions
must be accommodated in the design concept.
The study indicated some rather important studies and test programs
were required, both on earth and in earth orbit. The major problems were
associated with the repair and/a replacement of components in liquid loops.
It is essential that a technique for breaking into these loops, reassem-
bling the loop and restoring operation be developed, which will minimize the
loss of fluids into the cabin atmosphere. Other areas of concern include the
selection of the most appropriate components for the new system functions
and the qualification of them as a function and system.
In Table 4. 16 a classification code is developed for assessing the
applicability of Apollo ECLSS hardware for the extended duration missions.
The codes have been applied to an assessment of the baseline mission system
requirements in Table 4. 17.
Of the 13 ECLSS subsystem functions, all but three are considered
already space rated and need only to demonstrate the life requirements. Of
the remaining three, two are critical systems included in the Ps estimate.
The Carbonation Cell for CO z removal has only demonstrated feasi-
bility, long term reliability and material compatibility are yet to be demon-
strated. This is a critical system requiring immediate work.
The Water Reclamation function has been tested by several companies
and feasibility has been demonstrated. But the effects of zero gravity and
long-term operation are, as yet, unknown. Reclamation of urine, in par-
ticular, introduces peculiar problems which though resolved in the sense of
feasibility, reliability is yet to be demonstrated. This system is also
critical to P .
S
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The Bosch Reactor is required for emergency use only; however, since
it is recommended, qualification is required. Although feasibility has been
demonstrated in a test conducted for Z5 days without interruption, little more
has been accomplished. Therefore, both qualification in space and reliability
for long life must be demonstrated.
Table 4. 16. EC/LSS Parts Applications Rating Key
Code Prospect For Long-Duration Application
1
2
2M
3
3M
Not feasible at M1
Feasible
Feasible considering maintenance, or modification
of respective Apollo hardware
Apparently acceptable as is
Apparently acceptable considering maintenance, or
modification of respective Apollo hardware
To preclude misinterpretation of the data in Table 4. 17 it should be
noted that, although a considerable quantity of parts appear to be eligible for
long-duration missions, the smaller group of ineligible items contains the
major and significant components. Some redesign may be required to attain
a satisfactory performance of those parts.
Table 4. 17. EC/LSS Parts Application Assessment
Parts Description
CO2 and odor absorber assembly
Check valve
Manual selector valve
Demand pressure and relief valve
Suit circuit return air check valve
Debris trap
Suit compressor
No. 1
No. Z
Check valve
Potential Applicationg-"
2 3
I Z M 3 M **
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
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Table 4. 17. EC/LSS Parts Application Assessment (Cont)
Parts Description
Suit by-pass valve
Cyclic accumulator valve assembly
Cyclic accumulator control
Cyclic accumulator 02 warning sensor
Signal conditioner
Inverter valve
Shutoff valve
Check valve
Glycol evaporator
Glycol temperature control
Temperature sensor
• Backpressure control valve
Manual valve
Glycol reservoir
Backpressure control valve
Backpressure temperature control
Glycol temperature control valve
Glycol temperature sensor
Glycol temperature sensor
Temperature sensor
Glycol temperature sensor
Pressure transducer, compressor inlet
Differential pressure transducer, suit compressor
Pressure transducer, glycol pump outlet
Pressure transducer, glycol accumulated quantity
measurement
Steam duct pressure switch (primary)
Power supply temperature transducers
02 pressure regulator assembly
Emergency 02 inflow control valve
Cabin pressure regulator
Tank pressure control and relief valve
Check valve
Flow transducer, oxygen supply
Outlet pressure transducer, oxygen
supply regulator
Cabin pressure relief valve
Potable water supply assembly
Potential Application _=
1 2 MI 3
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
---T----'---
X
EL
El_
X
EL
X
X
X
X
X
X E.L
X
- 99 -
SD 67-478-3
SPACE DIVISION or NORTH AMERICAN ROCKWELL CORPORATION
Table 4. 17. EC/LSS Parts Application Assessment (Cont)
Parts Description
Suit flow limiter
Suit hose connector assembly
Check valves
Shutoff valve
Water tank pressure relief valve
Water pressure relief valve
Check valve
Cabin temperature control valve
Cabin heat exchanger
Oxygen selector and check valve
CO 2 and odor absorber removable container
Suit compressor selector switch
Switch, diverter valve
Glycol pump selector switch
Glycol shutoff valve
Cabin temperature selector
Cabin temperature anticipator
Cabin temperature control
Cabin temperature sensor
Cabin blower closure
Cabin blower selector switch
Cabin recirculating blower
Manual 02 metering valve
Main 02 supply check valve
Manual valve to 02 surge tank
Pressure regulator and relief valve
Oxygen system filter
Potable water tank
Waste water tank
Manual valve to potable water tank
Post-landing ventilating blower
Temperature sensor, gaseous, suit supply
Pressure transducer, steam duct (primary)
Temperature sensor (steam duct)
Space radiator outlet temperature transducer
Command module cabin atmospheric
temperature sensor
Command module cabin total pressure transducer
Waste water tank quantity measurement pressure
Potential Application':-"
2 3
1 Z I%4 3 IV[ **
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
EL
X
X
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Table 4. 17. EC/LSS Parts Application Assessment (Completed)
Parts Description
transducer
Potable water tank quantity measurement pressure
transducer
Sensor amplifier(s)
CO? sensor
•Steam duct heater
Urine nozzle heater
Manual backup valve
Battery vent valve
Vacuum cleaner
Urine nozzle
Fecal canister assembly
Flex hose
Pump package
Suit circuit cooling
Glycol evaporator
Glycol temperature sensor
Back pressure control valve
Back pressure temperature control
Water control valve
C_y_n shu_oii valve
Water glycol check valve
Glycol pump selector switch
Inverter valve
Command module LM pressurization valve
Pressure equalization valve
LM pressure gauge
Command module hatch vent valve
Post-landing ventilating outlet valve
Pressure transducer, steam duct
Check valve
Glycol manual metering valve
!
-':-'See Rating Key, Table 4. 16.
"_'_Wholly electrical item
P___ote____ntia__l_lAppl ic__aation':-"
2 3
1 2 M 3 M ",:_-
X
X
EL
X
X
X
X
:X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
EL
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
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4. Z ATTITUDE AND STABILITY CONTROL SYSTEM (A and SCS)
Note: The data used herein was supplied by the Honeywell
Corporation of Minneapolis, Minn. Ref. 4.4.
4. 2. I A and SC System Functions
By definition, the A and SCS functions are required during the zero
gravity mode only. The gravity control systems are included under a sepa-
rate heading. In the zero gravity mode, the A and SCS is required to functiol
so as to maintain spacecraft stability in pitch, roll and yaw and to facilitate
the acquisition and maintenance of any attitude with respect to its line of
traveI or any other selected reference. The functions required for the
planetary mission are the same as those required for the lunar mission.
Mission success and crew safety is therefore dependent on accomplishment
of the following three critical A and SCS functions:
i. Attitude Hold Vehicle Maneuver Functions
2. Thrusting Function
3. Entry Function (earth entry module only)
Except where noted, these functions are required for all separable
modules. This includes the Mission Module and Earth Entry Module for the
baseline fIyby spacecraft.
These functions are to be performed using Apollo hardware as follows:
. During thrusting, the A and SCS controls the vehicle attitude by
positioning the gimbals of the thrusting engine in pitch and yaw.
Roll attitude is controlled by A and SCS operation of the roll
reaction jets. The A and SCS provides the on-oH control of the
thrusting engine.
During non-thrusting periods, vehicle attitude and rotational
maneuvers are performed by SCS control of reaction jets in ai1
three axes.
. The A and SCS displays provide a presentation of vehicle attitude,
attitude error and maneuvering rate. In addition, fuel pressure,
gimbal position, attitude set and a redundant roll angle during
entry are displayed.
- I02 -
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. Redundant body-mounted gyro assemblies sense vehicle rate and
attitude used for attitude hold-vehicle maneuver, and display
purposes.
The Apollo SCS, with the addition of an accelerometer and g-display, is
capable of performing all the required critical functions for the baseline
mission. Achievement of the specified mission reliability and safety requires
in-flight maintenance. The maintenance activities consist of replacing the
identified components essential to successful completion of the critical
functions as they fail, and if they fail. A complete system description and
schematic may be found in Reference I. i.
4. Z. 2 Mission Reliability Assessment
The system function reliabilities were estimated first on the basis of
no maintenance, using the Apollo data and taken from Reference 4.4 and 4.5.
In the zero gravity mode, the A and SCS provides the functions previously
described and the reliability estimates without M and R are as reflected in
the logic of Figure 4. 23.
As taken from Volume I, the estimated duty cycles are as follows:
I. Attitude hold-vehicle maneuver 904. 0 hrs
2. Thrusting maneuvers 4.0 hrs
3. Entry control (Earth Entry Module) 0.4 hrs
Attitude
Hold -Vehicle
Maneuver s
R = 0. 7647*
usnControl Control
R -- 0.99995 R = 0.99994
*Automatic Mode only; inclusion of manual modes raises
to at least O. 8793
Figure 4. 23. Top Level A and SCS Reliability Logic
From this figure, it is evident that the predominent weak link is the attitude
hold-vehicle maneuver functions. These are explored in detail in the
subsequent analysis.
Reliability calculations were made assuming that the zero g configura-
tion functions were performed in time sequence, i.e., the 904 hours of
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attitude hold and vehicle maneuver would be performed before the thrusting
function and the thrusting function would be completed prior to entry. While
it is common knowledge that vehicle thrusting occurs at intervals after
achieving earth orbit and before entry, the assumption greatly simplified
calculations without "any significant effects on the accuracy of results. It
was also assumed that the only A and SCS components powered were those
components required for the particular function being performed.
The probability of success for the entire mission was developed from
the product of the individual success probabilities of the five critical
functions, where these individual probabilities were conditioned to reflect
the probability that the equipment would be properly operating at the beginning
of each function. Because of the relatively short operating times for the
thrusting and entry functions, these functions do not significantly affect the
reliability of the A and SCS. Therefore, the availability improvement study
considered only the reliability models associated with the attitude hold-
vehicle maneuver functions.
The failure rates utilized in the reliability logic diagrams are the
predicted failure rates of identical or similar subassemblies in the Apollo
system. These represent the latest and best source of space rated hard-
ware reliability data.
The probability of completing the zero-g mode of operation was deter-
mined by combining the probabilities of completing the thrusting function,
entry function and the attitude hold-vehicle maneuver function. The analysis
of each mode is presented below.
I. The Thrusting Function
The reliability block diagram for the Apollo A and SCS used for the
thrusting function is shown in Figure 4. 24. A worst-case reliability
analysis was made to determine if the reliability during this function would
affect the overall reliability of the A and SCS capabilities. Although there
are two modes of operation, it was assumed that both set of gyros had to
operate and were needed. With this pessimistic assumption, the reliability
of the Apollo system for the thrusting function on the baseline mission is
0. 99995. Since the actual reliability, considering both modes of operation,
will be greater than 0. 99995, and since this is significantly larger than the
mission reliability goal, this function will require no maintenance for the
planetary mission.
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2. Entry Function
The reliability block diagram for the Apollo System as used for the
Entry function is shown in Figure 4. 25. The SCS has two modes of operation
during the entry function and is only required for the EEM during earth
entry. To simplify the calculations and consider the worst-case condition,
it was assumed that the most complex mode, requiring the use of the
gyros (GA-I) and the FDAI was required. With this assumption, the relia-
bility using Apollo hardware was calculated to be at least 0. 99994 for the
reentry function. With this high reliability, the probability of requiring a
maintenance action is negligible.
3. Attitude Hold-Vehicle Maneuver Function
The proposed system, as for Apollo, provides four methods of per-
forming vehicle Attitude Hold Maneuver functions. The modes of command,
in order of increasing hardware complexity, are: (I) direct command,
(2) acceleration command, (3) minimum impulse, and (4) automatic
command. Direct, acceleration and minimum impulse commands are
initiated by the astronaut via the rotation control. The automatic commands
are derived from the rate and position sensing gyros and provide automatic
attitude hold using closed loop operation.
The reliability block diagrams for the automatic command mode is
shown in Figure 4.26. Figure 4. 27 shows the block diagram for the direct
command, acceleration command, and minimum impulse command. Many
of the components used in the direct mode are also common to the other three
modes. In addition to these common components, the acceIeration command
mode requires the jet driver amplifiers, the minimum impulse mode requires
the jet driver amplifiers, the reaction jet control and power supply A of the
Electronics Controi Assembly (ECA), and the automatic mode requires the
jet driver amplifiers and the entire ECA.
Since the direct command mode requires less equipment, the highest
probability of having one of the four modes operable is equal to the proba-
bility of the direct command mode being operable which is only 0. 879. The
same reasoning can be used to show that the probability of having the accel-
eration command, minimum impulse, or automatic command operable is
equal to the probability of having the acceleration command operabie which
is also about 0. 879. The probability of having either the minimum impulse
or automatic command operable is equal to the probability of having the
minimum impulse mode operable which is only 0. 859.
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The results of the analysis show that the reliability for the mission
module attitude and stability control function is inadequate for the planetary
mission without maintenance or repair of the stability control function.
4. 2.3 Availability Analysis
The relatively long operating time of the Manned Mars Flyby mission
necessitates improvement in the baseline system reliabilities. The required
level of safety was achieved by sparing the baseline system. System weight,
volume and maintainability requirements were first established based on
sparing at the component level. A second iteration investigated the weight,
volume and maintainability advantages of sparing at the module level to
achieve equal mission safety. In both cases maintenance was possible and
spares were added to the system, as required, to eliminate weak links,
equalize risk and to lower the probability of a failure (and no spare) for each
mode of vehicle maneuver and attitude hold to a minimum of 0.99. The
resulting contributions to Ps was less than 0. 99938 with 6 spares.
I. Component Level Sparing
Examination of Figure 4.27 shows the weak links in the attitude hold
vehicle maneuver reliability-logic diagram are the GDC, FDAI/EDA, the
gyro assemblies and the ECA. These components were spared as shown in
Table 4. 2-I. Column 1 presents the reliabilities of the baseline attitude
hold-vehicle maneuver function as determined in the preceeding section.
Column Z shows the effect of adding a spare GDC, FDAI and EDA. The spare
GDC increased the GDC contribution to Ps from 0. 99405 to 0. 99977. The
effect of sparing on the various modes can be determined by comparing
Column 1 with Column 2. Since the weakest links in the direct and accelera-
tion command mode are the GDC, FDAI and the EDA, these modes benefited
most from sparing these components. The addition of a spare GDC, FDAI
and EDA brought the direct acceleration command modes within the objective,
however, the minimum impulse and automatic command modes require
additional spares. Referring to Figure 4. 2-5, the weak link in the minimum
impulse mode is the ECA. The addition of a spare ECA increases the Ps
for that function from 0.9762 to 0.99468. This spares level increases the
minimum impulse mode Ps to 0. 99031. The level of spares and associated
maintenance considered to this point would only increase the safety or Ps of
the automatic mode of operation to 0. 89218. The weak links left are the
gyros and the GDC even through a spare GDC is already incorporated.
If we consider adding one spare gyro package to the Apollo concept
which consists of three gyros and associated electronics along with the
redundant GDC, a spare FDAI/EDA and a spare ECA, the Ps for the auto-
matic mode of operation would increase to 0. 98710. A second spare gyro
package is required to increase the Ps to 0.99Z19. The desired level of
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safety can also be achieved by adding one spare gyro package and a second
spare GDC to the spares level mentioned previously. This results in a
A and SCS contribution to Ps of 0. 99345.
The results of the sparing analysis at the Component level is presented
in Table 4. Z-l. It indicates that six spare components were required to
achieve better than 0. 9994 contribution to the probability of no failure which
cannot be restored (or 0. 9994 contribution to Pcs); and a 0. 9935 probability
that the automatic mode will be kept functional throughout the mission as
required.
Z. Module Level Sparing
Sparing on the module level was investigated for potential weight and
volume benefits and to permit the most efficient use of the equipment carried
on board the spacecraft. The following discussion identifies the A and SCS
components that are modularized and gives a description of the recommended
modularization techniques for each component, Table 4. 2-2 summarizes the
spares required for the module level M and R concept.
The GDC. The proposed module sparing for the GDC is shown in
Figure 4. 2-5. Advantage was taken of the commonality of the voltage-to-
frequency converters and the resolver assemblies for weight and volume
improvements. The module sparing approach shown in Figure 4. 2-5 increases
the reliability of the GDC from 0.88692 to 0.99806. This is a significant
increase over the reliabillty of 0. 99335 obtained using one complete GDC spare
at the component level.
The FDAI/EDA. The proposed module sparing for the FDAI and EDA
is shown in Figure 4. 27. The physical characteristics of the Apollo FDAI
impede sparing this device at the module level. Maintainability considera-
tions make it more desirable to spare the FDAI at the component level. The
EDA electronics and power supplies can be packaged individually or shown
in Figure 4. 27. The existing Apollo EDA Channel No. 1 and Channel No. 2
electronics are interchangeable as are power supply No. 1 and power supply
No. 2. The spare FDAI and the EDA interchangeability feature assures a
FDAI/EDA Ps of 0. 99968. This is only slightly less than the Ps of 0. 99977
obtained by using one spare FDAI and one spare EDA at the component level
but the weight advantage makes it more advantageous.
The ECA. The proposed module sparing of the ECA is shown in
Figure 4. 2-8. The Ps of the ECA using module replacement is 0.99987 as
compared to a Ps of 0. 99938 by sparing the complete ECA package. By
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sparing at the module level, it is possible to eliminate one FJC axis spare,
one power supply spare and one axis RC spare and still end up with a higher
Ps than by sparing the complete ECA package.
The Gyro Assembly. The proposed module sparing of the gyro
assemblies is shown in Figure 4. Z9. The modularized gyro packages each
contain a gyro and associated electronics that is capable of operating in the
attitude mode as GA-1 or in the rate mode as GA-Z. The Ps of the gyro
assemblies using module level replacement is 0. 99457. The Ps using com-
ponent level replacement is the same since two gyro failures at either the
module or component level will result in the loss of the automatic mode of
vehicle attitude hold. The Apollo concept has two gyro packages, each
containing three gyros and three sets of gyro electronics. During the auto-
matic mode of attitude hold the two packages operate in series (reference
Figure 4. 29). If component sparing is used, a spare gyro package has to
be carried consisting of three gyros and electronics. If one gyro in one of
the primary packages fails, the complete package will have to be replaced
by the spare gyro package. If a second gyro fails, there will be a system
failure because there will not be two operating gyro packages, although there
are still seven good gyros on board, and only six are required. The system
will be failed because there is at least one failed gyro in each of the
package s.
Using the module sparing approach, the same Ps can be obtained by
carrying one gyro spare and its electronics. In this case, if a gyro fails in
either of the two packages, the failed gyro will be replaced by the spare
gyro. Hence, using the module sparing approach results in the same Ps but
more efficient use of the weight allocation and conversly, higher safety and
Ps is achievable for the given weight allocation.
4. 2.4 Achievements through Availability
The results of this study demonstrate the Apollo designs can fulfill all
of the A and SCS functional needs for the planetary missions. The 700 day
mission duration objectives can be met through the addition of about 19 pounds
of spares at the module level or 40 pounds of spares at the component level.
Sparing at the module level requires about I, 185 cubic inches less than at
the component level. However, sparing at the module level would introduce
a requirement for some repackaging while at the component level the design
could remain virtually unchanged.
The recommended system utilizes sparing at the module level in
accordance with Figures 4. Z8 through 4.31. Table 4. 19 shows the spares
required to obtain the given mission Ps for each mode of A and SCS operation.
The spares and Ps using component-level sparing are also shown for com-
parison purposes. The system weight and volume data in Table 4. 2-4 shows
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Figure 4. 32.  Photo, A&SCS Electronics,  Open for M&R 
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Table 4. 19. Sparing Requirements, Module Level Maintenance Concept
No.
Req.
1
1
1
13
Spare Required
EDA/Power supply module*
FDAI
Attitude/rate gyro module
Roll RJC module
Pitch/yaw RJC module
Power supply module
Roll rotation control elect.
module
Pitch/yaw rotation cont.
electronic module
Spare gyro uncage logic module
Weight
Lbs.
7.5
8.9
7
0.92
0.92
0.61
0.41
0.72
V/F converter
Xe_ulver assemblies
Electronic module
Totals
0.5
0.98
5.2/i0.4
6.0
19.62
Volume
Cubic -Inc he s
36O
350
2Z0
30
30
32
21
3O
15
30.0
73. O/i_6
228. o
1462
the prime advantage of sparing at the module level. The data considers the
total weight and volume of the system components to achieve the Ps values
given in Table 4.20. Weight and volume of the cables required to intercon-
nect the system components was not considered.
4.2. 5 Maintainability Inferences
The maintainability considerations are approximately the same for both
the component and module level sparing concepts of in-flight maintenance.
This assumes that the module packaging is consistent with present Apollo
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Table 4. 20 Extended-Mission Redundancy and Reliabilities
Spares Required
Module Sparing* Component Sparing
A and SCS
Mode of
operation
Automatic
command
Minimum
impul s e
Acceleration
command
Direct
command
4 for - GDC (See Fig. 4.28)
1 - FDAI/EDA Component
6 for - ECA (See Fig. 4.30)
1 - Gyro
2 - AE/GD
2.- Accelerometers
0. 99 130
0. 99662
0. 99673
0. 99677
1 - GDC
1 - FDAI/EDA
1 - ECA
2 - Gyro Assy
2 - AE/GD
2 - Accelerometers
0.99136
0.99194
0. 99218
0. 99222
;:-'Recommended Sparing Concept
Table 4. 21. SCS Weight and Volume Summary Module-Level Sparing
vs. Component Level Sparing
SCS Components
i. Spared Components
GDC
EDA/FDAI
ECA
Gyro assy
Accel - AE/GD
Weight - ibs
Comp
Sparing
49.40
73.6O
32. 20
9O. 00
6.0
Module
Sparing
41.48
63. 70
23. 58
63. 00
6.0
Volume - cu-in
Comp
Sparing
i, 390
2,636
i, 830
2,440
45
Module
Sparing
i, 251
2,380
i, 720
i, 760
45
Total - Spared components 251. 20 134. 76 8,341 7, 156
2. Non-Spared Components
270
85O
97
74
45O
77
13.9
19.6
5.6
3.3
12.4
2.85
2 - Rotation controls
RJ/EC
Trans. control
ASCP
TVSA
GP/FPI
13.9
19.6
5.6
3.3
12.4
2.85
270
850
97
74
450
77
Total - Non-spared components 75.65 75.65 i, 818 i, 818
SCS Total 326.85 210.41 I0, 159 8,974
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component packaging concept. Regardless of the sparing concept, the
in-flight replaceable units require the following considerations:
I.
o
The units requiring physical replacement must have fasteners
compatible with zero-g environment.
The units requiring electrical replacement should have connectors
that are readily connected and disconnected in a zero g shirtsleeve
environment, preferably without tools.
, Where possible, spare units should be located adjacent to the
replaceable unit to preclude physical replacement.
. Additional means of protection should be considered for cable con-
nectors exposed during repair, stowage and handling.
5. Fault isolation to a defective unit must be included.
The maintainability of the A and SCS for extended missions will vary
considerably depending on the extent the above considerations are reflected in
the design. Preliminary redesign investigations indicate that the present
Apollo components can be properly maintained within the mission constraints.
The system has existing parallel redundancy for each mission critical func-
tion. This feature eliminates the possibility of exceeding the minimum down-
time allowable. Figure 4.30 is included to verify maintainability in its
present (Apollo} form.
The use of module level sparing would enhance the A and SCS maintain-
ability since less of the system function would be inoperable during repair.
Also the smaller moduleswouldfacilitate handling, stowage and rep!_=_=-t.
4.2.6 Recommendations for Future Studies
During the course of this study specific potential problem areas were
identified that were beyond the scope of this study. These problems must be
resolved by future studies. These include:
. Required Time Between Maintenance. The Apollo components,
except the gyros, are designed to operate for 1400 hours after
a shelf life of 3 years. The gyro assembly is a limited-life-
time item and requires checkout and recalibration, if necessary,
every 6 months. The gyros, FDAI, GDC, ASCP, GP/FPI and
G-display will require special maintenance attention for the
planetary mission. These devices have bearings that will prob-
ably require special lubrication schedules to insure proper
operation during a 700-day mission. Component redesign using
state-of-the-art material might extend the time between main-
tenance to be compatible with the extended mission times. The
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1
3,
mean time between maintenance of the EDA, ECA, TVSA, RJ/EC
and accelerometer should not present any problems.
Spares Checkout Capability. Consideration must be given to
providing on-board facilities to insure the spares will be oper-
able before they are required. Maximum use should be made of
the redundant SCS channels for this purpose to conserve volume
and weight.
Detailed Redesign Investigation. The redesign investigation per-
formed during this study was sufficient to provide reliable weight
and volume estimates. A detailed redesign effort is required to
insure that each component is built to facilitate installation,
removal stowage and handling. The redesign consideration must
be given to those components that require recalibration and
lubrication during flight.
!
f
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4.3 REACTION CONTROL ENGINES
Note that much of the data used in this section was provided by the
Marquardt Corporation in Reference 4.6.
4.3. 1 Functional Description
The Reaction Control Engines (RCS) are required to perform several
functions on the manned planetary spacecraft. In each case, the R-4D
Marquardt engine used for the Apollo Service Module was found to be adequate.
The functions required are:
1. Spacecraft attitude change and maintenance, zero gravity mode
2. Spinup and Despin, artificial gravity mode
3. Spin plane precession, artificial gravity mode
The long duration mission exposes these engines to the space environment
for up to two years, require long burn times of over an hour each time (for
spin/despin) and requires in some cases, tens of thousands of ignitions.
These requirements far exceed those imposed by Apollo; but because of the
other uses the R-4D has been empIoyed, much data is available to provide
assurance in its capability to meet the mission requirements. A typical
schematic diagram is given in Figure 4.33.
4.3.2 Reliability Assessment
The reliability of the R-40 engine has been assessed against each of
the required functions and found to be adequate in all respects to meet the
baseline mission requirements. From Table 4.2Z it can be seen that in the
most stringent function, that of stability control, the reliability in this func-
tion exceeds 0. 99975; without any form of maintenance.
A detailed analysis of failure probability, failure mode and effects,
and a critical items list for the Model R-4D-4 on the baseline mission was
made, (see Reference 4.3-I). The reliability logic block diagram is pre-
sented in Figure 4.34 for the thrust chamber assembly (basic engine) and in
Figure 4.35 for the Model R-4D-4 engine; the latter includes the accessory
equipment consisting of heater, redundant thermostat switches, and arc
suppression diodes.
The results of a reliability analysis is presented in Figure 4.35. It
was assumed that the burn life and structural capabilities of the engine were
- 123 -
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Figure 4.33. Spin Engine Subsystem Schematic
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Table 4.22. Engine Reliability Estimates by Usage
Engine Duty
1. Spin-de spin
control
2, Precess
3. Stability
control
No. of
Ignit ion s
16
20
10,059
Burn Time
(seconds)
9,995
379
1,000
Reliability'k
0.9999996
0.9999995
0.99975
*The reliabilities shown above were based on tests totaling over two million engine ignitions, and 50 million
valve cycles with no assessible failures.
much greater than the requirements for a given application (i. e., large
margins) of safety so that engine reliability is a function of the required num-
ber of ignitions. The predominant failure mode is then valve failure to open
or close. For the valve design, no assessible failures have been experienced
in the extremely large number of tests encompassing over Z million engine
firings plus over 50 million valve cycles (Reference 4.3-1). Therefore,
statistical methods were used to predict a minimum engine reliability.
Engine reliability is presented in Figure 4.36, as a function of the required
duty cycle or number of ignitions based on (1) the engine firing tests only,
and (Z) for engine firing plus valve cycle tests. Because of these presented
ax-g_r_ei,ts, the curve based on engine firings plus valve cycle tests should
accurately predict engine-reliability. The unusual "bumps" result from use
of six scale changes on the reliability abscissa; one change was made for
each 9 units to enhance the accuracy in reading the reliability numbers.
From the upper curve the engine reliability is taken as follows:
Required Duty Cycle or
No. of Ignitions
Demonstrated or Achieved Engine
Reliability (50 Percent Confidence)
i, 000 O. 999975
5,000 0.99988
I0,000 O. 99975
50,000 0,9988
I00,000 O. 9975
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The engine exceeds the requirement by a substantial margin with resort to
maintenance. The accuracy and extent of available data make it an attractive
selection for any of the extended missions.
4.3.3 Engine Reliability/Life Factors
As previously indicated, three factors affect engine life and the resulting
mission reliability and safety. These are burn time, space storage and the
number of ignitions.
The predicted burn time limit of the molybdenum/molybdenum disilicide-
coated combustion chamber, and the critical burn life limiting component of
the engine is a function of maximum chamber temperature. The R-4D engine
operates at a maximum chamber temperature of 2000 F. The predicted
chamber life is in excess of 1500 hours; no application or margin test pro-
posed to date would utilize even a small fraction of the engine's lifetime
capability. This capability has been demonstrated by the supplier, see
Reference 4.3- i.
The Number of Ignitions can also have a deleterious effect on engine
life; this is normally created by the occasional rough start. However, since
the beginning of the development program, there has never been a failure of
any type in I. 5 million firings. This is not considered a failure hazard since
the recorded number of successful firings is far in excess of the planetary
mission requirements.
Deep space storage capability was one of the important design criteria
•"-- .... _.-_.._. i;*i=_=,_=L_ =nu _Lan,p_ng loads in the hardware have all been
selected to provide no degradation from stress or galvanic corrosion over
long periods of storage, with or without engine firings. Space storage capa-
bility on the order of one year has been demonstrated on the Lunar Orbiter
flights. During the past program, the engines demonstrated zero valve
leakage in extended space exposure, as well as no ill effects due to the com-
plete space environment (hard vacuum, micrometeorities, or solar radiation).
During long duration missions with intermittent engine operation and
long off-times, it is possible to freeze propellants in the lines leading to the
engines. This may be prevented if they are mounted in a plane with respect
to the sun, so that all of the engines are warmed by the sun, or by intermittent
engine operation every few hours. However, if the vehicle orientation is
such that one side is in the shade and the engine is not used for long periods
of time, the propellants may freeze in the lines. This may be avoided by
using an electrical heater which is mounted on the engine injector head.
Redundant thermostat switches are provided to regulate the head temperature
between 65 F and 89 F. The heaters can be used as listed on the following
page.
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. During long engine-off periods, the propellants can be allowed to
freeze in the lines. The heater is then turned on prior to engine
use to thaw the propellant.
2. The heater can be left on continuously, or
3. Thermostats can regulate the head temperature
There are no basic limitations on engine operations under any duty
cycle except for propellant freezing as discussed above. The engines are
unaffected by the presence of dissolved helium pressurant in the propellant.
Variations in propellant supply pressure and voltages have only second-order
effects on engine performance.
4. 3.4 Engine Maintainability Potential
Although it has been shown that the engine displays sufficient reliability
without M and R, it may be well to explore the possibility. The high relia-
bility of the engine plus the redundancy obtained from having a number of
engines capable of performing the same control functions reduces the need
for replacement parts or repair of an engine during a mission. System
reliability studies are expected to show that replacement parts should be
assigned to other subsystems with lower reliability. To aid in such analyses,
however, the in-flight maintenance possibilities based on the most likely
failure modes requiring maintenance are considered.
I. Contamination in the propellant which is flushed through the engine
could cause valve leakage from either blocking the valve in the
open, or partially open position, or the contaminant could scratch
the valve seat and leave a leak path. In the case of very slow
leaks, the self-healing properties of the teflon seat will probably
stop the leak before appreciable propellants are lost. If not, sub-
system valves isolating the engine or engine cluster from the tanks
could be closed during long periods of engine-off-time to reduce
propellant loss. For larger leaks which could be detected visually,
the engine should be removed and the valve replaced.
.
Micrometeorite hits or accidents from extravehicular activity or
rendezvous maneuvers might damage the bell or molybdenum thrust
chamber. Either of these parts could be replaced without removing
the engine from the mount. However, this maintenance might be
accomplished more conveniently in the vehicle workshop. In this
case engine removal would be required. A large special-spanner
torque wrench with a 3-inch jaw open and Z00 ft-lbs, capability is
required to remove and replace the bell. Only small wrenches
with low torque requirements are required to remove the engine
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from the mount, the thrust chamber from the head, or the valves
from the head (Figure 4. 37).
On the first four Lunar Orbiter flights using this engine, through
25 July 1967, iI micrometeorite hits had been recorded by the
detectors. Estimates of micrometeorite hit probability have indi-
cated that the four engines should have been hit about 6 times_ one
or two of the hits should have been on the molybdenum chamber
and the remainder on the bell. Since the engines have been fired
recently and successfully, it would appear the engine can tolerate
micrometeorites which are at least large enough to puncture the
0. 001-inch-thick beryllium copper skin of the micrometeorite
detectors. (Reference 4.3-i.)
, Heaters and Thermostats - if operation is required for long time
periods measured in months, it would degrade the reliability of
the engine assembly and failures could be anticipated. These
components are screwed to the injector head and could be replaced
easily. However, missions and engine operations could be
accomplished even with thermostat and heater failures by limiting
the duty cycle or vehicle orientation.
Removal of the engine from its mount will require an accessible mount
design, removal of four to six studs with the head ends pointing in either the
fore or aft directions, unplugging the electrical lines, and removal of the
threaded Dynatube fittings from the walves. The latter operation requires
a special wrench of about 40-ft-lbs capability which can anchor against the
valves to avoid attach screw da__nn_g,._. _.n._ +_ ...._;._ _--- •......
on the valves, the cluster isolation valves should be closed and the engine
valves opened for a minimum of one hour, to provide hard vacuum purge of
propellants remaining in the lines attached to the engine. (See Figure 4.37.)
4.4 THE UP-DATA LINK SYSTEM
Note: Much of the information contained herein was provided by the
Motorola Corporation through Reference 4. 7.
4.4. 1 Mission Functional Requirements
The primary function of the Up Data Link (UDL) is to provide the data
required to update the Guidance Computer as it is received via the earth-
spacecraft link. This is particularly important since the recommended
operational mode involves shutting down the guidance and navigation system
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Figure  4.37. Rocket Engine Assembly,  Exploded View 
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for a major part of the mission. This places primary responsibility for the
navigation function on the earth tracking and computing complex, plus the
earth to spacecraft communication link.
Specifically, the UDL performs spacecraft command and control
functions by receiving the signal from the communications link, processing
the data, and transmitting the commands to the spacecraft functions serviced.
The types of commands to be handled are expected to be much the same as
those used for Apollo, they will be coded by subsystem and type of command
or data and will include the following.
i. Real time commands to control the operational mode of some
spacecraft subsystems functions.
Insert words into the guidance computer to update and/or
modify stored information. Words consist of a storage
address, and either an instruction or numerical data;
includes updated trajectory.
3. Update computer data.
The data provided by the earth complex depends on the Deep Space Net
Tracking which is to be the primary mode of navigation for most of the
mission. This function is particularly critical for the earth approach phase
where the on-board major navigation capabilities are expected to be marginal.
The projected functional requirements are given in Figure 4.38.
The reliability assessment is based on the assessed reliability of the
Apollo system as reflected in Reference 4.8 and applied to the 700 day base-
line planetary mission. The expected duty cycle for the UDL in the baseline
mission is a 530. 16 hours, maximum. Of this time, 0.56 hours is expected
to involve a more severe environment resulting in a factor of i0 higher
failure hazard for that mission phase.
The data used herein has been correlated with several other space
programs involving similar digital command equipments that utilizes cord-
wood construction modules, using similar or identical type high reliability
discrete components that have preceded the present Apollo Up Data Link
design. Among these are:
Apollo Block I UDL (NAA P.O. M4J3XAX-406044).
Gemini Digital Command System (McDonnell Aircraft Corp.
P. O Y20223-R).
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Agena UHFCommand Receiver Type IX (LMSC P.O. 28-2539).
Mariner-Venus 1967 (Jet Propulsion Lab., Contract 370991).
Mariner C (Jet Propulsion Lab., Contract 950481).
Mariner R (Jet Propulsion Lab., Contract 950078).
Operational data has been acquired on components and assembly tech-
niques throughout the phases of these programs to establish reliability
history worthy of use in an extended mission. These data got to assure the
validity of this analysis.
The resulting reliability of a UDL in the Apollo configuration may be
computed using a failure rate of 1.076326 percent per 1000 hours, as defined
for the unit. The probability of no failure during the mission is therefore
0. 994.
Since the failure rate used represents an elevated temperature
reliability number and the expected equipment temperature during the Mars
mission will be limited to a normal maximum of 70 F, a new pessimistic
failure rate may be achieved by applying a multiplier of 0. 5 to the existing
high temperature failure rate. It is likely, then, that the resulting relia-
bility will be at least 0. 997.
A breakdown of the system to subassembly levels is shown in
Figure 4.39. Respective failure rates are shown in each block. Although
the faih,_............_*_ r_p_=_*......... =_^'_-_*_-_;_ ten-_pcraturc aonditio_, rei_Live
magnitudes may be easily determined to establish subassemblies that have
a higher probability of failure than others.
The results of the reliability analysis indicates that the reliability of
the UDL without maintenance or repair is nearly high enough to satisfy the
mission requirements. That is, there is less than three chances in
one thousand that a failure will occur to prevent accomplishment of the
intended functions.
4.4.3 Availability Analysis
Despite the fact that the UDL will come close to meeting reliability
and safety objectives without M and R, it seems desirable to consider the
possibilities and the resulting influences on these objectives. To increase
the potential reliability and safety of the UDL functions, several alternatives
are possible, any of which will surpass the baseline mission objective by a
substantial margin.
- 135 -
SD 67-478-3
SPACE DIVISION oF NORTH AMERICAN ROCKWELL CORPORATION
°g
z_<
_ o
z _z
I
÷
0
0
0
II
0
X
N
u_
X
0
|
z
_z u
_o_
_Z
o,,
.d
U
c_
,n_.
_°
e_
¢b
',O
c_
,,-ff
>,
_o
>-
uJ 0.,
>'8
_o_
0
O,
co C 8.
o
_°
u_
O-
0
o,
c
c;
¢_o uj C
_0
d
>-
u_
_o
_>-._5_
_0
O,
0-
O,
_ w
0
0-
O-
136 -
SD 67-478-3
c_
!
D_
•,-4 _J_
e-4
_O
oe-4
SPACE DIVISION oF NORTH AMERICAN ROCKWELL CORPORATION
. Two UDL's operating in redundant fashion with paralleled output
capability yields the resulting reliability (RPo) et 70 F:
Rpo = 0.9999917. This number represents a maximum estimated
reliability since additional circuitry will be required in the UDL
to allow outputs to be connected in redundant fashion. Therefore,
this is a less desirable mode of operation from the reliability
point of view, but somewhat safer because no information is lost
in the switchover or replacement process, in case of failure.
Z. Operate two UDL's in a standby redundant mode with paralleled
output capability and manual or automatic switching between the
two; or, as a third alternative, replacement of the total UDL
package. Either of these will increase the resulting reliability
and safety or Ps to:
at 70 F: P = 0.9999919.
S
UDL
_I UDL
Further considerations of redundancy is considered unnecessary
since one spare or standby redundant UDL reduces the chance of
loss of function to nearly eight in one million (8 x 10-6).
, Maintenance and/or Repair of the UDL can be accomplished at two
levels in its present form, with minor modifications, as noted in a
Ref:rr:n_ " e.'" i_ i_ evident thatsubseou_nt nar_g.,'_pb ^ : - to Figu_e _ -,7,
the two levels, in addition to the total component, are the sandwich
level and the "motherboard assemblies." Also see two photos,
Figures 4.40 and 4.41.
From Figure 4. Z3 it is evident that one sandwich assembly and/or
three of the motherboards contribute over 70 percent of the mission failure
hazard. The sparing concept could be established to work at either or both of
these levels. From Table 4.28, it is evident that three of the sandwich boards
must be spared to reduce the risk of no spare (Ps), to less than one in a
thousand, and four motherboards were required to accomplish the same pur-
pose. This is because the motherboard is rated at a lower level of assembly
than the sandwich level. Of the two levels, the sandwich level may be the
best selection, since one must be spared in either concept and, in addition,
the diagnostic requirements are far less.
The total hazard could be further reduced to a level of insignificance,
less than 8 x 10 -6, by providing 6 spare sandwich assemblies or 8 spare
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Table 4.2.3 The UDL Sparing Analysis
No.
Req
Resultant
UDL
Ps
W eight
(pounds)Assembly
Basic UDL 1 0. 994 19 600
Sandwich level
0 1 - Z3853G
01 - Z3856G
0 1 - 23854G
Totals
Motherboard level
B 46G
B 47G
B 48G
0.997
0.998
0.999
0. 999
0.996
0.997
0.998
0.999*01 - 23854G
Totals
2
2
2
Volume
(cubic inches)
8O
8O
8O
240
30
30
30
30
4 0. 999 5 120
All rnotherboards 10-",' 0. 999998 10 400*
All sandwiches 6 0. 999998 8 480
_-Includes sandwich level where no further breakdown is practical - (two only
motherboards with 2 spare sandwich assemblies, one for each in the UDL.
However, this is unnecessary.
4.4.4 Maintainability Considerations
The UDL in its present form is maintainable to a limited degree. This
may be seen from Figure 4.40 and 4.41. Minor modifications can improve
its maintainability substantially. In the previous section, it was noted that
only one sandwich board need be replaced and/or up to three specific
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motherboards which contained most of the failure hazard. Therefore, the
following assumptions govern the maintainability requirements:
I. Reliability necessitates in-flight maintenance.
Retaining as far as possible the present UDL design of potted
modularized discrete components mounted on printed wiring boards.
. The lowest replaceable units required are the "sandwich"
assemblies.
. Environmental conditions do not require a sealed UDL housing,
i.e., in the sense that it must be soldered.
5. A minimum usage of in-flight tools.
The present printed wiring board tracking layout and potted module
design will be retained. Physically, however, the boards will be designed
to mount in aluminum frames for mechanical stability, and also provide the
means of locating the sandwiches on guide tracks in the housing. Stranded
hook-up wire, hard-wired to the printing wiring boards will provide the
external connections.
The sandwiches will be installed through the main opening at the left in
Figure 4.42. Initial positioning will be provided by guide tracks on the side
walls of the housing. The left to right positioning of the sandwiches will be
by a wedge action provided by matching tapered surfaces between the guide
trackz and the sandwich frames. These _urf_ce_ "_,!!!_-_ _._+._a _+ +_._ ._-a
of the sandwich frames away from the main opening. The main cover will
be installed by dropping it vertically in guides provided by the side walls of
the housing. After the cover is slid down into position, knurled headed
screws will contact the sandwich frames and force them against the tapered
wedge surfaces at the opposite end. The sandwiches will thus be firmly
secured against vibration and shock.
Each sandwich will have a harness lead assembly hard-wired to the
sandwich printed wiring boards. The end of the lead assembly will provide
an electrical plug for attachment to the appropriate housing mounted
receptacle. The harness leads of the three logic sandwiches and the power
supply will pass through the opening between compartment A and compartment
B and be connected to the top side of the feed-through receptacles between
compartment B and C. All required interconnections between sandwiches
will be done in the harness assembly in compartment C on the lower side of
the internal receptacles. This harness assembly also provides the con-
nections to the external connectors, shown in a single row to the right. The
relay subassembly will have a branched harness lead assembly, part passing
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into compartment B and all outputs going directly through the opening into
compartment C to the external connectors. All the plugs will have knurled
rings for bayonet locking.
Only approximate estimates of size and weight have been made. The
dimensions are 14 inches long by 10. 5 inches wide by 6.5 inches high. The
volume is 900 cubic inches. The total new weight for the modified UDL is
estimated at 35 pounds.
The UDL assembly, when repackagedfor the recommended mainte-
nance, will have only snap-on covers and a main cover that slides into
place, locking itself and the sandwich subassemblies by means of the knurled
finger screws. All connector plugs will be attached by hand. Therefore, no
tools are required for disassembly and reassembly for in-flight maintenance.
The only wrench required may be a standardized tool necessary for removing
the UDL base mounting screws if the unit is in a location in the vehicle that
makes disassembly in place impractical. However, this is not a severe
requirement since a single standardized tool could be designed for removal
of all equipments in the vehicle.
4.4.5 Conclusions and Recommendations for the UDL
The data presented herein demonstrates that the Apollo UDL will per-
form satisfactorily on the longer missions. For the 700-daybaseline
mission, a modest sparing concept will virtually eliminate the hazard.
Maintenance is possible but some repackaging is recommended to facilitate
maintenance at the sandwich level. The following recommendations are
suggested to facilitate maximum avaliablilty of the ut)L:
. The UDL should be repackaged into a form factor previously
recommended - thus providing for faster removable subassemblies
_° Since the UDL has no power-on "idle" mode, it is necessary that
power be applied only when the unit will be operated so that the
integrity of the reliability goal is to be preserved. The number
of power on/power off cycles is low and should not create any
reliability degradation.
Table 4. Z4 describes the different use considerations for the UDL, and
respective estimated parameters. Although it was intended that the electrical
design should not incur any changes, mention is made of the integrated
circuit designs to illustrate the impact of size and weight reductions, should
these savings ever be required.
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4. 5 PROPELLANT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
4.5. 1 Mission Functional Requirements
The propellant management system involves all of the functions
required to store, control, measure and disperse all propellants. Pro-
pellants must be provided to three basic systems, the reaction control
engines, the gravity control engine, and the main propulsion engine. Each
function operates under a different set of circumstances and therefore
impose different requirements and constraints on the propellant management
system.
The Reaction Control Engine must work in the zero-gravity mode
which imposes the need for a positive expulsion feed concept for a total of
about 900 hours. This is divided into five periods, the longest of which is
460 hours.
The Gravity Control Engines can operate under one of two modes.
Either a zero-gravity condition can be assumed, as will be the initial state,
or, it can be planned to use the RCS engines to provide ullage control and
then operate as if under a gravitational field. This is feasible and perhaps
the most desirable since the spinup/despin time will take about 1.2 hours
per cycle. For purposes of this study, the ullage control mode will be
as sumed.
The Main Propulsion Engine(s) can be operated under the same con-
ditions as the Gravity Control Engines and, since the Apollo concept involves
ullage control and uses it successfully, it seems desirable to apply the same
concept to the longer planetary missions. No change in conditions are
expected to influence this situation. Therefore, the propellant feed system
associated with the Apollo Service Module will be applied to the baseline
mission herein.
4. 5. 2 Positive Expulsion Tankage
Note: Much of the data used herein was provided by the Bell Aero-
systems Company of Buffalo, N.Y. through Reference 4.9.
i. Functional Usages
A study of positive expulsion tanks is presented to provide infor-
mation on the feasibility of using and/or modifying the Apollo
systems from the present configuration to a 700-day mission
duration capability.
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As presently configured the positive expulsion tank (bladder type) is
loaded and pressurized (suppression pressure) prior to launch. Depending
upon tank application the pressure may be increased to its operating level
either prior to or subsequent to launch. From this point the pressure
remains constant enabling positive propellant expulsion on demand. Pulse
type flow is the normal requirement and is effected by operating a valve in
the reaction control thrust chamber subsystem. Apollo mission require-
ments include the tank assembly capability to perform satisfactorily for one
cycle, i.e., a propellant loading ullage draining and complete expulsion to
full bladder Ap. Figure 4. 43 is a functional block diagram of a typical
positive expulsion tankage subsystem.
Whereas the Apollo spacecraft contains six different (slightly) con-
figurations of the positive expulsion tank concept, their basic design is the
same. Therefore, for the sake of clarity, one specific design is presented
(Figure 4.44) to enable proper identification of parts and correlation with
remarks in the body, table and figures in this analysis. Pertinent difference
will be identified where applicable throughout the report.
The operational usage for the baseline long duration mission is
expected to vary from the Apollo usage. For missions employing the
artificial gravity modes the RCS is only used during zero gravity flight, the
system can therefore, be depressurized for the major part of the mission.
This is expected to relieve the reliability problem since pressurization with
Helium creates a major failure mode by migrating into the propellant.
Pressurized operation is required for no more than 900 hours out of the
over 16000-hour _ission. A functional diagram is presented in Figure 4.45.
Z. Reliability Assessment
Using the Apollo spacecraft system as the baseline, the reliability
logic (block) diagram was established and appears as Figure 4.45. From
the diagram, note that the tank assembly has been divided into three main
subassemblies (tank, bladder and diffuser assembly) with their associated
failure rates. Subdivisions are listed to correlate with the failure mode
and effects analysis. The diagram is a simple series arrangement since no
redundancy exists for the primary function of propellant expulsion. The two
vent lines are a servicing aid only.
The failure rates for the tank and diffuser assembly fallout is insig-
nificant in arriving at the tank assembly reliability. Potential problems
peculiar to extended missions are discussed in subsequent portions of this
report. Therefore, tank assembly reliability is primarily a function of the
bladder failure rate and it has been demonstrated that, given a satisfactory
leakage check and propellant loading, a successful full expulsion (pulsed or
continuous) can be effected with a 0.9976 reliability at 90-percent LCL.
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Helium Pressurizing
Port-Oxidizer
Provides for Charging of the
Gas Side of Oxidizer Tank
Positive Expulsion
Oxidizer Tank
A. Bladder Type Tank
B. Contains Expellable N204
C. Contains Helium at
Approx 181 psia
(Operating Pressure)
Oxidizer Bleed Port
Provides for Venting
during Filling Operations
and Access during Drying
and Flushing Operations
A°
B.
Helium Pressurizing
Port- Fuel
Provides for Charging of the
Gas Side of Fuel Tank
Positive Expulsion Fuel Tank
Bladder Type Tank
Contains ExDellable
Hydrazine/UDMH Fuel
Contains Helium at
Approx 181 psia
(Operating Pressure)
I Valves
TCA' s Etc.
I Ic ::t0:,o n
Subsystem
/-
|' x x• Oxidizer
Fuel
Fuel Bleed Port
Provides for Venting
during Filling Operations
and Access during Drying
and Flushing Operations
POSITIVE EXPULSION TANKAGE FUNCTIONAL BLOCK DIAGRAM
Figure 4.43. Positive Expulsion Tankage Functional Block Diagram
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10 21
9
23 22
11
3
19
26 17
24
8 4
25
14
7
15
5
16
15
POSITIVE EXPULSION TANK ASSEMBLY
2O 18
12
1. Diffuser Assy.
Fuel 8339-471053-3 *nut cut off
Ox. 8339-471054-3 predelivery
2. Bolt 8271-471019-1
3. Washer AN 960-C416L
4. Bladder
Fuel 8339-471080-1
Ox. 8339-471080-3
5. Ring 8271-471117-1
6. Pad 8271-471249-1
7. Bolt 8271-471114-1
8. Gasket 8271-471025-1
9. Gasket 4G2-4 (Test Only)
10. Gas Inlet Fitting (Test Only) 8339-471026-1
11. Boss End of Tank Assy.
12. Washer Assy. 8271-471144-1
13. Nut 8271-471021-3
14. Vent Line Assy.
Fuel 8339-471027-1
Ox. 8339-471027-3
15. Eyelet 8271-471141-1
16. Mountiag Flange
17. Bimetal Joint (6061 A1.A1. to 347 St. St.)
18. Tank Shell Assy. (T16AL-4V Titanium)
Fuel 8339-471110-1
Ox. 8339-471110-3
19. Bleed Tdbe Assy.
Fuel 8339-471059-9 * ,mr cut off
Ox. 8339-471059-11 prior to delivery
20. Bleed Tube Spacer
8339-471058-1
21. Nut 8271-471049-1 (Test Only)
22. Retainer End of Diffuser Assy.
(Ret. Assy. 8339-471057-1)
23. Retainer Cone 8339-471057-5
24. "Outlet End" Cone 8339-471034-1
25. Diffuser Tube 8339-471036 (-1 Fuel: -30x)
26. Elbow (Outlet) Tube W/O Nut & Sleeve 8339-471031-'
Figure 4.44. Positive Expulsion Tank Assembly
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It is noted that this data was not derived from the one specific design
referred to earlier but rather is based on five of the six configurations in the
spacecraft plus two from the launch vehicle. The one from the spacecraft
not considered (CMO) contains a bladder with 9-rail-thick hemispherical ends
with a 6-rail cylindrical center section, as opposed to the others which are
"uniformly" 6 mils in thickness. The two launch vehicle tank assemblies
were included since their bladders are identical (same part number) to that
shown in Figure 4.44. Calculations are based on 965 actual propellant
expulsions (fuel-MMH or 50/50 blend; oxidizer - NzO 4) with zero reliability
failures. The 41 test tank assemblies employed were expelled under
various combinations of attitude, temperature and prior dynamic testing.
A failure mode and effects analysis - FMEA was conducted on the tank
function components to identify the potential and its "operational effect" on
the equipment and system and on the Mission. The problem was isolated to
the mission lowest affected level. In all cases, except one, where a mission
effect exists at all, the lowest affected level of assembly is the tank assem-
bly, in toto. The one exception is a crack in the diffuser tube (without a
separation of the parts); however, it should be noted that with respect to
repair, if desired, the entire assembly would be affected.
The analysis is based upon an occurrence of a single failure mode. B 3
anticipating all of the possible failure modes and providing inherent compen-
sation (adequate design margins) and checkout procedures, the occurrence
of failures that will jeopardize the successful completion of the baseline
mission is eliminated.
3. Availability Analysis
As noted earlier, the assembly reliability is a function of the bladder
failure rate since the probability of tank or diffuser assembly failures is
essentially zero. Improving availability, therefore, centers around the
bladder, with the potential problem of long term permeation (bubble forma-
tion) as the area of most concern.
For the sake of the analysis it is assumed that the bladder reliability
is not adequate for the mission. This approach results only from the stand-
point that long-term storage/usage has not as yet been demonstrated.
Maintaining the assembly at or near its operating pressure has been
shown to postpone effectively the formation of a gas bubble resulting from
helium permeation to the liquid side. Since the length of postponement is
not presently certain and since there is no method to detect this short of
using an X ray, it appears that periodic timed re-bleeding during non-
operating artificial g (I/3-g) phases is the best solution, and will resolve
the problem. Whereas this would not require accessibility, if a remote
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control vent valve were employed on the bleed tube, it would necessitate
proper tank orientation (installation) and a sufficient helium supply to
compensate for losses.
Two methods of improving the availability and safety of the positive
expulsion tanks are possible. The first involves replacing the tanks as an
entity when failed. This would involve storage and handling of tanks which
are sensitive to mishandling. The second involves use of redundant design
with a crossover feed systems. The first would increase the safety and
reliability of the system to greater than 0. 9999976 if the handling hazard is
neglected and the redundant designs would be 0.9999942. Although the
redundant design displays almost twice the failure hazard of the maintainable
design, it is more desirable because of maintenance problems; see sub-
sequent section. Further, the risk of the non-functioning RCS is less than
6 x 10 -6 and since the proposed design includes two for each axis, the
probability of no failure for each axis is for all practical purposes I. 0
(3. 6 x I0-12).
4. Maintainability Considerations
Detailed maintenance and repair of these type of tanks is impractical.
Bladder type tank assembling typically requires a two-man effort in an
ambient controlled clean room environment. The thin wall shell construction,
with a fragility likened perhaps to that of an egg shell, is susceptible to even
minor mi ' "'" - _ .... or su1=_,,==.
+40 to +i00 F. Storage and shipping are restricted to -20 to +Ii0 F and
+20 to +120 F respectively, with the tanks empty and a slight internal
pressure. These restrictions are primarily a ....._._=_._._._4"of _'_o___ _-_+a+_,_,=_....__.._
(brittleness at cold temperatures for example), and "storage" conditions
specifically limits the safe handling of the tank assembly. These charac-
teristics, are not the best for in-flight maintenance or repair when conducted
in a zero-g "contaminated" environment, below the level of the integrated
tank assembly.
Although gas leakage at the tank flange gasket is not a primary con-
cern, it does, however, serve to illustrate some general requirements
pertinent to maintenance or repair activities. Given, (a) tank assembly
accessibility, (b) monitoring on diagnostic equipment - a mass spectrom-
eter, for example, and (c) proper tools - a torque wrench and wire cutters,
the flange bolts could be retorqued (55 to 60 in-lbs). Similarly, proper
plumbing and existing system pressure, or a by-pass/pump system, would
allow transfer of propellant from a suspected (or proven) faulty tank to a
spare assembly. The spare assembly might well be a previously exhausted
unit. "Exhausted," in this case, refers to approximately i/2 of the pro-
pellant remaining to assure proper bladder re-expansion and loading.
Assuming a failed bladder could be detected (liquid leakage to the gas side),
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we must now consider the practicality of spare parts - bladders and flange
gaskets, in this instance. Storage of gaskets should present no problem
because their weight and size are "negligible." Bladders are normally
stored inflated by means of an internal slightly pressurized balloon to prevent
the possible permanent set of creases or folds which could result if
collapsed for long periods. The use of a balloon also precludes undue blad-
der stress.
Since the volume of an inflated bladder is only slightly less than a
complete tank assembly, the choice of sparing would seem to center around
their relative weights - approximately 0.75 pounds (plus gasket and balloon)
versus i0. 34 pounds (tank assembly) for example. However, in the light of
the maintainability limitations cited earlier, where assembly mishandling
and bladder replacement can pose problems, a trade-off may well favor
sparing the assembly. This is particularly advantageous since no handling
would be required if its storage area were also its use area. That is to
say, it could be plumbed in as part of the system installation, but maintained
isolated and slightly pressurized. In this condition it would not only be free
from the possible unknown effects of long-term bladder exposure to pro-
pellants but would also serve in place of the aforementioned "exhausted"
receiver unit.
5. Design Considerations
Since there are no known failure modes which cannot be precluded or
eliminated through the inherent compensating provisions, adequate checkout
procedures or in-flight maintenance, no design changes appear necessary
at this time.
In view of the unknown potential problems, several produce improve-
ment considerations are offered. Regarding long-term bladder exposure to
propellants and radiation, an added laminate of aluminum foil shows much
promise. (This could also serve as a permeation barrier in both directions,
if this proves to be a problem.) Metal bellows offer the same qualities and
also possess reloading capabilities unaffected by assembly attitude or zero-g
environment. This would introduce a substantial weight increase, but is
worth considering if reloading is desired.
Deterioration effects on the titanium shell from sublimation could be
reduced through increased wall thickness, a protective coating, or a
material change. (Increased thickness or a coating also reduces suscepta-
bility to denting or scratching; materials such as aluminum or stainless
steel also afford longer term protection against the possible effects of
propellant contact from a damaged bladder. )
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In considering any design changes or improvements, it would be well
to assess the relative merits of standardization throughout such as (a) iden-
tical tank assemblies for both oxidizer and fuels, (b) identical fuels (the
oxidizer is already common), (c) substitution of a welded joint for the flange
gasket, (d) the avoidance of the use of dissimilar metals to preclude gal-
vanic action considerations and, (e) use of proper orientation of all tanks
from the artificial g and horizontal vacuum propellant loading standpoints.
Incompatibility of the tank shell with the oxidizer (NzO4) was formerly
thought to be a problem. However, curtailment has been accomplished by
negating the effect of propellant vapor permeation by either controlling the
NO content or peening the shell. Use of a different oxidizer is a possible
improvement which gives rise to some interesting speculation regarding
results of past Bell test programs. In all cases where actual stress cor-
rosion and tank rupture took place, the titanium shells had been exposed
directly to the N20 4. This resulted from loading the NzO 4 into shell assem-
blies which did not contain bladders.
Omission of the bladders was a test expediency and obviously preceded
awareness of the stress corrosion problem. The facts that if the N20 4
itself permeates, or if only some of its constituents actually transfer, may
be detrimental to shell life. To illustrate the point, investigations of fuel
tank assemblies with bladders showed that MMH does not permeate. Rather
only some of its constituents do so, notably CH 4 (methane) and NH 3
i....... :-_. ^ _'_:--_I _ ........ I_ A_+_.,,___ if N204 fo!! ....... "_'n-_'_1_'.
pattern, and therefore, its suitability can be established.
L
u. Recornrnendations and Conclusions for _°^_*_--=_=_,_o_-w...._=_., _p_U=go_-_._
The results of this study indicate that the Apollo RCS tanks are capable
of meeting the requirements of a 700-day mission without significant
redesign and contribute no assessible hazard to crew safe return. This is
based on the analysis of all known potential failure modes which indicates
that they can be precluded through adequate design margin and through check-
out procedures, or nullified by in-flight maintenance - provided that the
recommended provisions can be incorporated.
For example, to eliminate the potential problems of flange gasket
leakage accessibility for retorque is required. For gas bubble formation on
the liquid side, it is necessary that the tanks be properly oriented with
respect to the artificial-g mode and a remote control vent valve be added to
the system.
An assessment of the extended mission also reveals several unknown
•areas relative to environmental effects, such as long-term bladder exposure
to propellants and radiation. Therefore, further studies are required to
- 153-
SD 67-478-3
SPACE DIVISION oF NORTH AMERICAN ROCKWELL CORPORATION
establish firmly the useful operating lifetime of the present configuration for
extended mission applications. These include such tests as:
i, Long term material/propellant compatibility, external gas
leakage, galvanic activity, bladder permeability, and shell sub-
blimation.
Tendency of excessive bladder twisting experienced in assemblies
requiring "horizontal" propellant loading (by vacuum) and
expulsion.
, Effects of repeated dynamic loads (a "time" rather than an
"intensity" consideration) imposed on the bladder.
4. 5. 3 Main Propellant Tankage (Storage)
Note: Some of the data used herein was provided by the Allison
Division of General Motors through Reference 4. I0.
i. Functional Usages
The main propellant tankage is required to store both the fuel and
oxidize, in a liquid state, for the full mission duration. Final fuel depletion
is to be accomplished during earth approach for retrograde, and as a means
of reducing the magnitude of the reentry velocity. The fuel will be used for
about four mid-course corrections, one at each periplanet, one at earth
approach, and finally, retrograde. Since the engine is pressure fed, helium
will be used as a pressurant to expel the liquids from the tanks, after ullage
control. At least two are required, one for oxidizer and one for fuel;
redundancy is expected to be required for each. For a schematic, see
Section 4.5. 5 on the Propellant Feed System.
The operational concept involves relief of the helium pressure during
the long coast periods and activation just prior to igniting the engines.
Ullage control is accomplished through use of the appropriate reaction con-
trol engines just prior to main engine ignition.
Tank volume could be designed to meet mission requirements by
merely varying the length and/or number of the cylindrical tank sections
welded to the hemispherical domes.
2. Reliability Assessment
The reliability study for the Apollo Tank program is summarized in
the Allison Final Design Report, Reference 4. 5-3. The reliability of the
propellant tank is estimated to be 0.99999974 compared to the program
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reliability goal of 0. 999995. The reliability estimate applies to the actual
use phase of the tank life, that is a propellant tank which has passed all
inspections and acceptance tests and has been checked out in the vehicle has
a 0.99999974 probability of going through the preparation, the countdown,
the earth launch, the transfer, the lunar orbit, and the lunar landing without
malfunction.
The reliability estimate and failure mode-failure effect analysis
indicated that the probability of failure is nil for all modes of failure, with
the exception of the burst mode of the tank pressure wall. This has a failure
probability of 0. 262 x i0-6. The failure probability of the tank wall was
calculated by the method of interference, using the probabilistic distributions
of the tank stress and material strength.
Except for the 700-daymission duration, the propellants and tankage
environment are assumed to be essentially the same for the baseline and
Apollo missions. Consequently, the Apollo tanks should be directly appli-
cable to the planetary missions provided the recommended testing reveal no
detrimental effects of the extended mission time.
The reliability estimates for storage tanks are always suspect because
they are not amenable to calculation by the normally accepted methodology,
i.e., R_ e-kt for storage tanks. Rather, for the longer mission in partic-
ular, this results in a very pessimistic estimate and the true value (all the
other factors being considered) is always much higher. However, to
establish some boundary values, that value has been calculated and found to
be 0.9956 for the baseline mission. Therefore, the expected value is known
to be somewhere between the 0. 9956 anct u. _7 and known to be near the
latter since it was calculated on the basis of strength-stress relationships
and can be controlled by changing wall thickness.
3. Availability Analysis
Maintenance is not required, nor applicable. Availability of the
storage function has been improved by relief of the helium pressure when not
required. This act should result in raising the potential safety to nearly the
Apollo value because approximately the same number of burns are required.
This depends only on the result of the recommended test.
4. Conclusion and Recommendations
Apollo tankage designs are satisfactory for the proposed planetary
missions. The safety estimates are expected to exceed the requirements by
a substantial margin. Redundancy is expected to be desirable since the one
potential failure mode could be negated by not pressurizing a given tank until
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its fuel is required. One tank set would thereby not be used until the final
phases of the mission.
Qualification tests and propellant storage tests have established the
suitability of tanks for the Apollo Mission. To substantiate the suitability
of this tankage for the longer duration Mars Flyby Mission it is recommended
that the following testing be considered.
I. Long-term creep testing of titanium material specimens,
including welded specimens.
. Long-term stress corrosion testing of welded and nonwelded
titanium specimens in each propellant.
. Long-term storage of propellants in tanks at design stress.
These tanks could be either full-scale tanks or sub-scale tanks
made by the same fabrication methods as the Apollo tankage.
4. 5.4 Propellant Gaging Function
Note: Much of the data used herein was provided by the Simmonds
Precision Products, Inc. through Reference 4. ii.
i. Functional Usage
The propellant gaging function (PUGS) is required to monitor fuel and
oxidizer consumption and/or loss. In its present form or with minor
modifications, it will meet the functional requirements of the 700-daybase-
line planetary mission. The potential variation in the dimensions of the
selected fuel and oxidizer storage tanks can influence the applicability of the
sensor assembly in particular. For this reason (and others) there is some
useful arguments for maintaining the present dimensions and using redundant
tanks.
Four years of invaluable information and experience have been accrued
to date in designing, developing, testing and fabricating PUGS, which can be
applied directly to the program of upgrading areas of PUGS to meet the
baseline mission criteria.
The Apollo PUGS has been used as a baseline for study to determine
what areas require change in order to provide a PUGS that will satisfy the
mission reliability, performance, safety and maintainability criteria for any
extended mission program.
The Apollo PUGS is comprised of two fuel probes, two oxidizer probes
(these may be increased by a factor of two for the baseline mission), and
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oxidizer control valve, a control unit and a display gage. All of the com-
ponents will be located in the propulsion module, which is part of the EEM,
with the exception of the display unit, which is in the Earth Entry Module
and the Mission Module. The diagram in Figure 4.46 illustrates the
probable PUG component location, interconnection and interfaces.
The PUGS function is critical to crew safety because of the need for
very accurate control of engine firing duration which, in turn, establishes
the resulting velocity vector changes. Its functions are therefore twofold,
monitoring fuel and oxidizer remaining and responding to the "burn time"
control signals from the guidance functions.
2. Reliability Predictions
Reliability predictions have been determined for the baseline PUGS for
the Mars mission. A breakdown was made for all the major components of
the system down to the module or circuit function level. In this way it
became evident which areas of the system were most prone to failure.
Additionally, it indicated whether or not a module or circuit function required
,imorovement to meet the reliability requirements for the system. Tables
4. Z5 through4. Z7 list the module or circuit function along with its failure
rate for various major system components. The failure rates for each
function remain the same regardless of mission duration. The Apollo mis-
sion on-time is 660 seconds, while the baseline mission on-time is expected
to be much lower because of the recommended change in operational mode -
about 150.5 seconds. Since this is so, the baseline mission duty cycle may
_^_='_===^'""_'"-_,=,__;.... times shorter than for +ha.....Apollo mission. Circuits not
energized, will have negligible effect upon the components of the system, if
they are not in the environment of the propellants. Reliability data supports
this position and, as a result, reliability criteria have been met with existing
circuit configuration. Further, it will be more than satisfactory for any of
the planetary missions. The limiting factor is the sensor submerged in the
propellant. The data indicates that the reliability of this function will
probably exceed 0.99 1 per function; or 0. 99992 probability that one of the
two in each tank will function normally throughout the mission.
The only potential problem area will be the use of servo motors and
motor generators, motor tachometers, potentiometers and gear trains,
because of their use of lubrication in their bearings. In addition to the mis-
sion time of 700 days and a storage time prior to launch of possibly two to
three years, the bearing lubrication may migrate out of the bearings to some
extent. Selection of the proper bearing lubricant for the extended mission
would be in order, and does not pose a significant problem.
A detailed failure mode and effect analysis was performed and may be
found in Reference 4.5-5.
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DISPLAY GAGE 
MAIN DISPLAY CONSOLE 
EARTH ENTRY 
MODULE 
PROPELLANT SENSING PROBE OXIDIZER VALVE - 
Figure 4.46. Component Interconnection and Interface 
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Table 4.25 Failure Rate Estimates, PUGS Control Unit
Module Description Percent/i000 hrs.
AI00
AI01
AI02
AI03
AI04
AI05
AI06
.A107
AI08
AI09
All0
All1
All2
All3
All4
3898,50
All6
All7
All8
All5
Flag servo ampl.
Display oxid. ampl.
Display fuel ampl.
Unbal. servo ampl.
Pri. fuel ampl. tank 1
Pri. oxid. ampl. tank 1
Pri. oxid. ampl. tank 2
Pri. fuel quad. ckt. tanks 1 and 2
Pri. fuel ampl. tank 2
Discrepancy ckt.
Pri. power supply
Aux. power supply
6 kc osc.
D/A or gate fuel
D/A or gate oxid.
Gear train assy., including motors and pots.
Aux. oxid. ampl.
Aux. fuel ampl.
Empty and full adj. ckt. , tank l and 2
Motor control caps, etc.
Grand Total
i. 5212
0. 528O
0. 5280
0. 6594
0. 2424
0. 4747
0. 4687
0. 0409
0. 3124
I. 3399
0. 8876
I. 305 1
0. O369
0. 3899
0. 4695
10. 6560
0. 3527
0. 3340
0. 1724
0. 2334
Z0. 953 1
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Table 4.26 Failure Rate Estimates,
System D e scription
Primary
Primary
Primary
Primary
Auxili a ry
Auxiliary
Auxiliary
Auxili a ry
Fuel Sensor I, storage tank
Fuel sensor 2, sump tank
Oxidizer sensor i, storage tank
Oxidizer sensor 2, sump tank
Fuel sensor i,
Fuel sensor i,
Primary system
storage tank
sump tank
Oxidizer sensor i, storage tank
Oxidizer sensor 2, sump tank
Auxiliary system
PUGS Fuel and Oxidizer Sensors
Subtotal
Subtotal
Total
Subtotal
Subtotal
Total
Percent/1000 hrs.
0. 0126
0. 0126
0.0252
0.0146
0.0146
O. 0292
0.0544
0.0166
0.0166
0.0332
0. 0198
0. 0198
0.0396
0. 0728
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Table 4. Z7 Failure Rate Estimates, PUGS Display Gage
Section Description Percent/1000 hrs.
I
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Oxidizer display servo
Fuel display servo
Unbalance display servo
Flag display servo
I. 732
i. 734
1.736
i. 740
Test circuitry
Valve switch
Oxidizer flow switch
Control switch
Total
1.7Zl
0. iZ0
0. O62
0. 180
9. 027
Table 4. ?8 Failure Rate Estimates, PUGS Oxidizer Valve
Section Description Percent/i000 hrs.
Primary valve
Secondary valve
1.818
1.818
3. Availability Analysis
Although the PUGS function meets the required goals through opera-
tions control, it would be well to note that application of the availability con-
cept could improve the mission safety through repair and maintenance of
potentially weak links. The data given in Figure 4.47 indicates that the
weakest link in the function is the Control Unit and further, Table 4. Z5
indicates that its weakest link is the gear train assembly. From Figure 4.48,
the gear train is identified as a separable assembly which can be replaced
as a unit, if the control unit case is modified to permit ready access. How-
ever, the duty cycle is too low to expect the need for replacements during the
engine firing even if all the lubricant was lost due to migration.
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Control
Unit
21 x 10 -5
Primary
Sensors
-5
O. 088 x I0
Secondary
Sensors
-5
0.088 x 10
Display
Gage
-5
0.90 x 10
Primary
Valve
As sembly
-5
1.8x 10
Secondary
Valve
A s sembly
-5
1.8x I0
Figure 4.47. Reliability Logic, Propellant Gaging Function
An adequate lubricant can be selected for the extended mission appli-
cation to preclude the possibility of operation with dry bearings. Prior to a
mission, the checkout testing for the components (if not the system), will
involve test durations far in excess of mission on-time requirements.
One other failure mode that deserves consideration is that of a PUGS
fuse being opened as a result of external electrical transients. The PUGS
fuses are now located in the hermetically sealed control unit, which, in its
present configuration and location, is not maintainable. The mining_a! change
to correct this situation would be to locate the control unit, preferably to the
EEM, and provide a gasketed access cover for replacement of blown fuses.
Other elements in Table 4. 30 contribute to its high failure hazard, 3 or 4
modules are weaker than the others and could be replaced if provisions for
gear train replacement was provided.
4. Conclusion and Recommendations
The data indicates that the PUGS will produce satisfactory performance
on the baseline mission. The weakest link, the sensors, will exceed
0.99992 probability of functioning correctly. Since the pertinent Apollo and
planetary mission environments are essentially the same, with the exception
of mission duration, the principal environment of concern is that of propellant
exposure for the sensors and valve.
A review was made of the Apollo Qualification Test Programs speci-
fically for propellant exposure information. Each of four oxidizer valves
had been exposed to N20 4 for = 130 hours for a total of 5200 valve unit hours,
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and no signs of deterioration were noted as a result of exposure. Each of
four oxidizer and four fuel sensors were exposed for = 2800 in their
respective propellants, for a total of Ii, 200 fuel or oxidizer sensor unit
hour s.
The greatest potential problem area is confined to solder joints and
associated feed-throughs in the sensing probes. Although a considerable
amount of effort and testing has been expended in this area, further investi-
gation and tests are warranted in these areas to provide adequate assurance
for the greatly extended mission duration since they will not be maintainable
during a mission.
4. 5. 5 Propellant Control Function
The propellant control function provides the means of moving both
fuels and oxidizer from the storage tanks (passive or positive expulsion) to
the engine proper. This function is required to service:
(a) Reaction control engines
(b) Gravity control engines
(c) Main propulsion engines
Once the propellants leave the tanks, the method of control is very similar
for all three functions, although the method of expulsion differs.
A study of the Apollo configurations, as applied to the baseline mission,
indicates that the same configuration will be directly applicable to any of the
potential planetary missions and spacecraft configurations, with minor
modifications to fit the specific application and selected operational concept.
The RCS and gravity control systems are expected to be enough alike
to discuss and analyse them together; however, the main propellant control
is handled separately.
i. The RCS and Gravity Control Propellant Feed Function
The reliability logic diagram for this function was given in Volume II
of this report. The reliability assessment is presented in Table 4. Z9 The
assessment indicates that the system will meet the mission functional
requirements, but in the Apollo configuration, it displays two weak links that
should be investigated. The failure hazard should be reduced to achieve a
Ps of over 0. 99993. The weak links are the helium supply check valve and
the helium storage tank - in that order.
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The helium supply check valve problem was relieved by a change in
operational concept. By relieving the pressure in the system during the long
artificial gravity coast phases, the operational duty cycle was reduced by a
factor of about 19. This decreased the probability of a failure to less than
l x 10-6. This change in operational concept is not expected to introduce
any problems; but rather, it has further decreased the probability of failure
in other components of the function.
The helium tank could fail in two modes by leakage and by burst. The
effects of leakage is reduced to insignificance through use of a gate valve at
the outlet, and by including a redundant source of helium. The probability of
bursting a tank is virtually eliminated by increasing the tank wall thickness
by about 10 percent.
Z. The Main Propellant Feed Control Function
The reliability logic diagram for this function is presented in
Figure 4.50 and the resultant assessment is presented in Table 4. 30 The
weak links in this function are similar to those in the RCS feed system. The
weak link seems to be the tankage, but available engineering data indicates
that this can be corrected by increasing the tank wall thickness. The
resultant weight change would be insignificant.
As indicated in the referenced table, addition of a redundant tank has
about the same effect on weight and an appreciable increase in the function
effect on Ps; whereas the function contribution to Ps could be as low as
0. 989, the redundant tank and feed function increases this to more than 0. 993.
This is a practical alternative since the required fuel can be divided between
the two redundant functions.
A further increase in Ps is achievable by isolating the H e pressurant
at the tank and venting the feed lines. This eliminates the major failure
mode andwill probably reduce the failure hazard to less than 1 x 10 -6 per
mission.
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Table 4. 30 Main Propellant Feed Function,
Contribution to Crew Safe Return Analysis
Sub Function
Helium Supply
Subtotal
Propellant Supply
Tank prop.
Valve, vent.
Heat exchanger
Bellows
Subtotal
Function Total
Add to propellant
Supply and purge
capability
Tank, prop.
Valve, vent
Valve prop. iso1.
Subtotal
Revised
Function Total
Logic
Block
RI
R2
R3
R4
R5
R 6
R 7
R 8
R 9
RI0
Duty Cycle
16, 602.8 hrs
4.0 hrs
4.0 hrs
16, 602.8 hrs
7 cyc
7 cyc
16,602.8 hrs
16, 602. 8 hrs
16, 602.8 hrs
16, 602.8 hrs
16, 602.8 hrs
4.0 hrs
!6, 602.8 hrs
16,602.8 hrs
16, 602.8 hrs
16,602.8 hrs
4.0 hrs
16, 602.8 hrs
7.0 cyc
2x 10-6
(Apollo & AAP)
0. 0220
0. 0020
2. 9762
0. 0020
0. O586
16.7 x 1018
0. 000036
2.0 x 106
/
4.0 x i00
0. 04761
0. 0850
0. 0020
0. 0020
0. I000
0. 0119
0. O85O
0. 0020
0. 0200
0.01 cyc
C ontribution
to Ps*
0.999635
0.9999
0.9999
0.9999
0.9999
0.9999
0.9999
0.9999
0.999l
.9988
0.994356
0.999999
0.999934
0.99668
0.999605
0.991
0.9894
0.994356
0.999999
0.999987
0.999999
0.9943
0.993
-','-'These values are known to be very conservative.
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4. 6 THE MAIN PROPULSION ENGINE
Note: Much of the data used in this section was provided by the
Aerojet General Corporation through Reference 4. 1Z and 4. 13.
4. 6. 1 Functional Description
The main propulsion engine was assumed to be the Apollo Service
Module Engine where one, two, or three were used for the baseline mission.
For usage details see Volumes I and II of this report. The baseline mission
study indicated that this was one of two possible engines that could be used,
the LEM descent engine (LMD) or the SM engine. The SM engine was selected
for this study because of the preponderance of accurate data available from
the Apollo program at SD the data is indicative of either engine capability.
The main requirements of the engine are to provide the necessary
thrust for midcourse correction during the transplanet phase, trajectory
correction during planet approach, midcourse correction during the trans-
earth phase, and retrofiring for earth approach and reentry. The total
engine firing required for the complete mission of about 700 days is an
average of seven cycles for a maximum total duration of 155 seconds.
The subsystem schematic is given in Figure 4.49 along with a list of
functioning components.
4. 6. 2. Reliability Analysis
Reliability logic diagrams are presented in Figure 4.51 for engine start
and steady state operations and Figure 4.52 for engine shutdown operations
and coast periods. Associated with each component or assembly identified in
Figures 4. 51 and 4.52 are all of the various parts associated with its construc-
tion. The bipropellant valve has been separated into four valve assemblies,
each consisting of an actuator and the associated pair of ball valves (one for
fuel and the other for oxidizer), shafts, seals, springs, housing, and other
related parts. The gimbal actuators for pitch and yaw are considered sepa-
rately. In each actuator, the redundant motor-clutch assemblies are individ-
ually identified. There are two redundant electrical harnesses assumed.
The reliability logic diagrams shown in Figures 4.51 and 4. 52 provide
a reasonably rigorous basis for calculating the engine reliabilities. A more
detailed set of logic diagrams, for the lunar mission, are presented in
Reference 4.6-Z.
The engine contribution to Ps should be assessed inboth the active and
passive phases since the engine will be dormant for a major part of any
planetary mission.
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Figure 4.49. Subsystem Schematic
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The Active phases include the time from fuel system pressurization
through the burn to the time pressure is relieved and the feed system is
purged. This phase is normally considered the most hazardous.
Reliability estimates given in Reference 4. 13 for the lunar and base-
line missions are presented in Table 4. 31 These reliability estimates
provide a basis for estimating reIiabilities for the Mars flyby mission,
which is related to the ratio of burn time, 155 for the baseline mission vs.
600 for the Lunar landing mission. (The longer burn time for lunar mission
is created by the large AV required for escape from Lunar orbit).
The hot-fire engine reliability for the baseline mission would be on
the order of 0. 996 without changes. This level of reliability is probably
adequate. However, if it is deemed necessary to increase the engine hot-
fire reliability, the combustion chamber reliability may have to be improved
before a significant increase in engine reliability could be achieved. A
review of the hot-fire test history of engine combustion chambers indicates
only two failures. In both cases, the chambers were tested to failure -
one for a duration of 1956.4 seconds, the other for 2392.4 seconds. Both
failures were of the wearout type, and a value of 0. 99999992 can be caicu-
lated as the estimated probability of no wearout for the baseline mission.
There were a totaI of 25 chambers tested for durations of at least 750 sec-
onds without the occurrence of any random-type faiIures. These data can be
used to obtain a median value for the MTTF of about 27, 000 seconds which
result in a demonstrated random reliability of 0. 9943 associated with the
ll5-second hot-fire duration specified for the planetary flyby mission. This
test experience indicates an adequate (perhaps overIy conservative by refer-
,_,,o,_ zt 12_ ,_,_4g,, ,_+_, respect to wearout. The demonstrated _-_d_,,_, _,_1__
biiity is quite Iow due to lack of data. The true random reIiability is known to
be significantIy higher, but this cannot be demonstrated without accumuIating
more test data. Since no random failures have occurred up to the present
time, there is no reason for recommending any change in design. The cur-
rent combustion chamber (and all other engine components as weII) can be
accepted without change for the hot-fire portion of the Mars fIyby mission.
The Passive Engine phase of the proposed Mars flyby mission involves
consideration of the effects of the prolonged coast period (about 700 days)
on coast reliability. Reliability estimates are given in Reference 4. I3
along with a qualitative appraisal of the anticipated effects of baseline
mission. As an aid in making the required qualitative judgments, it was
found helpful to performa failure mode-cause-effects analysis (FMEA) of
each component. The FMEA analysis is presented in Reference 4. 13.
There is a definite controversy over the effects of long-term exposure
• to the space environment, and there is little data to verify any position. So
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Table 4. 31 Estimates of Component Reliability for all
Periods of SPS Engine Firing
Component
Thrust mount
Nozzle extension
Combustion chamber
Injector
Propellant lines
Gimbal actuator (each)
Pneumatic actuation
system*
Bipr opellant valve
Single Engine Total
Engine Hot-Fire Reliability
Lunar Mission
O. 999052
O. 998887
O. 993596
O. 998959
O. 996634
O. 998541
O. 98 9623
0.999524
Baseline Mission
0.999755
0.999712
0.998342
0.999731
0.999623
0.999623
0.997309
O.999877
0.996
*The reliability figures given for the Pneumatic Actuation System are
applicable to each of the two pneumatic systems which are functionally
redundant; that is, failure to supply pneumatic actuation pressure.
far, there have been no failures attributable to this effect. The FMEA
indicates the potential effects and, in each case, protective measures can
be taken to pr event the problem. Since this is true, this study will be based
on that assumption; however, this represents one of the major problem
areas requiring a full scale test program.
4.6.3 Availability Requirements Analysis
The reliability analysis shows that the Apollo engine will meet the
baseline mission hot-fire requirements with a higher Ps than for the lunar
mission, and with a large margin for error. However, the long vacuum-
cold soak and the associated unknowns make it desirable to consider ways of
augmenting this function and reducing the potential effects of the unknown.
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Four solutions seem apparent and are not mutually exclusive:
a. Use of multiple engines
b. Limited maintenance and repair
c. Use of heaters on the fuel lines and the injector
d. Relieving pressure and purging fuel/oxidizer lines after use
Maintenance is discussed in paragraph 4.6.4, the last two require no
explanation other than to indicate that the proper application of both would
negate several of the more prominent failure modes, both in the engine
proper and the feed function.
The use of a redundant engine configuration provides a significant
increase in reliability relative to crew safety and mission success by
elininating a critical single-point failure condition and incorporating addi-
tional flexibility in the number of acceptable operational modes. However,
this does increase system complexity and adds weight.
This evaluation is concerned with the ramification of utilizing three
Apollo engines (LMD) to provide a one-engine-out capability, thereby
effecting greater propulsion flexibility and reliability during missions.
The configuration involves a common manifold with individual propel-
lant shutoff valves for each engine to provide isolation in event of engine
failure .......
_: igure 4. 5 • meo_a)). "_' isolation valves are assumed to be normally
open and explosively operated closed and also serve as a backup to an engine
valve failure open condition, Figure 4.53(c). The failure hazard of
inadvertent operation, closed by the explosively operated valve, would effect
loss of one engine leg; however, the subject configuration is capable of two
out of three engine leg operation as in Figure 4. 53(b).
Review of possible gimbal requirements considered two potential con-
figurations; (I)A single gimbal platform incorporating the three engines,
and (Z) individual gimbal assemblies for each engine.
The Individual Gimbal Assembly Concept results in a series relation-
ship of the gimbal with its respective engine and a two out of three total
capability Figure 4.54(b). The loss, therefore, of one gimbal assembly
causes only the loss of use of one engine. This configuration concept requires
three platforms with increased installation complexity and also presents
formidable interface problems with the SCS and EPS systems. For accurate
SC control, the three gimbal assemblies must achieve positive phase angle
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interlocking including accurate intelligence relative to gimbal responses.
The EPS system would also be affected by the increase in power Ioading
requirements.
The resultant Ps for the proposed configuration would increase from
singIe engine 0. 996 to over 0.99999, discounting the effects of storage. The
effects of storage are overcome by seaIing off one engine and using it in the
event of failure of the others.
The Single Platform Concept provides for minimal instaIlation and
functional problems when considering the A and SCS and EPS interfaces.
This platform would be similar in configuration as currentiy incorporated
on Apollo excepting mounting provisions forthe three engines. It also
presents a potential single point failure mode that could cause loss of use
of the engines (Figure 4. 54(a)); therefore this would necessitate extremely
high reliability. However, it is probabiy the most reliable of the two mount-
ing concepts, alI factors considered.
4. 6.4 MaintainabiIity Analysis
Although maintenance and repair operations are not necessarily
recommended for the main engine, there is good reason to beIieve some of
the more prominent failure modes couId be remedied by some comparatively
simple replacement actions. From Table 4.31 the weakest link is found to
be the gimbaI actuator (pneumatic). From Figure 4. 53 it is evident that the
unit could be replaced in toto by removing and replacing:
2 electricaI connectors
2 lock nut s
2 retaining nuts
The tasks have been analyzed and are known to fit within the astronaut
constraints envelnpe, even under EVA, provided he has a simpIe restraint;
this without change to the present design. The photo also reveals that,
although it is a somewhat more complex operation, the complete valve
assembly could be replaced if the two welded joints were replaced with a
flange connection.
4. 6.5 Conclusions and Recommendations
The study indicates the Apollo type engines will more than meet the
hot-firing requirements for the planetary flybys, basically, because the
burn time is about one-fifth of the present design level. The effects of the
10ng coast periods and deep space soak have not been evaluated sufficiently
to draw any safe conclusions. The available data seems to indicate that few
problems should be expected since no failures were encountered in space
attributed to this cause. Maintenance of sensitive components is possible
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Table 4. 32
Component
Estimates of Component Reliability for Coast Periods
Thrust mount
Nozzle extension
C ombus tion chamber
Injector
Propellant lines
Gimbal actuator (each)
Pneumatic actuation system
B ipr ope llant v alv e
Lunar
Miss ion
Coast
Reliab ility
I. 000000
0. 994028
0. 993348
0. 998751
0. 995960
I. 000000
0.995022": _
0.999917
Effects of Extended Coast
of Mars Mis sion on Coast
Reliability
None
X
X
X
X
Potential
Decrease
X
X
X
X
;:'This value is applicable to each of the two redundant pneumatic
actuation systems
and minimum redesign may be desirable, however, M and R is not required
to meet the objective. Use of multiple engines can reduce the chance of
failure to less than i x 10 -5 .
Areas recommended for further study include:
0 A study of metal creep seems warranted because of the long
mission duration. Of particular concern are the tanks and lines
in the pneumatic actuation system that are continuously exposed
to the high pressure GN2; the design should be conservative enough
to assure that the creep strength of the materials are not exceeded.
Another area of concern is the possible stretching of bolts used in
intercomponent joints; the bolt materials should be analyzed to
determine whether a design change is required; retorquing is
required during coast; or no change is required.
Determine protection requirements against meteoroids - both for
the engine proper and the nozzle extension
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Further studies are required of the effects of prolonged exposure
of the non-metallics to the propellants and the hard vacuum of
interplanetary space. Data regarding long-term exposure in space
should be obtained from existing satellites, if possible.
An evaluation of the effects of hard vacuum on the binder used in
the combustion chamber. If binder sublimation is found to be a
problem, then a method for retaining low-pressure GN 2 within
the chamber during coast can be developed and evaluated.
Redesign of some component interfaces may be necessary to
facilitate parts replacement. With the present system design it
would be impractical to change some components in space.
An improvement in the bipropellant and valve propellant sealing
may be required to avoid propellant loss, evaporative freezing,
and possible explosion during ignition subsequent to the long coast
period; or, the inclusion of a gate valve and purge may be a
better alternative.
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4.8 CUIDANCE AND NAVIGATION
Note: Much of the data used herein has been provided by the
A. C. Electronics Division of General Motors Corp.
through Reference 4. 14.
4. 8. 1 System Functions
The Guidance and Navigation (G and N) system is employed to provide
a means of determining the spacecraft position and velocity vector with
respect to the planets of interest. Two basic operational modes of navigation
are possible; local primary and earth primary via the communications link
(Section 2. 1). Former studies indicate that earth primary is the optimum
mode for all mission phases except in the immediate vicinity of planets or
during earth reentry.
The G and N system is expected to be composed of an optical navigation
subsystem, a guidance computer, and an inertial measurement unit. These
same functions are required for the Apollo mission. Therefore the associ-
ated components formed the basis of this analysis. The optical subsystem
possesses the ability of measuring the angle between a star and planet center,
or some landmark thereon, and the capability of measuring the apparent angle
subtended by a planet (stadiametric). The guidance computer (AGC) is to have
the capability of performing the necessary calculations to relate the optically
measured data to the position and velocity of the spacecraft; and when re-
quired, to calculate the vehicle course corrections required. The inertial
measurement unit (IMU) provides a reference coordinate system and monitors
the applied accelerations to the vehicle.
The functional logic for the Mission Module G and M functions are
given in Figure 4. 55. The functional logic for the Earth Entry Module system
is given in Figure 4. 56. It will be noted from these examples that the dif-
ferent modules impose somewhat different requirements. The earth entry modu
module functional requirements are similar to Apollo in all respects and the
Apollo system is expected to meet those needs or exceed them without
change. The mission module system is to facilitate velocity corrections only
and function under different circumstances. This is the system studied in
depth herein, the recommended operational concept is justified in Section 2. 1
of this report.
4.8.2 Reliability Analysis
The capability of the Apollo G and N system, using present operational
concepts to meet the above requirement, can be grossly evaluated by con-
sidering the entire G and N system ON (energized) for the maximum duty
cycle time of 825.16 hours, as shown in Volume I of this report. The total
G and N system failure rates are 895.6 and 77 failures per mission hours
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Table 4.43, Estimated Reliability for the Electric Power Source,
Thermalelectric Backup System (16,000-Hour Duty Cycle Assumed)
System of Component
Heat Source
Isotope capsules
Heat exchanger
Shield
Primary Coolant System
Piping
ECU
Converter, electrical
Heat Rejection System
Piping
ECU
Radiator
Performance
Meteoroid Requirements
Capsule safety ejection
Acros s -the-line pump
Performance reliability
Total Reliability
SiGe System
kx 10 -7
0.53
1.2
0.04
Reliability
0.99907
0.9979
0.99993
0.4
Z. 13
9.05
0.9993
0.99996
0.9982
0.9993
0.99996
0.9963
0.9957
0.9984
O. 9958
0.984
0.980
Table 4.44_ Redundancy Recommendations, 5 kWe TE Power Source
Recommended Design Action
1. Redundant separate-source pumps in
primary
g. Two active converter-heat rejection seg-
ments, plus one standby segment
3. Shutoff vaives on heat rejection
Performance reliability, TE system
Required meteoroid non-puncture
reliability per radiator segment
Two-Year
Mission
0. 9902
0. 997
Emergency
Only
0.9999+
Depends on
design
0.99 0.999+
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Power Return- The distribution system is normally a two-wire grounded
system for DC and single-phase AC loads, and four-wire grounded system
for three-phase AC loads; i.e., wire and buses should be employed as the
return path for electrical currents rather than the spacecraft structure. The
system negative and neutral should be grounded at one point only in the
spacecraft and not be interrupted by any control or switching device.
The recommended DC and AC power characteristics for the baseline
mission is as follows, as sensed at the load: (Reference 4.9. 2-I).
a. DC Power
I. Steady- state voltage
limits :
27. 5 plus or minus 2..5 volts
2. Transient voltage
limits :
21 volts to 32. volts with recovery to
steady-state within one second
3. Ripple voltage : 1 volt peak-to-peak 30 to 15,000 cps
b. AC Power, if anAC power distribution system is used
i. Phases: Three phases -- displacement
120 degrees-tolerance, plus or
minus two degrees
2. Nominal voltage limits :
Steady-state 115 plus or minus 2 volts rms
(average of three phases measured
line to neutral)
T rans ient 115 plus 35, minus 65 volts rms
recovering to 115, plus or minus
I0 volts rms within 15 milliseconds
and steady-state within
50 milliseconds.
Unbalance 2.volts rms (worst phase from
average)
Modulation 0. 5 percent maximum
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(Reference 4. 15) for ON and STANDBY usage, respectively. Applying the
maximum duty cycle time to the ON faiIure rate, and the remainder of the
mission time to the standby failure rate, the functional reliability becomes
0. 478 and the standby reliability becomes 0.294 for an overall G and N
reliability in the mission of 0.14I. The reliability logic is given in Fig-
ure 4.57. Three spare G and N systems would be required to bring the ON
reliability up to 0. 9939, while four spares would be required to bring the
"standby" reliability up to 0. 9920. The overall G and N reliability would
then exceed the required value of 0.99.
This approach is obviously pessimistic since all of the G and N equip-
ment is not energized during every operating interval, and greater reliability
gains can be realized by sparing at a lower equipment level than whole
G and N systems. However, an upper bound has been established, and it
does point out that an exorbitant amount of extra equipment would have to be
carried by attempting to achieve safety through redundancy or spares at the
component level.
The greatest reliability penalty results from the long standby periods
when the G and N system is not required to perform any guidance, naviga-
tion, or control functions. During these intervals, the computer clock elec-
tronics and the inertial instrument suspension and heater circuitry are
operative under present apollo operational concepts. It wouId appear quite
difficult to improve the STANDBY failure rate enough by simple redesign,
and the sparing of heater and suspension assemblies inside the IMU would
seem difficult and very time consuming, at best. A more promising approach
would be to change the operational concept so that all G and N equipment can
be de-energized during STANDBY periods.
This approach greatly tel[eves the reliability problems. However, the
problems of updating computer time to the required accuracy and possible
inertial instrument performance degradation due to the lack of temperature
control and suspension must be fully investigated. Presently the computer
time is updated during the boost because of overloading of required functions
at liftoff, so the operational concept is feasible. The effect on accuracy
that the time update has to be performed to successfully accomplish mission
objectives and what accuracy can be provided over great transmission dis-
tances should be investigated. Considerable study has already been
performed on the effects of cool-down and loss of suspension on the inertial
instruments, the results are encouraging and indicate the feasability of
meeting the requirements of the baseline mission.
The effort herein was concentrated on isolating the weak reliability links
in the operationaI equipment and determining the possible courses of action
to bring the functional reIiability from 0. 478 to over the 0.99.
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Since the reliability goal is fixed, any error or uncertainty in equip-
ment usage will be directly reflected in the amount of redesign, spares, or
redundancy required. Therefore, a detailed equipment usage timeline was
developed for the baseiine mission and is given in Tabie 4.38. Required
G and N system performance during the various mission phases was formu-
lated from the duty cycle estimates and functional flow logic of the baseline
mission. Ttmeline details estimated were then based on accuracy and
system operational requirements. Constraints and ground rules derived
from Apollo experience and adhered to are as follows:
The G and N system performs all thrust, precise attitude, and
entry controls following transplanet injection. The Attitude and
Stability Controi System (A and SCS) provides attitude stabilization
during periods when lesser attitude accuracy is acceptable.
• The G and N system performs a monitoring function from liftoff
through transplanet injection.
• The G and N system performs star-landmark navigation measure-
ments during the planet encounter phase.
• No G and N functions are required during the artificial gravity
phases.
After shutdown, a warmup period of one hour is required before
aligning the inertiaI reference. However, no warmup of the optics
or computer equipment is necessary.
A complete alignment of the stable member is assumed to take
15 minutes. Where time is critical, the alignments are scheduled
to be completed at least 15 minutes prior to needing the inertial
reference.
Stable member alignment updates are assumed to occur every
1.5 hours during the planet encounter phase, and every 4 hours
during the earth orbit, planet approach, and earth approach phases.
• A star-landmark angle measurement via the sextant (SXT) is
assumed to take 6 minutes.
• An average of one navigation measurement every two hours is
assumed during the planet encounter phase.
• Usage times for the G and N system reliability calculations include
the prelaunch aIignment time.
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• It was assumed that the first transplanet velocity correction (AV)
could occur anywhere within the zero-g coast period, but not neces-
sariiy at the beginning. Therefore, an additional warmup period
and IMU alignment were required which would not occur if the plat-
form remained on following injection.
• System status monitoring is performed whenever the G and N
system is operative.
The timeline indicates that the total inertial and computer subsystem
(CSS) usage times are approximately 500 hours, and the optical subsystem
(OSS) usage time is approximately 50 hours for the indicated mission. Com-
puter subsystem usage time is no greater than the inertial subsystem (ISS)
time since optics functions are planned only when the inertial subsystem is
operative. Therefore, the computer never has to operate separately with
the optics subsystem.
Usage times are broken down into major subsystem usage times and
not G and N functional times. This is possible because the various G and N
functions, in general, use the same equipment. For example, the same
inertial subsystem equipment is energized when performing attitude control,
entry control, AV control, monitor, warmup, alignment, checkout and status
monitor. The same optical subsystem equipment is energized when perform-
ing optical alignment, navigation, checkout, and status monitor. The entire
CSS is used whenever the ISS or OSS is used. The one exception to exciting
all equipment in a subsystem when any one part of the subsystem is neces-
sary, occurs during the earth retro burn when the digital to analog converters
of the optics coupling data units are used to relay the main engine gimbal
signals.
Equipment failure rates are derived from Reference 4. 15 and apply to
Apollo Block II equipment. The major subsystem and subassembly failure
rates are given in Table 4. 34 °
Table 4 34 G and N Subsystem and Function Failure Rates
Subsystem >, x l0 -6 Subassembly k x l0 -6
Inertial
(ISS)
Optical
(oss)
C omputer
(CSS)
394
264.3
237.3
IMU and PIPA Elec. Assy
PSA
CDU
Optical Assy.
PSA
CDU
D&C Group
AGC
DI<SY
129
ll0
155
94
77
91
2.3
235
2.3
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Not all the display and monitoring equipment is included, even though
many G and N system signals might be displayed there. Only the DSKY's
and the Displays-and Controls group (D and C) are considered O and N equip-
ment. The DSKY's are normally redundant, accounting for the low failure
rate, and the D and C group is considered part of the optical subsystem since
it is used only during optics functions.
Applying the subsystem usage times to the subsystem failure rates as
shown in Table 4. 35 it is seen that the reliability for a singIe G and N
system in the defined mission is 0.7195. A redundant unit for each of these
subsystems now yields a reliability of 0. 9761.
The optical subsystem practically meets the overall G and N system
reliability goal while the inertial and computer subsystems are considerably
lower. Improvement is obviously required in ai1 areas. If the operational
concept is not changed and the usage times remain the same; the reliability
is inadequate for the proposed mission.
4.8.3 Availability Analysis - G and N System
The next step in isolating the weak reliabiIity links, to enable deter-
mination of the optimum means of improving the system contribution to the
probability of safe Return (Ps)' is shown in the subassembly reliability
breakdown of Table 4. 36 ,Here, it is shown that the three major sub-
assembly reliabilities for the inertial subsystem are of comparable magni-
rude and all need improvement. The optical subsystem failures are of an
order of magnitude less than those of the inertial subsystem., but some
improvement is still necessary in some of these if the overai1 Gand N system
reliability goal is to be met. The Display and Controls Group (D and C) is
obviously good enough. The computer subsystem is broken down into the
computer itself and the normally redundant display and keyboard (DSKY).
Only the computer itself needs improvement.
Examining the subassembly level, it is clear that a total of eight spares
(approximately 350 pounds) are required to bring the total G and N system P S
to better than 0.99Z0. A smaller amount of spare equipment than that shown
would actually be needed for sparing at a lower assembly level. For a given
amount of additional equipment or weight, normally, greater gains in reli-
ability can be achieved at the lower level of the spared item.
For example, if the AGC failure rate could be divided into four equal
portions representing four separate assemblies and a spare for each
assembly was available, rather than just a complete spare computer, the
overall G and N reliability goal would be met. By sparing at the whole
computer level, two spare computers are required. Similar arguments can
_ 189-
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be applied to the other assemblies with a resultant decrease in total weight
and volume of spares required, but an increase in malfunction isolation
difficulty and maintenance.
Even at the subassembly level some juggling of assemblies and the
associated spares required is possible. If, instead of the spares listed in
Tabie 4. 36 two spares of the IMU and PIPA electronics assembly and the
ISS portion of the CDU were provided, only one spare computer would be
needed. Also, if minor improvements were made, no spare of the optical
assembly would be required. This would be desirable because portions of
the optics assembly are outside the spacecraft. Only the electronics part
of the optical assembly wouid have to be spared in any event since the glass
is completely reliabie when protected.
Approximately 80 percent of the ISS and CSS usage times and over
90 percent of the OSS usage time occurs during the planet encounter phase
due to the local vertical hold and navigation requirements. Therefore it
would be well to re-evaluate the necessity of these requirements for the
totai time durations. Impact on redesign and spares/redundancy will be
great if these planet encounter usage times vary significantly. As a
counter example, assume on-board navigation is only backup to ground
tracking and is not required behind the planet. Also assume that an accu-
rate alignment and attitude hold is only required for an hour early and an
hour late in planet encounter when probes are launched and collected. ISS
and CSS usage becomes approximately 100 hours and CSS time becomes
approximateiy 4 hours. For this mission, inwhich the G and N system
performs boost monitor, AV control, short-term attitude control, and entry
control, the present Apollo G and N system wili meet the reliability con-
straints with no modifications (except turning equipment OFF during non-
operational periods) as shown in Tables 4. 37 and 4. 380
The inertial subsystem subassemblies and the computer reliabilities
are slightly low for this mission application while the opticai subsystem sub-
assemblies are much better than needed. Considering spares for those sub-
assemblies with reiiabilities less than 0.99, it is seen that four spares
(approximately 175 pounds) are required. However, the resultant failure
totai in the mission is more than five times better than is necessary. The
same arguments concerning sparing at a lower equipment level than the
subassembly level as set forth for the other timeline are even more
applicable in this situation.
Spares below the subsystem component level was not considered for
the optical subsystem since they were not required. They were also not
considered for the inertial subsystem below the component level because of
the impracticaiity of maintenance or repair.
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Up to this point, the performance of one G and N system with spares
has been considered in two different mission applications. In actuality, two
complete G and N systems, one in the Earth Entry Module (EEM) and one in
the mission module (MM) are planned to provide the required mission func-
tions. No reliability is gained if only one of the systems is available at any
one time. On the other hand, little or no additional spare equipment would
be necessary if the two sets of equipment were always available to back up
one another. The actual situation will most likely lie somewhere between
these extremes.
Some factors to be considered are as follows:
The astronauts will be in the EEM at least during boost, major
thrusts, and entry. Therefore, for monitoring purposes, at least
some of the EEM G and N equipment must be operating, while all
the EEM G and N equipment must be operative following EEM/MM
separation prior to entry.
The EEM optics head is covered by a shroud whenever the EEM
and MM are docked. Therefore, the only time the EEM is
uncovered and astronauts are in the EEM is when an optical system
is needed late in the mission after EEM/MM separation prior to
entry.
During the artificial gravity modes, the vehicles are no longer
docked, but all the astronauts are in the MM. Therefore, the
entire EEM G and N system is unavailable for use unless some
data coupling or switching mechanism is devised.
Accurate alignment of the EEM inertial reference with the MM
optics is probably not possible because of large misalignments
between the two mounting bases. Possibly, the EEM and MM air-
frames could be aligned accurately before launch, or at least
the misalignment could be calibrated, but this accuracy would be
lost once the vehicles had separated.
It would appear that some cross switching between the EEM and MM
computer subsystems or their subassemblies will be desirable since EEM
display equipment is needed during the monitoring phases when the inertial
reference is probably in the MM. Also, it would be desirable to have the
attitude and navigation data placed into the EEM computer prior to EEM/MM
separation before entry even though it was obtained using the MIV[ optics.
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4.8. 4 Availability Analysis - Guidance Computer (AGC)
Note: Some of the material used herein was provided by the
Raytheon Company through References 4.16 and 4. 17.
The AGC presents the highest failure hazard of any of the G and N
subsystems. For this reason and because of its modular design, so amen-
able to maintenance, it is desirable to explore the effects of sparing at the
lower levels of assembly.
Table 4.39 presents a breakdown of the AGC modules along with the
projected failure rates for both operating and standby states. There are a
total of 48 modules in the AGC, 38 are different types and all of them must
operate for the 497.6 hours of Table 4. 336 The resultant mean time before
failure (MTBF) is 2878 hours and the probability of no failure or Ps = 0.74
for the mission and 0.84 for the active time only; this is, of course, too
low. Also, it does not tell the whole story; about 1.85 hours of this time is
critical since little or no time exists for maintenance or repair and there-
fore, the downtime constraint may not be satisfied. However, the assessed
MTBF assures a 0. 99936 chance of no failure during the critical phases of
the mission provided it is functioning at the start. This is well above the
requirement. Therefore, the only periods where the probability of a failure
is unsatisfactory is associated with the zero-gravity mission phases where
no commitments are scheduled and maintenance is possible.
From Table 4.36 it is evident that there are several weaker links in
the AGC modules and the remainder are fairly equal. Some of the modules
are interchangeable which will permit canabiiization and a reduced number
of supporting spares.
Figure 4.55 presents the results of various sparing concepts as
applied to the AGC for various duty cycles. It indicates that it would take
two spare computers, or about 38 spare modules to provide a Ps in excess
of 0.999. Canabalizations would improve the results of using two completely
sparedAGC's. However, the associated weight penalty of 112 pounds is
excessive since the modules required for the same Ps would be about one-
sixth of that weight.
Conducting a spares requirements analysis at the module level in an
attempt to reduce the risk of no correctable failure to less than 0. 999 pro-
vided the results recorded in Table 4. 37, each module function must exceed
0. 999973 to achieve the goal. By providing the 41 spares indicated therein
and with no changes made to the AGC, the Ps was reduced to less than
0. 99975 and thereby assures meeting the mission requirement safely. The
•resulting weight requirements summary is presented in Table 4.41 along
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Table 4.39 Breakdown of Computer Module
Module Name
A1 Scalar
A2 Timer
A3 Sequence Register
A4 Stage Branch
A5 Cross Point Gem I
A6 Cross Point Gen. II
A7 Service Gate
A8 Through All Four Bit
A1Z Parity
A13 Alarm
A14 Memory Tim[ng
A15 Rupt Service
AI6 IN OUT I
AI7 IN OUT II
A18 IN OUT III
A19 IN OUT IV
A20 Counter Cell I
A21 Counter Cell II
AZZ IN OUT V
AZ3 IN OUT VI
A24 IN OUT VII
A25, AZ6 Interface
AZ7-A2 9 Interface
A30, A31 Power Supply
B7 Clock Oscillator
B8 Alarm
B9, B10 Erasable Driver
Bll Current Switch
B1Z ]Erasable Memory
B13, B14 Sense Amplifier
B15 Strand Select
B16, B17 Rope Driver
B21 Rope Memory 1
822 Rope Memory Z
]323 Rope Memory 3
824 Rope Memory 4
B25 Rope Memory 5
B26 Rope Memory 6
No. of
each
Type
(N)
i
i
i
i
i
I
i
4
I
i
I
i
I
i
I
I
1
i
i
I
I
2
3
2
I
I
2
I
I
2
I
z
I
I
I
I
i
I
Operating
Failure
R ate /
Module
(×o)
6. 6625
6. 8825
6. 6625
6. 7725
6.3875
6. 0575
6. 8825
6. 8825
6. 6075
6.7175
6.7175
6. 6625
6. 8825
6. 8825
6. 8825
6. 8275
6. 8825
6. 7725
6.7175
6.7175
6. 7175
7.3920
9. 9450
6.2765
2.2845
5.3470
7. 0200
3.2170
5. 4533
15. 5530
4. 9565
6.4340
8.2080
8. 2080
8. 2080
8.2080
8. 2080
8. 2080
Standby
Failure
R ate /
Module
Z. 0225
2. 0825
Z. 0ZZ5
2. 0525
1. 9475
1. 8575
Z. 0825
2. 0825
Z. 0075
2. 0375
Z. 0375
Z. 0225
2. 0825
2. 0825
2. 0825
Z. 0675
2. 0825
2. 0525
2. 0375
2. 0375
2. 0375
0. 7561
0. 7751
0. 5958
0. 2267
0. 8213
1. 0129
0. 4450
3. 7253
2.3364
0. 8255
0. 8665
1. 5968
1.5968
1. 5968
1. 5968
1. 5968
1. 5968
N ko
6. 6625
6. 8825
6. 6625
6. 7725
6. 3875
6. 0575
6. 8825
27. 5300
6. 6075
6. 7175
6. 7175
6. 6625
6. 8825
6. 8825
6. 8825
6. 8275
6. 8825
6. 7725
6.7175
6. 7175
6.7175
14. 7840
29. 8350
IZ. 5530
Z. 2845
5.3 470
14. 0400
3.2170
5. 4533
31. I060
4. 9565
iZ. 8680
8.2080
8.2080
8.2080
8.Z080
8.2080
8.2080
Nks
Z. 0225
2. 0825
Z. 0225
2. 0525
i. 9475
I. 8575
Z. 0825
8. 3300
Z. 0075
Z. 0375
2. 0375
2. 0225
Z. 08Z5
2. 0825
2. 0825
Z. O675
Z. 0825
Z. 0525
Z. 0375
Z. 0375
2. 0375
i. 5122
2.3253
i. 1896
0.2267
0. 8213
Z. 0258
0. 4450
3. 7253
4. 6728
0. 8255
I. 7330
I. 5968
1. 5968
i. 5968
1.5968
i. 5968
i. 5968
Totals 48 347. 7173 78. 1483
MTBF x2878 Hours
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Table 4.40, Sparing Analysis, Guidance Computer, Module Level
Item NkT R. w/one Spare w/two Spares
AI
A2
A3
A4
A5
A6
A7
A8-11
AI2
AI3
Al4
AI5
AI6
AI7
AI8
AI9
A20
A21
A22
A23
A24
A25-26
A27-29
A30-31
B7
B8
B9-10
Bll
B12
B13-14
Bl5
B16-17
B21
B22
B23
B24
B25
B26
0.00331526
0.00342473
0.00331526
0.00336999
0.00317842
0.0030142
0.0034247
0.0136989
0.0032879
0.00334263
0.00334263
0.00331526
0.00342473
0.00342473
0.00342473
0.00339736
0.00342473
0.00336999
0.0033426
0.0033426
0.0033426
0.007358
O. O14459
0.0062463
0.00113677
0.0026606
0.0069863
0.00160077
0.0027135
0.0154783
0.00246635
0.00640311
0.0040843
0.0040843
0.0040843
0.0040843
0.0040843
0.0040843
0.996685
0.996575
0.996685
0.994430
0.996822
0.996986
0.996575
0.996301
0.996712
0.996657
0.996657
0.996685
0.996575
0.996575
0.996575
0.996603
0.996575
0.996630
0.996657
0.996657
0.996657
0.992642
0.985154
0.993754
0.998863
0.997339
0.993914
0.998399
0.997286
0.984522
0.997534
0.993597
0.995916
0. 995916
0. 995916
0.995916
0.995916
0.995916
0.9999946
0.9999942
0.9999946
0.9999942
0.999995O
0.9999955
0.9999942
0.9999050
0.9999946
0.9999946
0.9999946
0.9999946
0.9999942
0.9999942
0.9999942
0.9999942
0.9999941
0.9999942
0.9999946
O.9999946
O.9999946
0.9999720
0.99988
O.999881O
0.9998994
0.9998965
0.9998750
0.9998987
0.9998967
0.9987
0.9987971
0.9987978
0.9987918
0.9987918
0.9987918
0.9987918
0.9987918
0.9999918
0.9999995
0.9999994
0.9999994
Totals 0.84 0. 99941 0. 99975
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Table 4.41 • Spares and Weight Requirements ..
Module - Name
Scaler
Tim e r
Sequence Register
Stage Branch
Cross Point Gen. I
Cross Point Gen. II
Service Gate
Four Bit
Parity
Alarm
Memory Timing
Rupt Service
IN OUT I
IN OUT II
IN OUT Ill
IN OUT IV
Counter Cell I
Counter Cell II
IN OUT V
IN OUT VI
IN OUT VII
Interface
Inter face
Power Supply
Clock Oscillator
Alarm
Erasable Driver
Cur rent Switch
Erasable Memory
Sense Amplifier
Strand Select
Rope Driver
Rope Memory 1
Rope Memory 2
Rope Memory 3
Rope Memory 4
Rope Memory 5
Rope Memory 6
Identification
Number
A 1
A 2
A 3
A 4
A 5
A 6
A 7
A 8 to All
AI2
AI3
AI4
AI5
AI6
AI7
AI8
AI9
A20
A21
A22
A23
A24
A25 & A26
A27 to A29
A30 & A31
B 7
B 8
B 9 & BI0
BII
BI2
BI3 & BI4
BI5
BI6 & BI7
BZI
B22
B23
B24
B25
B26
|
Module Wt.
in Grams
No.
Req.
163 1
163 1
163 1
163 1
163 I
163 1
163 1
163 Z
I
I
i
i
I
i
i
i
I
I
I
I
I
1
2
1
I
I
I
1
1
2
I
I
1
I
1
I
I
I
163
163
163
163
163
163
163
163
163
163
163
163
163
165
_vv
5O8
180
310
Z50
297
272
202
316
297
904
904
904
904
904
904
Total Wt.
in Grams
163
163
163
163
163
163
163
326
163
163
163
163
163
163
163
163
163
163
163
163
163
165
4OO
508
180
310
250
297
272
202
316
297
9O4
904
904
9O4
904
904
Totals Required 41 12, 207*
"*Equals 26.91 pounds
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with the total number of individual spares recommended, by module. Again,
these estimates do not reflect the effects of module repair and interchange-
ability of EEM and MM modules which would further improve the picture.
4.8. 5 G and N Maintainability
Present design constraints limits the ability to maintain or repair most
of the inertial subsystem components; and the optical subsystem is not
expected to require either.
The AGC is the major contributor to the failure hazard and is repair-
able in its present state. However, it could be improved, in terms of
reducing the repair time by changing the method of fastening the container
so as to decrease the access time. Refer to Figure 4. 56 where the Apollo II
AGC is depicted, notice that there are about 40 screws to remove to gain
access to either module tray and 18 more to remove it from the mounting.
Once access is made, it is very easy to replace any of the modules as shown
in Figures 4. 57 and 4.58. Even the logic rnodules themselves display some
potential repairability as seen from Figure 4. 59.
The conclusions to be drawn relevent to the maintenance and repair
potential of the G and N system is that it is maintainable where needed most.
Those aspects not maintainable are either not required, or it is more prac-
tical to replace them at a component level. For an example of the latter,
see the Display and Keyboard (DSKY) of Figure 4. 60.
4.8. 6 Summary and Conclusions
This analysis establishes the feasibility of using the Apollo Guidance
and Navigation (G and N) equipment in long-term missions, as exemplified
by the baseline Mars Flyby mission. It does however, identify areas where
further study would be needed to arrive at an optimum system configuration
for any defined mission application.
The results would indicate a reasonable amount of spare equipment is
necessary, depending on mission, system application, and reliability
improvement concept folIowed. The recommended operational concept is
as follows :
. G and N equipment must be turned completely OFF during the
non-controlling standby periods of the mission, that is, during
the artificial gravity phases.
w On-board maintenance must be performed using spare equipment
provided with some provisions for scavenging between the mission
module system and the EEM just prior to reentry. A total of
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Figure 4.57. Electronic Subsystem
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Figure 4. 5 9 .  Block I1 AGC, External View 
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Figure 4.60. Block I1 AGC Tray B 
- 204 - 
SD 67-478 
SPACE DIVISION OF NORTH AMERICAN ROCKWELL CORPORATION 
- 
Figure 4.61. Block I1 AGC Tray  A 
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Figure 4.63. Display and Keyboard 
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about 3 spares at the functional assembly level are required for
the ISS and OSS. Forty-one spares are required for the CSS at
the module level.
Areas where further effort is necessary are as follows:
I, Determination of the available and the required computer time
update accuracy after shutdown.
Z. Investigation of inertial instrument performance characteristics
after cooldown and lack of suspension during shutdown.
, Determine maintainability characteristics of stable platforms
(IMU).
. Detailed analysis of the precise G and N system functional require-
ments for development of required equipment usage and duty cycles.
. Determination of the optimum of weak-link reliability improvement
based on redesign possibilities, ease of maintenance, malfunction
detection and isolation, and weight and volume penalty of recom-
mended additional equipment.
6. Determination of mounting and packaging changes required for
maintenance.
, Consideration of means of coupling data and cross switching of
components between the two on-board systems and/or the
EEM/MM.
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4.9 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM
The electrical power system (EPS) is composed of three subsystems,
the main power source, the power distribution and processing system and the
batteries. Each of these have been examined in detail to determine the impli-
cations of extended missions on the subsystems design and support
requirements.
The functions of the electrical power system are presented in
Figure 4.64. It must provide the required energy to operate the spacecraft
systems. Total loss of the function for an extended period would be cata-
strophic to the missions and the crew. Temporary ioss is permissible for a
short period of time. (See Volume I on downtime constraints. ) The EPS is
a Criticality I system, and therefore, must not create any failure hazard that
cannot be maintained within the accepted risk Ievel; that is, about 0. 999.
4.9. 1 Electrical Power Source
Note: Much of the data used herein was derived from a study
conducted by NAR/AI in Reference 4. 18 and NAR/SD in
the baseline mission study, Reference I. i.
Functional Requirements and Selected System Concept
The baseline mission study recommended two concepts for the elec-
trical power source, a solar voltaic system for a zero-gravity mission and
an isotopic system for the seiected baselinemission. Since this study
..........rorn_,ends the _-_4-;4;i_i"lu_xJ._J._J._..... _v_y:..........ls_uue for the major portion of the mission,
the isotopic system is recommended and was used herein as the baseline
system. The soiar voltaic is very unreliable and not amenable to M&R or
reliable operation in the artificial gravity environment.
Of those radioisotope systems considered, the Rankine DowthermA
conversion system was selected as the most likely isotope system which
could be developed in time for a 1975 mission. This is based on its low
temperature requirement and the minimum difficulty anticipated in its
development all components are within the state of the art.
A power level of 7.0 kWe was established for a four-man crew as
average power required for the peak loads during the 20 days of planet
encounter. Other mission periods will require an average of 6.0 kWe. This
provided the basis of sizing the isotope systems. An exception to this
requirement was made for the case of soiar photovoltaic. It was determined
that for the Mars Twilight mission the array size could be set at a power
output of 5.5 kWe and the array sized at the farthest solar distance of
2.2 A.U. This provided approximately 7.8 kWe at Mars encounter.
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Power levels of 4. 2 kWe were established for backup requirements,
considerable in excess of emergency levels of 2.8 kWe. Emergency power
was dictated primarily by ECLS requirements and is defined as that power
absolutely required for the safe return of the crew to earth.
Earth orbital power requirements are set at 3200 watts. With solar
photovoltaic as the primary system, earth orbital needs presented additional
problems. A specially strengthened array of 720 ft2 had to be provided to
withstand loads of 1 to 2 g's, randomly applied. This array can be included
in the EPS as backup/emergency capability for use during the remainder of
this mission.
A philosophy was established to provide a primary and backup/
emergency system. For the case of an isotope dynamic system the backup
consists of cascaded thermoelectric compact converters which provide
approximately 60 percent of the primary power required when used in place
of the dynamic conversion equipment. The emergency system consists of a
separate solar array sized for emergency requirements and deployed only
in case of catastrophic failure of the total isotope primary system. This
backup array would normally be stowed within the spacecraft and deployed
only when required and the remainder of the mission would revert to the zero
gravity mode to assure a high margin of safe return.
The preliminary work was accomplished at these levels with the
isotope located in the EEM. Later study indicated that relocation of the
isotope to the mission module was desirable to reduce spacecraft reentry
weights. To simplify the power system concepts it was decided to size the
isotope for the increased power demand of planet encounter. Consequently,
a 7.0-kWe average power output is shown for the isotope system.
The Rankine Conversion Cycle -- using Dowtherm, a floor wax deriva-
tive, is selected for the primary power source. A simplified schematic of
the proposed power conversion system using an organic substance
(Dowtherm A) as a working fluid is shown by Figure 4.65. This is basically
a turbine prime mover operating in a closed Rankine cycle, with heat input
to the cycle supplied directly to the working fluid in the boiler heat exchanger.
Heat regulation is accomplished directly in the condenser/radiator.
The turbine wheel is mounted on an integral shaft with the alternator and
the liquid pump. A regenerator heat exchanger is included to improve
overall cycle efficiency, and an auxiliary radiator is used to control fluid
temperature during the variations in heat output rate of the isotope. The
peak temperature and pressure of the working fluid are 700 F and 107 psia.
The minimum values are 275 F and i0 psia. The overall cycle efficiency
is 12. 2 percent, including all conversion losses and parasitic power con-
sumption. Bearings are lubricated by the working fluid with the turbine-
alternator pump assembly hermetically sealed.
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Only Dowtherm A and mercury, which are comparable on a system
weight basis, are competitive as working fluids for final selection. The
SNAP 2 and SNAP 8 programs have provided much mercury performance
data. Mercury requires a minimum radiator area, but its system tempera-
ture requirement is 1300 F, compared to 700 F for a Dowtherm-A system.
From a reliability, safety and maintenance standpoint, lower temperature
systems are more desirable and will result in minimum development risk
and time. Also, the Dowtherm A radiator area requirements are within the
400 ft2 available on the PM. For Dowtherm A as a working fluid, turbine
design modification to the existing design is relatively simple since it is a
single-stage design relying only on nozzle inlet design for change in power
output. As a fluid, Dowtherm A suffers from gaseous decomposition at
temperatures in excess of 700 F. However, with periodic maintenance this
would not result in a serious problem. The isotope development for operating
at 700 F is minimized. Existing isotope encapsulation techniques are proven
adequate for this temperature.
The Cascaded Thermoionic System is proposed as a primary backup
power source, the first of two backup systems to be used in the event of loss
of the primary system, its schematic is presented in Figure 4.66. The
compact thermoelectric converter consists of a closely packed array of
SiGe or PbTe thermoelectric elements confined between a heat source and a
heat sink. The heat source could be a hot NaK channel or direct radiation
from isotope fuel capsules. A coolant loop is required to remove waste heat
from the converter and transports it to a space radiator.
The compact converter themoelectric elements are also electrically
connected in series and in parallel to provide the desired voltage and power.
Interconnections between the series modules are used to provide the high
reliability against open circuit failure.
An isotope source, fueled with Pu-Z38, is used to heat NaK in the
primary loop. The NaK is circulated by an electromagnetic pump and main-
tains the hot junction temperature of the thermoelectric converter. Thermal
energy passes through the thermoelectric elements in the compact converter
to a second NaK loop that rejects waste heat by means of a space radiator.
Isotope-thermoelectric systems may also be configured with direct radiating
power converters. The weights and performance of compact thermoelectric
converters are also representative for direct radiating power systems.
The inherent reliability, safety and simplicity of the TE system will
permit a short and simple development cycle since all components are within
the present state-of-art. The overall efficiency of this conversion will vary
depending upon materials. Highest efficiencies can be relaized by cascading
GeSi and PbTe so that both operate at their optimum temperatures. This
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Figure 4. 66. System Schematic, Isotope Thermionic
Electrical Power Source
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results in an overall gain in efficiency; i.e. , from 7 to 8 percent overall
efficiency compared to single element efficiency of 4 percent. At best,
thermoelectrics will mean an increase in isotope requirement of about twice
that for the dynamic systems if used alone. This becomes a critical con-
sideration when isotope availability and cost is considered. These disad-
vantages of thermoelectric system preclude their selection as the primary
power conversion system. However, since the radiator area requirements
for the thermoelectric cascaded elements are competitive with the Rankine
DowthermA and the thermoelectrical system was considered as a backup
conversion to the dynamic CRU's, the combination offers a highly reliable
power conversion design at a minimal weight penalty.
Reliability/Availability Analysis, Main Power Source
Since much of the components used in both the primary and secondary
EP source are the same, the reliability analysis can evaluate them together.
The component and subsystem generic and allocated failure rates are indi-
cated in Table 4.42a These are considered in series for reliability logic
and the basis for setting system availability requirements.
The combined rotating unit (CRU) is the component which will pace
system reliability. A plot of system reliability as a function of CRU relia-
bility and using two, three and four standby PCS loops has been made. The
CRU failure rate was allowed to vary from 0.6 x 10 -6 to 70 x 10-6, while
keeping other component failure rates constant at the indicated values; in
addition, a very pessimistic meteoroid environment was assumed at a proba-
bility puncture of 0. 972, Figure 4.67 summarizes this analysis.
If a failure rate of 2 x 10 -6 per hour or less is expected from the CRU,
a 1 active loop plus 2 standby loop system could be postulated for the 4 KW
requirement. Replacement of the CRU is considered impractical at this
time because of lack of good data, therefore, inactive redundance is suggested
as a safe satisfactory alternative.
Normally two 3.5 kWe CRU's will make up the 7 kWe system.
The NaK from the isotope source heat exchanger will flow through the
PCS boilers arranged in a series configuration. For greater than 4 kWe,
two CRU's will be on the line, and two each of associated TE pumps and
boilers will be active. This approach will provide the criticality I and II
requirements at 0. 999 for the power system. In addition, it can be seen that
power system contribution to PS at 3.5 kWe will be very high (about 0. 999999)
represented by one active plus four standby CRU loops in the recommended
design. This is a worse case and the requirement could be as low as two
standby loops, depending on the operational mode. Estimates are known to be
pessimistic since usable data for the assessment was based on the mercury
cycle tests a more deleterious working fluid.
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Figure 4.67.
CRU RELIABILITY
Effect of CRU Reliability on Total
System Reliability
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The other major weak link, the radiator, must be compensated for by
oversizing it in the design stage to compensate for any tendency to clog or
leak resulting from the meteoroid hazard.
Some maintenance may be possible on the Dowtherm Rankine system
because of the lower operating temperatures and the working fluid (floor
wax). Further, it may be desirable and indeed expedient to purge the system
overboard and replace the fluid periodically to offset the effects of potential
decomposure. In addition, it seems feasible to replace the CRU in a system
of this nature, about 13 pounds are required for each cycle.
Reliability/Availability Analysis, Thermoelectric Backup Power Source
A study of a thermoelectric power source for a mission equivalent to
the baseline mission used herein was conducted by AI/NAR and reported in
Reference 4. 18. The system design was estimated to achieve a reliability
for a two-year mission when used as a primary power source of better than
0.98. This same system was upgraded to provide 5 kWe at a PS of 0.99.
The same design would meet the baseline mission emergency power level
with aprobabilitv exceeding PS = 0.999. The system requirements are
given in Table 4.440 Maintenance is not expected to be required because of
the low duty cycle and the high potential reliability in the emergency mode.
Although the concept is obviously reliable and feasibility has been demon-
strated, a test program is required.
4.9. Z Electrical Power Conditioning, Distribution and Control Subsystem
(PCDS)
i. Functional Requirements
The electrical power distribution subsystem provides electrical
energy, both unregulated and regulated, and electrical distribution consistent
with the mission requirements.
All electrical loads applied by the EPS equipment are classified as
essential and nonessential, this associated with crew survival and safe
return of the spacecraft and those associated with mission success. Pro-
visions have to be made for disconnecting the nonessential loads, as a
group, under emergency conditions. Ordnance loads are normally supplied
from a separate and independent battery source.
Distribution panels or boxes have to be enclosed to minimize hazards
and to provide maximum mechanical protection. Switching and control may
be accomplished by manually operated circuit breakers or contactors.
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Table 4.43o Estimated Reliability for the Electric Power Source,
Thermaielectric Backup System (16,000-Hour Duty Cycle Assumed)
System of Component
Heat Source
Isotope capsules
Heat exchanger
Shield
Primary Coolant System
Piping
ECU
Converter, electrical
Heat Rejection System
Piping
ECU
Radiator
Performance
Meteoroid Requirements
Capsule safety ejection
Across -the-line pump
Performance reliability
Total Reliability
SiGe System
kx 10 -7
0.53
1.2
0.04
I
0.4
1
r
1.0
1
0.4
Z. 13
9.05 I
Reliability
0.99907
0.9979
0.99993
0.9993
0.99996
0.9982
0.9993
0.99996
0.9963
O. 9957
0.9984
0.9958
0.984
0.980
Table 4.44j Redundancy Recommendations, 5 kWe TE Power Source
o
Recommended Design Action
Redundant separate-source pumps in
primary
Two active converter-heat rejection seg-
ments, plus one standby segment
3. Shutoff valves on heat rejection
Performance reliability, TE system
Required naeteoroid non-puncture
reliability per radiator segment
Two- Year
Mission
0.9902
0.997
0.99
Emergency
Only
0.9999+
Depends on
design
0.999+
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Power Return-- The distribution system is normally a two-wire grounded
system for DC and single-phase AC loads, and four-wire grounded system
for three-phase AC loads; i.e., wire and buses should be employed as the
return path for electrical currents rather than the spacecraft structure. The
system negative and neutral should be grounded at one point only in the
spacecraft and not be interrupted by any control or switching device.
The recommended DC and AC power characteristics for the baseline
mission is as follows, as sensed at the load: (Reference 4.9. Z-l).
a. DC Power
i. Steady- state voltage
limits :
ZT. 5 plus or minus Z. 5 volts
Z. Transient voltage
limits :
Zl volts to 3Z volts with recovery to
steady-state within one second
3. Ripple voltage : I volt peak-to-peak 30 to 15,000 cps
b. AC Power, if an AC power distribution system is used
1. Phases : Three phases -- displacement
120 degrees-tolerance, plus or
minus two degrees
2. Nominal voltage limits :
Steady-state I15 plus or minus Z volts rms
(average of three phases measured
line to neutral)
Transient 115 plus 35, minus 65 volts rms
recovering to I15, plus or minus
I0 volts rms within 15 milliseconds
and steady- state within
50 milliseconds.
Unbalance Z volts rms (worst phase from
average)
Modulation 0. 5 percent maximum
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C,
.
,
Nominal frequency tolerance:
Normal Negligible (synchronized to a
master timing device)
Emergency 400 plus or minus 7 cps (loss of
master timing)
Wave shape: sine wave
Maximum total
distortion
Highe st harmonic
Crest factor
Maximum voltage
5 percent
4 percent
1.414, plus or minus i0 percent
150 volts, i00 milliseconds
Unregulated 400-cycle AC power from individual inverters
I. Phases: Three phases -- displacement
120 degrees --tolerance, plus or
minus two de_rees.
2. Nominal voltage As inverted from the S/C 28 VDC
limits : distribution system without
transformer s.
Steady-state Z1 plus or minus 2 volts rms
(average of three phases measured
line to neutral)
Transient 21 plus 5, minus 6 volts rms.
Unbalance 1 volt rms (worst phase from
average)
Modulation 0. 5 percent maximum
3. Nominal frequency tolerance:
Normal Negligible (synchronized to a master
timing device)
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Emergency 400 plus or minus 7 cps (loss of
master timing)
4. Wave shape: Quasi square wave
Buses and electrical loads are to be selectively protected so that
individual load faults will not cause an interruption of power on the bus to
which the load is connected. A fault on a logic bus or an ordnance bus should
not cause an interruption of power on the main buses. Similarly, a fault on a
load circuit should not cause an interruption of the main buses, but should
disconnect the fault at that circuit breaker closest to the fault.
The electrical equipment should be compatible, physically and func-
tionally, with other spacecraft subsystems within which it is designed to
ope rate.
The detailed design of a power conditioning, distribution, and control
system can only be performed after the characteristics of the power source
and the requirements of the spacecraft and mission are accurately known.
For a solar cell power source, the power conditioning and distribution
schematics are similar to those of an isotopic power system whose net
product is regulated DC. The PCDS is basically the same with the exception
of voltage regulators and battery charging circuits. If the net output of the
isotopic power system is both DC and 400 cps AC, the inverters are, of
course, eliminated.
DC-to-AC inversion is the major factor in overall life extension of
Apollo type power systems. To alleviate this problem, three approaches
were studied: (i) improvement in inverter reliability; (2) simplification of
the inverter by changing the AC power characteristics to something other
than an accurately controlled sine wave; and (3) elimination of AC power
requirements. Westinghouse Electric (the manufacturer of the Apollo
inverter), examined the first approach. The results indicate that significant
improvements in reliability are feasible by (i) normal component improve-
ment; (Z) by upgraded components; (3) by circuit simplification; and (4) by
incorporation of in-flight maintenance provisions. The other system relia-
bility improvement approaches (mitigating or eliminating AC requirements)
were considered by examining the characteristics of those components that
are the primary users of spacecraft AC power.
The electric power generated can be DC and AC and can also be a
function of power source selection, capable of variation within Certain limits.
Higher voltages are favored for reduced distribution losses, but are limited
by source characteristics and available hardware. It is generally accepted
to use 28 volt DC or 115 volt, three-phase 400-cycle AC in power systems.
The 28 volt DC power distribution losses are relatively high and on several
space systems 56 volt DC was adopted.
- 222 -
SD 67-478-3
SPACE DIVISION OF NORTH AMERICAN ROCKWELL CORPORATION
Electric power distribution systems are also limited by energy storage
system selection. Usually electric storage batteries are used for this pur-
pose. A matching of the main power source with the energy storage device
and power distribution system is required. With a DC distribution system
this is no difficulty. An AC generator output can be rectified with high relia-
bility. On the other hand, an AC distribution system with static inverters in
the storage battery output would limit the system overload capability and,
due to the complicated inverter circuitry, impair system reliability. A DC
electrical distribution system providing power within the spacecraft is pre-
ferred if the distribution line is not too long.
Based on SD studies in Reference 4. 19, it seems apparent that some
equipment using AC power from separate inverters are preferred, eliminating
the requirement for an AC distribution system, and simplifying both the
distribution and reliability problems.
A DC power distribution system with localized identical inverters can
be incorporated in the baseline spacecraft and reduce system weight. Spare
inverters of a standardized plug-in type would increase system PS to well
above the ideal requirement.
2. PCDS Reliability Analysis
Since the EPS must operate full time, so must the PCDS function. This
means a mission duty cycle of 16,800 hours. However, this does not bear
the same implication as an equivalent duty cycle on systems operating in a
cyclic manner; continuous operation without transions is far less severe in
terms _ _:'--- i..... ,
_x x_e u_zara.
The recommended power distribution concept, designed to assure a
high degree of safety is presented in Figure 4. 68. This kind of an approach
will minimize catastrophic loss of power. It also indicated that the require-
ment for highly conditioned power imposes a higher failure hazard. There-
fore, during any design research, every effort should be made to relax the
power conditioning requirements. Figure 4.69 presents the associated
reliability logic diagram in simplified form as it was derived from the base-
line mission. The logic block numbers correspond to the components given
in Table 4.45 as do the associated failure rate estimates which were taken
from Apollo (Reference 4.5).
The data indicates that two potential weak links exist in the function,
the inverter, and the battery charger. These are responsible for the high
hazard and low function reliability of 0. 787. This is obviously unsatisfactory
and must be raised to above 0. 999.
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Figure 4.68. Typical Power Distribution System
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Table 4, 45.
Logic
Block
No.
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
Electrical Power Conditions,
Reliability
1tern
Entry battery A
Shunt
Circuit breaker
Entry battery B
Shunt
Circuit breaker
Entry battery C
Shunt
Circuit breaker
Battery bus A
Battery bus B
Battery bus C
Flight and post landing bus
Failure Mode
No output
Open
Open
No output
Open
Open
No output
Open
Open
Short-fail
Short-fail
Short-fail
Short-fail
Distribution & Control Subsystem,
Estimat es
Failure Rate
(x I0 -6 Hrs)
Duty Cycle
(Hour s )
I. 5 max
I. 5 max
i. 5 max
I. 5 max
I. 5 max
i. 5 max
i. 5 max
1. 5 max
1. 5 max
i. 5 max
I. 5 max
i. 5 max
16, 000
Battery relay bus
Flight bus
Main DC bus A
Main DC bus B
AC Bus No. 1
AC Bus No. Z
Pyrotechnic battery
Circuit breaker
Pyrotechnic battery
Battery charger
Shunt
Relay
Switch, panel, rotary
Switch, panel
Circuit breaker
Inverter
Switch, motor
Switch, panel
Circuit breaker
Inverter
Switch, motor
Circuit breaker
Inverter
Switch, motor
Switch, panel
Circuit breaker
System Total
Short-fail
Short-fail
Short-fail
Short-fail
Short-fail
Short-fail
No output
Open
No output
No output
Open-short
Open
Fail to operate
Fail to operate
Open
No output
Fail to operate
Fail to operate
Open
No output
Fail to operate
Open
No output
Fail to operate
Fail to operate
Open
8. 000
O. 008
O. I_'0
8. 000
O. 000
O. IZO
8. 000
O. 008
O. 120
0. 005
0. 005
0. 005
0. 005
1.5
16,000
1.5
560
16, 000
16,000
16,000
16,000
16,000
16, 000
16,000
16,000
16, 000
16, 000
16,000
16,000
16,000
16,000
16,000
16,000
*Any one of the three will permit the crew to return safely
0. 005
0. 005
0. 005
0. 005
o. o9_
0. 005
8. 000
0. 120
8. 000
142. 0
0. 005
0. 003
0. ll8/cs
0. 003/cs
0. 1Z0
12Z. 7
0. 564
0. 003/cs
0. 120
122. 7
0. 564
0. IZ0
IZZ. 7
0. 564
0. 003/cs
0. iZ0
Estimated
Reliability
0. 99996-t
0.9999964
0.9999964
=I.0
=I.0
=I.0
0.999916
0.999916
0.9999|6
=l.0
-_1.0
O. 9921
:I.0
O. 65*
0.65_: _
O. 65 _:_
0. 787
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3. Availability Analysis
An examination of the identified weak links demonstrate that the addition
of one spare battery charger will raise the function PS from 0. 992 to 0. 99997
and will eliminate this factor from further consideration as shown in
Table 4.46 Having accomplished this, the data indicates that for all prac-
tical purposes the PCDS reliability is limited by the DC-AC inverter or an
AC-DC converter reliability-- even if all other components were perfect, no
measurable improvement in reliability would be reliazed. It is clear from
the analysis that the DC-AC inverter concept has to be improved for pro-
longed missions, or provisions for maintenance and repair must be provided.
The contemporary DC-AC inverter is a static inverter which provides
a sinusoidal, 3-phase, 400-cycle output with high efficiency and low harmonic
content. The reliability can be assessed for this unit based on failure rates
and parts count of individual components, and verified by tests of completed
assemblies. In order-of-magnitude the failure rates of the more ciritical
components of this inverter are:
Filter capacitors
-5
I. 80 x i0 per hour
Power transistors
-5
1.20 x I0 per hour
Power diodes
-5
0.96 x i0 per hour
Micro-module preamps
-5
0.75 x i0 per hour
_,-_._nce of components
-5
7. 55 x i0 per hour
Net Failure Rate
-5
12.26 x i0 per hour.
From the net failure rate of the inverter we arrive at a MTBF (average
life) of 8, 156 hours. It is evident that improving the inverter reliability is
not a simple matter of improving or avoiding the use of a few weak compo-
nents; even if the four most critical component types were eliminated the
MTBF would only be increased by 60 percent. Since the Apollo inverter is
typical of contemporary hardware it would seem that repair is less practical
than replacement of the unit, particularly if individual units are used.
Table 4. 50 indicates that six spare inverters are required to increase the
function contribution to safe return to about 0. 99964.
As a potential alternative, a square-wave interter can be built with a
very small number of components; such an inverter will be rr, ore reliable,
lighter in weight, and more efficient than a sine-wave inferrer. In view of
the difficulties associated with providing sine wave AC power for prolonged
missions, the necessity of a sine wave inverter must be reappraised and
the rise of a square wave converter considered.
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Table 4.46, Sparing Requirements Analysis, Electrical Power
Distribution and Control System
Component
Inve rter
Battery charger
Subtotal (Crit II)
Circuit Breakers
for Safe Return
for Criticality II
Expe cte d
Numb e r
Used
30
Z0
R o
0.65
0.9921
0. 787
<0. i
<0. I
Spares
Required
6
1
16
7
Ps
0.99975
0.999968
0.99964
>0.9999
>0.9999
Subtotal 50 <0. 1 23 >0. 99963
Spares Weight
Unit in
Pounds Total
48 288
3.0 2.5
- 290. 5
2to 5 oz 3
2 to 5 oz i. 4
- 295
One serious objection can be raised on the use of square wave power -
that is, the greater amount of electrical interference associated with it.
Based on this analysis it is important to reassess the need for use of a
centralized inverter system withAC power distribution. Separate square-
wave inverters strategically located in the S/C could provide the necessary
AC power with a decrease in electromagnetic interference and increased
reliability. This approach was followed in the design of the Gemini S/C.
There, however, every inverter was individually matched to the equipment
it operated. This made servicing more difficult. A very good square wave
inverter design is used for the Apollo S-II booster recirculation pumps.
These inverters provide 42 volt three-phase AC from a 56 volt DC line with-
out the use of transformers. They weigh less than one-third as much as the
Apollo inverter for approximately the same output rating and have a failure
rate 1.55 x 10-5 per hour as opposed to the 12 x 105 for the centralized unit.
Use of a small number of spare inverters would further improve system
reliability and meet any reasonable goal. Thus, a survey of waveform
requirements of subsystems using AC power shows that substantially all
subsystems could operate on square-wave power.
The spacecraft components normally using or requiring AC electrical
power are:
Lights. Fluorescent or incandescent. These operate as well or more
efficiently on a square wave (of 400 cycles) than on a sine wave. Some of the
lights in Apollo use DC and incandescent lights operate just as well from a
regulated DC power source.
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Electronic power supplies. These operate just as efficiently and
reliably with less ripple in the output, using a square-wave source.
Induction motors. These may be made to operate on a square wave
with slightly decreased efficiency; however, this is offset by the increased
efficiency of the square wave inverter; 90 percent versus 80 percent for a
sine wave inverter. The fact that an induction motor will be operated on
square wave power should be included in its specification.
Instruments. Certain Instruments may require AC power of high
sinusoidal purity. The amount of power required is not large, however, and
may be avoided completely if such instruments are replaced by analog to
digital converters and digital computation.
Electric Motors. The largest demand for AC power comes from
electric motors. Three-phase induction motors are used for their self-
starting capability and, because they require no brushes or switches, they
also operate reliably at good efficiency. Reliability of the three-phase
inverter-motor combination should be improved for long missions. All
electric motors operate with alternating current. Those motors which invert
DC to AC power are called DC motors. The commutator is nothing more
than a mechanical state inverter built into the motor. Such motors are built
by several companies for space programs. Integrating the inverter with an
AC motor lends itself to arrive at special motor characteristics at the cost
of weight volume and efficiency. Overall system reliability would be reduced
by the use of so-called brushless DC motors instead of separate inverters
with separate AC motors.
Battery Charger Circuits. The state of charge of electric storage
batteries is controlled by battery charging circuits. The unmanned S/C
orbited today which utilizes a solar-cell power source, employs batteries
and battery chargers. These .battery chargers use excess power from the
main power source to bring the batteries to the desired state of charge and
regulate the rate of battery charging. The battery chargers, in general, use
a simplified inverter circuit combined with voltage regulators and sometimes,
current regulators. Reliability of basic battery charger circuits is high.
Communication systems are operated from the DC power line in
unmanned spacecrafts. The selection of 400-cycle AC sine-wave power in
the Apollo S/C was based on the requirement of synchronizing the different
parts of the data system with the AC line. IfDC power is used, a new
synchronizing function will have to be provided. This is solved for the lunar
excursion module and for unmanned S/C by providing a centralized timing
pulse for these functions, as is recommended for the baseline mission.
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Navigation and Control Systems. Several navigation systems are
suitable for space application requiring only DC power. The Autonetics N-16
system and the AC Sparkplug Carousel Mark V systems were developed for
manned aircraft and have reliability goals compatible with long-duration
space mission requirements.
Other spacecraft subsystem and components normally call for AC
power, but, in each case, DC can be used directly, or through a small local
inverter.
Other parts which enter into the PS estimate are included in the respec-
tive subsystem or the power source with the possible exception of the circuit
breakers. As indicated in Table 4.46, there are about 30 which affect the
Criticality I function (Ps), and 20 more which affect Criticality II --the less
essential function. Using the normal failure rate estimates which are based
on total on time rather than use cycles produces a very pessimistic estimate
of the supporting spares required to raise the PS contribution to over 0. 999.
The results are listed in the referenced table along with the respective
weights. The replaceability of these components are demonstrated by a
typical installation depicted in Figures 4. 70 and 4.71.
4. PCDS Conclusions
The contemporary concepts for the PCDS will permit a safe and suc-
cessful mission where the recommended maintenance provisions are included.
The number of maintenance actions (spares required) will probably not
exceed 30, and the spares weight will probably not exceed 295 pounds in
achieving a contribution to the PS of better than 0. 9996.
4.9.3 Batteries
Note : Much of the information used in this section was furnished by
Eagle Pitcher Company through Reference 4. Z0.
I. Battery Applications
The selected baseline mission as well as any other manned planetary
mission is expected to carry batteries to augment the main power source and
for special applications. Contemporary batteries of many types have been
used successfully for periods far in excess of the baseline missions; for
example, the three-year auto battery. Therefore, it seems evident that
contemporary hardware such as that used for Apollo will meet the needs of
the near future planetary missions. To substantiate this premise, the
analysis herein was conducted.
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Figure 4.70. Power Programmer  Control 
Panel in  Place 
F igure  4. 71. Power Programmer  Control Panel Removed 
for  Maintenance 
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For the baseline or any extended Mission of approximately a 700-day
duration the life of the batteries should be in excess of two years. A con-
siderable effort has been devoted toward examination of existing hardware
from the APOLLO Program as well as existing hardware of other space
programs and the possibility of utilizing new hardware of various electro-
chemical systems.
There are at least two distinct power requirements for the baseline
mission, the peaking battery and the reentry battery. It appears to be the
desirable to separate these into two distinct battery packages because of
their diverse requirements. For the peaking battery, total ampere-hour
requirements are of lesser importance than voltage regulation considerations.
Silver-zinc, silver-cadmium, and nickel-cadmium batteries were examined
and, in view of the intended mode of operation and the reliability require, it
is recommended that a nickel-cadmium battery be used for this application.
For the reentry battery and some pyrotechnic batteries, the mode of
operation would be such that virtually two years in the inactive state would
proceed actual battery utilization. It appears that to achieve maximum
reliability, this inactive period should be accomplished with the battery
unactivated, that is in a dry-charged state. There are two methods of
achieving this; one is the conventional remotely activated battery that is
described in Reference 4. 20A; the other is a dry-charged manually
activated battery that would be activated by the spacecraft personnel prior
to reentry. For this specific requirement, a design concept has been
evolved and demonstrated which would permit such activation to be performed
with a minimum of physical handling problems, since there may be some
limitations in the ability of the personnel to perforn_ intricate tasks in the
projected environment. The exact physical configuration would be deter-
mined by the installation position of the battery, the resultant accessibility,
and the degree of mobility possible by astronauts. The concept is discussed
in detail in a subsequent section.
2. Reliability Assessment
Table 4.47 presents the reliability estimates for various battery types
under the baseline mission conditions and as a function of wet stand/use
life. From these data, it is evident that selection of the battery type,
application, and operational concept must be matched. But, in so doing a
reliable combination can be found.
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Table 4.47. Reliability Estimates for Various Battery Types
Time Months MAR
i
6
12
18
24
ESTIMATED )
WATT-HOURS )
PER POUND )
RELATIVE
WEIGHT
0.999
0.980
0.800
0.500
60
120%
Ag-Cd
0.9998
0.998
0.980
0.900
0.800
36
200%
NiCd
0.9999
0.9905
0.999
0.998
0.997
18
4OO%
EAP
0.998
0.997
0.996
0.995
0.994
24
300%
MAP
0. 999
0. 999
0. 999
0. 998
0. 997
72
100%
NOTES: MAR type is a manually activated rechargeable silver-zinc
battery
GAP type is a remotely activated primary silver-zinc battery
MAP type is a manually activated primary silver-zinc battery
The reentry batteries affect crew safe return (Criticality I) since they
provide the EEM with its oniy source of power, after separation and during
the reentry and recovery phases. However, from Table4.47, it is evident
that the reliability of NiCd baftory ,_r_11 exceed 0 nn_n, .......... 7777 for the short i- to
2-hour reentry period.
The peaking batteries contribute to crew safe return only in that they
provide temporary power during main power outages for repairs. Since
this is the case, the estimated 0. 997 mission reliabiiity could fuifill that
requirement without change. However, the mission success contribution, a
lower criticality, will only be about 0. 994 which may be considered too iow.
3. Availability Analysis
To assure reasonable probability of mission success (Criticality II)
both proper situations of the battery type and operational concept is required.
To do this, each application must be considered separately.
A. Peaking Batteries
From an analysis of Table 4.47 relative to the requirements of the
peaking battery, it become obvious that only the nickel-cadmium battery has
acceptable reliability after two years of operation. Conversely, there is a
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very small chance that the silver-zinc rechargeable battery (if in a charged
state) would operate normally after two years. The silver-cadmium battery,
although having a greater probability of success, is also less desirable than
the nickel-cadmium. The remotely activated battery would not meet the
functional requirements of a peaking battery. The nickel-cadmium battery
appears to achieve the maximum reliability, and with redundant units, will
meet the projected requirement to exceed a Ps of greater than 0. 999 for the
function. Some design effort will be required to integrate the battery require-
ments with the power system and charge controls. Because the considerable
experience with batteries and with automatic charge control equipment
accumulated on the GEMINI, APOLLO, and other space programs, this task
has been accomplished and an acceptable reliability achieved utilizing the
nickel-cadmium system. Since voltage regulation is the principal concern,
the watt-hour per pound estimate for a peaking battery is misleading, and
in this application is a secondary consideration.
To achieve two years of life for the silver-zinc rechargeable peaking
battery concept, each battery would require a great amount of separation
and would be significantly derated until any weight advantage it might have
originally presented for short missions will be considerably reduced. As
might be expected, the silver-cadmium system is somewhat better in energy
density, but still falls short of the nickel-cadmium battery in reliability.
Since voltage regulation (internal impedance) is a primary consideration
here, the nickel-cadmium battery is the best suited, not only for its excel-
lent voltage regulation capabilities, but also for its proven operational
reliability throughout periods measured in years. The failure modes of the
nickel-cadmium battery are internal cell shorting, loss of electrolyte,
memory effect, and externally induced physical damage. Internal shorting
can be almost eliminated as a probable failure mode if proper manufacturing
and inspection procedures are adopted. Eagle Pitcher has nickel-cadmium
batteries in space on classified programs that have been operating success-
fully for years. The loss of electrolyte can be prevented by using hermet-
ically sealed cells and paying particular attention to charge control.
Electrolyte is frequently lost because of overcharging. Sealed cells can
tolerate a nominal continuous overcharge rate without damage. Since most
sealed cells use steel cases, the construction is quite rugged, and the
possibility of damage is limited to a possible crack in the ceramic terminal
seals.
Two peaking batteries are required for the normal peaking load, one
battery will provide any emergency requirements necessary to assure crew
safety during any main power outages. Therefore, with one spare the crew
safety contribution (Ps) is well above 0. 9999999 and there would be less than
one chance in 106 of there being no batteries at any time during the mission.
This adds less than i00 pounds to the spares complement required.
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B. Reentry Batteries
For the reentry battery the problem is considerably different. Again
referring to Table 4.48, the reentry battery requirements are such that
acceptable reliability is possible with two forms of the nickel-cadmium
battery, either the remotely activated primary or the manually activated
primary battery. For this application, the watt-hours per pound criteria is
valid selection criteria and the primary manually ac tivated and the ren,(_:ely
activated primary silver->_inc batteries both present significant advantages
over the nickel-cadmium battery.
These batteries are squib activated and when stored dry and at
nominal temperatures, exhibit a high degree of reliability. And the remote
activation concept for these batteries are inherrently less reliable than
their manually activated counterparts because of the additional failure modes
associated with the activation device. However the r_.liable will be acceptably
high.
Manually activated primary silver-zinc battery normally has a wet
life measured in days as compared to the 1-hour to 5-hour-life require-
ment. However, they may be designed in a manner to extend this period to
two weeks. By activating these batteries manually by adding electrolyte a
few hours or several days prior to the intended usage, the highest degree of
reliability and the lowest weight and volume could be realized, and the
mission objectives achieved without any redundancy or repair. The problems
of requiring an astronaut to perform the task just prior to reentry can be
minimized through application of the technique presented in Figure 4. 72, a
simple method of activation in space.
The cell case would have a filling port that would be threaded on the
inside to mate with the outside threads of a cylindrical polyethelene electro-
lyte reservoir. The reservoirs would be screwed in against a stop which
could be overcome by twisting the reservoir with greater force than
originally required. At the bottom of the chimney would be a sharp blade-
like device which would cut the seal over the mouth of the threaded neck of
the electrolyte reservoir. This would permit electrolyte to run into the
cells. The reservoir, being somewhat flexible, could be "pumped" so that
activation in a vacuum and/or zero-g condition would be possible. Capillary
action would hold the electrolyte into the separators.
NASA experience in operating batteries for extended periods under
zero-g conditions present ample evidence that no problems will be
encountered with containing the electrolyte within the cells. Because
batteries will gas upon activation and during operation, a threaded, molded
boss would be incorporated in the end of the cylindrical electrolyte reservoir.
After activation, a valve with a sharp blade-like device on the bottom would
- 235 -
SD 67-478-3
SPACE DIVISION oF NORTH AMERICAN ROCKWELL CORPORATION
/
Figure 4.72. A Manually Activated
Battery for Space Applications
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be screwed into the molded boss. The sharp blade would puncture the
electrolyte reservoir and the cell would then be able to vent through the
reservoir and the valve. There may be other possible locations for the
valve, should there be physical reasons that would preclude such a
configuration.
4. Conclusions and Recommendations on Batteries
This analysis demonstrates what inherently seems to be true, i. e. ,
contemporary batteries will meet all the extended mission requirement and
with minor packaging changes to meet the specific mission requirements.
The nickel-cadmium cell will meet the requirement without change and
only one spare battery for mission success assurance. This amounts to an
additional I00 pounds of weight.
The manually or automatically activated silver zinc cells will meet
both the reentry battery and pyro battery requirements. Minimum modii;;
cations to contemporary designs have already been tested and proved.
4.9.4 Conclusions and Recommendations on Electrical Power
The analysis the electrical power system requirements indicate that: a
system whose logic is as reflected in Figure 4.73 will meet the baseline
mission objectives and surpass them. The probability of no failure which
cannot be repaired will exceed 0.9995. The supporting spares required will
involve :
i. For Criticality I: 16 spares amounting to 3 pounds plus the
recommended redundancy within the power source, i.e. , 2
redundant CRU loops, a cascade TE system, and some solar
voltaic cells.
For Criticality II: 15 additional spares amounting to about
39Z pounds, most of which is associated with the batteries and
power conversions.
The results of these provisions assure a probability of crew safe
return contributions of over 0. 999999, or there is less than one chance in
106 of a power system failure causing the loss of the crew.
Work is required in the area of isotope power sources to demonstrate
their performance over long periods of time; and to develop an economical
process for extracting the recommended isotope (Plutonium 238). For
details on test and study requirements, see the individual functions.
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4.7 THE CENTRAL TIMING SYSTEM
Note: Much of the data used in this section was provided by the
General Time Corp., through Reference 4.21.
4.7. 1 Functional Requirements
The functions of the Central Timing Equipment (CTE) are straight-
forward since it provides the master time reference for all mission systems.
The outputs appear in two forms, Time Accumulation and Frequency
Division. The CTE is a single component of about a ten-inch cube; internally,
it has four module boards.
The function is required to facilitate navigation measurements and
apply a thrust vector. It may be updated via the Up Data Link system.
Complete loss of the function would impair crew ability to return safely,
is considered a Criticality I function.
it
The CTE consists of four functional subsystems:
I. Power supply
2. Oscillator
3. Frequency divider
4. Time accumulator
The CTE power supply subsystem consists of two separate identical
pulsewidth modulated power supplies, each capable of handling full load.
The power supplies are fed by nominal Z8 VDC lines. See the functional
block diagram of Figure 4.74.
The oscillator is a highly stable device and can operate in a primary
or secondary mode, The primary mode is an internal 1024 kHz oscillator.
In the secondary mode the CTE is driven by an external 10Z4 kHz signal.
Both signals are double, shaped, and fed to a divide-by-four majority logic
network. The oscillator output is 51Z kHz.
The frequency divider is composed of successive two-out-of-three
majority logic networks which divide the 51Z kHz signal down to one Hz.
The time accumulator subsystem is composed of two sets of outputs.
The first of these is a serial time code output conforming to the IRIG B
format. The second is a set of parallel time code outputs.
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Physically, the CTE package configuration weighs approximately i0
pounds and has a volume of approximately 225 cubic inches.
The present Apollo CTE is completely qualified for the baseline
mission except to assess its life expectancy. Tests to date reveal no
potential weakness.
4.7. Z Reliability Assessment, CTE
The reliability goals for the Apollo CTE have been established for a
period 14 consecutive days under specific environmental conditions which
are commensurate with the baseline mission requiren_ents. These are
as follows :
For any set of Time Accumulator outputs, the probability of success
shall be 0. 999.
For any single Frequency Divider output, the probability of success
shall be 0. 999999.
The CTE utilizes various types of internal redundancy to achieve the
reliability goals. The power supply is a one out of t\_o parallel arrangement
whereby each power module is capable of handling the full load in the event
of failure of the other.
The oscillator section utilizes dissimilar parallel redundancy. This
arrangement allows the internal crystal oscillator to phaselock with an
externally supplied signal of the same frequency. In the event of failure of the
external signal, the internal oscillator continues to provide the correct
signal to the frequency dividers without any loss of count.
The frequency divider section uses two-out-of-three majority vote
logic. The output from the oscillator or previous divider is fed to three
independent divider chains. Any two of the three chains must have identical
frequencies and be in phase for a proper output for that divider stage to be
pr e sent.
Additional component part redundancy is used in various circuits to
guard against shorts, or opens, depending upon the criticality of the part to
successful circuit operation.
The subfunctional level reliability logic for the CTE is comparatively
simple as expressed by the logic of Figure 4.75. The reliability of the total
function for the baseline mission is at least 0.978; that of the subfunctions
are as indicated.
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0.99895
Power
Supply
No. 1
Power
Supply
No. 2
Frequency
Division
0.9981
Time
Accumulation
0. 984 Oscillator_0.99994
Figure 4.75. Reliability Logic, CTE, Subfunctional Level
The reliability is obviously too low in spite of the internal redundancy.
Figure 4.76 shows the reliability block diagram for any frequency
divider output. The on-Hz output is the worst case frequency divider output
since it represents the output preceded by the greatest number of dividers.
Its reliability for the baseline mission is only 0. 997. All other frequency
divider outputs have a correspondingly higher reliability.
Table 4.48 Circuit List
Reference No.
I
2
3
4
Circuit
Input amplifier
Doubler "A"
Doubler "B"
Temperature compensated oscil-
Circuit Failure
Rate (k)
lator (T C O)
Schmitt Triggers A, B,
Reset "Kl"
+ 4 shift register
Comparator "C 1"
Buffer "BI" {Quad)
C, D
O. 117 x 10 -6
O. 08O
O. 082
O. 639
0.073
0.041
0.230
0.222
0.122
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Table 4.48 (Cont)
Reference No.
I0
Ii
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
Z2
23
24
25
26
Circuit
Reset ':R2"
Counter Driver "DI"
+ 8 Johnson counter
Comparator "C2"
C omparator "C3"
Reset "R3"
Counter driver "D2"
+ 8 ripple counter
+ 10 Johnson counter
Power supply
Seconds/minutes counter
Seconds x 10/minutes x i0
C ounter
Hours counter
Days counter
Time accumulator buffer
Time accumulator 4 100
Time accumulator reset and
update
Circuit Failure
Rate (k)
0. 028
0. 043
0.050
0.222
0. 222
0. 028
0. 041
0. 030
0. O6O
i. 930
0. 080
0. 054
t
0. 128
0. 092
0.010
0. 120
0. 152
244 -
SD 67-478-3
Z.<
0
0
0
Z
.<(..)
.<
0
Z
o
Z
0
;>
0
.<
c_
/
SPACE DIVISION ov NORTH AMERICAN ROCKWELI, CORPORATION
Table 4.49_ CTE Frequency Divider Subfunction Reliability Estimates
5 12 kHz divider network
64 kHz divider network
8 kHz divider network
1 kHz divider network
100 Hz divider network
10 Hz divider network
1 Hz divider network
Quad buffer network
O s c illat or
Duty
Cycle
16,800
16,800
16,800
16, 800
16,800
16,800
16, 800
16,800
16,800
l_eliability
(Individual Networks )
0.99852
0.999968
0.999975
0.999975
0.999965
0.999965
0.999965
0.9999996
0.99994
To calculate system reliability, all of the frequency divider networks
are considered in series. For the worst case output (RIHz):
R = Rosc- R512 • R64 • 1_8 • R1 • R100 • R10" 1_1 • P_quad • Rps
= (0. 99994479) (0. 998521) (0. 9999678) (0. 9999747) (0. 9999747)
(0.9999651) (0.9999651) (0.9999651) (0.99999962) (0.998949)
R = 0. 99723
For any set of time accumulator outputs, the reliability is given by:
R = Rosc" R512 " R64" R8 " RI" R100" Rta" Rps
= (0. 99994479) (0. 998521) (0. 9999678) (0. 9999747) (0. 9999747)
(0. 9999651) (0. 986224) (0. 998949)
R = 0. 98356
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4. 7. 3 Availability Analysis, CTE
The reliability analysis reveals that the present system configuration
does not meet the requirements for a 700-day mission.
One approach to this problem would be to have one or moer spare
CTEIs on hand in the event of circuit failure. This approach requires
consideration of the following:
.
If it were desired to make the two CT]EIs functionally redundant,
both operating simultaneous, methods of load sharing need be
devised and some redesign would be required to accomplish this
objective.
If it were desired toprovide standby redundancy with a second
CTE, a method of switching is required. This switching system
may be complex due to the number of output lines required and
this may introduce some unreliability.
0 If the second CTE were treated as a shelf-spare, timing functions
would be interrupted in the event the spare was interchanged with
the original CTE. This can be handled through use of the Up-
Data Link.
Replacing the CTE, when failed, will raise the contribution to Ps to
0. 9999985 with only two spare units weighing 20 pounds total. This will
meet the mission requirements satisfactorily. However, since the function
and resulting data is temporarily lost, other forms of improvement may be
worth considering. In order for the CTE to meet the reliability goals for
the frequency divider outputs (0. 999999), each of the networks must have a
reliability in excess of 0. 999999; considering a 2 out of 3 network. The
required network failure rate is therefore:
0.999999 = 1 - 3 (Xt) 2
1 x 10 -6 = 3k 2
I x 10 -6 = 3k 2 (i. 68 x 104)2
k2
= 3x z (z. Z8Zx lO 8)
= 1 x I0 -6 = o. OOll x 10 -14
8.46 x 108
-8
X = O. 33 x 10
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This represents the required failure rate of one leg of a typical
frequency divider network considering a mission time of 700 days. For
comparison, the one leg of a typical frequency divider network in the present
system has a failure rate of 0. iZl x I0 -u. This comparison shows that
approximately Z orders of inagnitude failure rate improvement is required
for a frequency divider network. Data indicates that this may not be
feasible within the next decade.
Because of the character of the CTE design, it may be maintained at
three levels; cards, modules, or parts. Of the three alternatives, the part
level is entirely impractical, and the module level is possible but difficult in
the present design. However, the card level can be replaced fairly easily,
even in its present form, see Figure 4. 77. Sparing at that level and pro-
viding the necessary access through the case will improve the contribution
to Ps to 0. 999993 with only four spare cards as indicated in Table 4. 50,
This added only 8.3 pounds to the spares complement and the mission
objectives can be met without compromise.
Table 4. 50, CTE Card Level Sparing; Analysis
Card
Frequency Divider
Time Accumulation
Type A
Type B
Power Supply
(2 per card)
Totals
Reliability
0.997
0.98
0. 9989
0. 978
Spares
Required
4
Contribution
to P
S
O. 999996
0. 9999985
0. 999999
0. 999993
Spares
Weight
in ibs.
1.75
1.6
1.6
3.3
8. Z5
4. 7.4 An Optimized Maintenance Concept
If it were considered desirable to keep the timing and frequency
division functions available at all times, other forms of M and R should be
considered. In this case, M and R must be accomplished so that the signals
are not interrupted -- the inherent functional redundancy continues to operate
properly while the failed element is replaced.
In order for the CTE to remain operating during repair activities,
packaging design must complement the electronic design for redundancy.
That is, packaging must be similar to the configuration shown in the
the
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reliability block diagram of Figure 4.76. For example, the following
diagram shows the manner in which this would be accomplished. Using a
:-- i0 Johnson Counter as a model:
I
I REPLACEABLE
MODULES
In order to decrease the number of replacement items, circuits within
a particular leg of a network may be combined provided the principle of
"repair while operating" is not violated.
Repairs will be accomplished by module replacement. Consequently,
no individual component parts need be carried aboard for maintenance of
this system.
In order that the probabilities of success calculated in the previous
section be realized during the actual mission, methods for quick recognition
of a failed condition must be devised. Repair may be subdivided into
elements of recognition, isolation, replacement and checkout. By use of
modular replacement, time to replace and checkout will be short. The only
uncontrolled time elements are those of recognition and isolation. These
"allowed" repair times range between 2 and 109 hours. For any particular
network, the recognition time must be much shorter. Since the "allowed"
repair times are much shorter than a normal weekly or monthly preventive
maintenance period, a system of network monitoring become necessary. In
its simplest form, this system consists of visual indicators showing the
conditions of eachleg of a redundant network. Such a system would eliminate
the need for sophisticated built-in test equipment.
Preventive maintenance would still be required. However, these
activities could be minimized and would be performed on a scheduled basis
to detect degraded conditions indicative of impending failure.
To accomplish the approach described here, certain modifications to
the physical configuration become necessary. The most prominent of these
are listed below:
I. Repackaging of the unit so that maintenance philosophy may be
accomplished.
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2. Provisions for plug-in modules.
3. Inclusion of additional test-points for preventive maintenance.
4. Provision for the monitoring system described previously.
To accommodate this design concept for maintainability, the modules
presently existing need to be subdivided and repackaged in a form representing
the redundant electrical design. This includes the redesign of the various
p.c. cards to accept plug-in modules. In addition, the CTE case must now
incorporate provision for quick access to the modules. The printed circuit
cards would require corrugated or flat cabling allowing them to be with-
drawn from the case while operating. The size and weight of the CTE
would increase by about a factor of two as a result of these changes.
It should be reemphasized that this concept is not required. Rather,
it is an objective for the optimized design.
4. 7. 5 Conclusions and Recommendations on the CTE
The conclusions to be drawn from these analyses indicate that the CTE
is capable of operating for the long durations imposed by planetary missions
and that mission requirements can be most feasibly accomplished by pro-
viding for some in-flight maintenance. Such an approach would insure an
acceptably high probability of mission success.
Maintenance provision at the card level seems to be the most desirable
approach since minimum modifications and maintenance complexity results.
Any temporary loss of timing can be compensated for by use of a standby
unit and/or the Up Data Link.
The use of a proven, qualified design for extended mission application
is not without merit. The use of such hardware as a working baseline
shortens considerably the design, development, production cycle. In addition,
greater confidence can be placed in the operability of the resulting end
product.
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V. CRITICALITY II SUBSYSTEMS
In defining the mission success and safety objective and as a ground
rule for this study, the ::_ystem functions that did not directly affect crew
survival were separated by criticality rating from those that did. They are
the Criticality 1 grouping. A further separation involved the remaining
functions -- system functions that were related to crew safety and well being,
but that were not essential in that there was a way home. These were to be
included in the availability assessment and are considered Criticality II
functions. Thus, such functions as artificial gravity and communications
(excluding of data link) are separated into this category. Grouping system
functions under Criticality II is a somewhat arbitrary way of identifying
functions that do not require quite as much emphasis as crew sensitive
functions. They may be called "Crew Comfort systems" in that they may
affect the phisiological or psycological condition to some minor extent.
These are assessed in the following section.
5. 1 SPINUP AND DESPIN AND PRECESS CONTROL
(Note: Much of the data used in this section was provided by the
Honeywell Corporation through Reference 4.4. )
5. i. I Functional Description
The spinup and despin and process control functions are required
because of introduction of the artificial gravity mode. The control system
must perform four major functions:
I.
2.
3.
4.
Monitor artificial gravity status
Control artificial gravity acquisition
Control precession of spin phase
Wabble damping
Of these functions, only the first two introduce any requirement for
automated control. Precession can be accomplished by manual activation of
the precession engine when, and if required. Wabble damping can best be
controlled through a passive system using a viscous column of fluid as the
control medium. For details see Reference 1.1,
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ik4onitoring artificial gravity status is a simple function involving the
sensing of the achieved gravity level and displaying the resultant to the crew.
Its operating time is 15,727 hours for the baseline mission, the total of all
the artificial gravity phases.
The control of artificial gravity acquisition involves control of the
separation and extension system and control of the spinup and despin engines.
The sequence of operations involves, first, the rotation of the spacecraft at
about one rpm in the plane of the intended spin; next, the separation latches
are released and the extension system activated, permitting the two sections
of the spacecraft to separate on cables, which are kept at constant tension;
then the spinup engines are activated at the selected radius, to bring the
rotation rate to within the comfort zone.
Spinup and Despin Control
The spin vector direction and magnitude and the g level in the MM
during spinup and despin operations will be sensed by rate gyros (BMAG's)
and an x-axis accelerometer. These will be displayed in the MM on FDAI(s),
or equivalent, and a g indicator. Other displays for the spin and despin
operations should include a cable length meter and warning indicators of
cable winch stall, or winch malfunctions as yet undefined.
Cable deployment will be accomplished by cable winches, each con-
sisting of an electric motor, motor controls, gear box, reel-and-cable
laying guide, deployed cable length and rate sensors, brake, and structure.
A passive reel concept employing spring tension to control cable reel-in and
reel-out may be worthy of consideration.
Spinup torques will be supplied by reaction jets on the MM; Apollo RCS
engines will perform this function. Even if an additional RCS is required for
spinup (SU) and despin (DS) torques, the normal MM RCS can be used for MM
attitude control during SU/DS operations.
Cable deployment, spin torque, and MM attitude will be controlled by
the MM GguN computer during SU/DS operations. Measurement and control
of total spacecraft velocity change during SU/DS operations requires that
the MM G&C system have, in effect, the capability of executing small mid-
course corrections while spinning.
Spinup and despin operations have been estimated to require from 40 to
70 minutes each. Four to six SU or DS operations will be required for each
leg of the mission: initial spinup following planet departure and perhaps after
an initial correction; two for midcourse nonspinning periods for navigation
•and/or correction; and terminal despin during planetary approach. With a
maximum of four mission legs (triple planet flyby), the total time for spinup
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and despin operations should be 24 hours or less per mission. The cable
winches and spinup reaction jets must of course remain functional for these
operations after two years of exposure to the space environment.
Spin Vector Control
During spinning mode cruise, the spin vector direction will be moni-
tored and corrected as required. The principal constraints on spin vector
orientation are expected to be spacecraft thermal control, which will probably
require that the spacecraft-Sun line of sight be approximately normal to the
spin vector, and field of view requirements for the earth communications
antenna or other sensors.
The spin vector direction can be partially determined from the spinning
spacecraft by an array of four Sun sensors with a slit field of view spaced at
90 degree intervals about the nominal spacecraft spin axis. Differencing the
elevation angles measured by opposite sensors, with suitable filtering of
measurement noise due to MM wobble motions, will determine the spin vector
deviation from the nominal spin axis, and averaging the four readings will
give the spin axis-Sun angle. The time for one revolution determines the
spin rate. Failure of one Sun sensor would still allow attitude determination
with modified computer logic.
The complete three-dimensional spin vector orientation could be
determined fairly precisely with an electronic-image-sensing, two-gimbal,
star tracker, mounted externally on a despun base and used in conjunction
with the Sun sensor array. (Star acquisition and image data processing with
tracker platform wobble would present potential problems.) However, no
real need is seen for this additional complexity. Present estimates are that
the spacecraft spin orientation will not randomly change more than a few
hundredths of a degree per day, which is less than the beamwidth of the
communications antenna. If this is so, then, for earth communications
periods a day or so apart, earth acquisition does not present a problem. The
initial operation would be to true up the MM attitude, if necessary, so that
the antenna despin axis would be nearly colinear with the spacecraft spin
vector, as determined by the Sun sensor array. This would be accomplished
by RCS and perhaps slight cable repositioning with the cable winches. The
earth line-of-sight direction, in terms of angle with the spin axis and azi-
muth angle measured from the spacecraft-Sun line of sight would be computed,
assuming that the spin vector had not been rotated about the Sun line since
the last communications period. The antenna would then be pointed in the
computed direction. Equalization of the antenna despin rate with the space-
craft spin rate, to provide stabilized antenna pointing, might be facilitated
with a slit field Sun sensor on the antenna platform. This would require that
the antenna itself have complete azimuth freedom relative to the despun plat-
form on which the Sun sensor was mounted. This would require an extra
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movable joint in the system. Once the antenna received a signal from earth,
it would track the signal, and the antenna pointing angles would be fed into
the computer to update the spin vector direction.
Spin vector corrections would be controlled by the G&N computer and
executed by the RCS. It is expected that corrections would be required only
infrequently, with a very small RCS fuel requirement, but detailed studies
have not been made.
if the spacecraft spin vector precesses only a small fraction of a
degree per day, there is no need for continual monitoring of the spin vector,
and operation of the Sun sensor array and relevant computer module could be
limited to periods of antenna or scientific sensor pointing during spin mode
cruise.
Wobble Damping
Wobble motions of the MM will result from coning of the spacecraft
spin vector, resulting in erratic motion of the module center of mass, and
from attitude excursions of the module, which may be made worse by the
flexible cable system linking the MM to the EEM/Propulsion module. Nor-
mally these motions will be small, and will be damped by a passive viscous
fluid damper. Active wobble damping by the propulsion module RCS may be
required during spinup and despin operations and may also be required for
certain mission events and contingencies. Studies of control logic for wob-
ble damping of the artificial gravity spacecraft configurations indicate that
adequate control will require 3-axis sensing of attitude deviation, angular
rates, and accelerations. Thus, for short periods, the complete AS_SCS
system of strapdown gyros and accelerorneters may be required. During
these periods, control logic and RCS commands will be generated by a G_
computer module.
5. I. Z Reliability Analysis
The reliability logic diagram for the artificial gravity mode function is
presented in Figure 5. I, an analysis of each function follows.
SU/DS Control Function Reliability
The SCS components required to control the gravity force are the ECA,
AE/GD, driver amplifiers, and the rotation control (Figure 5. I). Because
of the relative short operating time for the SU/DS control function (24 hours)
as compared to the time these same components must operate in the zero-
gravity configuration, this function has little effect on the mission reliability.
The reliability estimate without provisions for maintenance and repair
exceeds 0. 999. Since some of the components herein are interchangeable
with those in the AS_CS function, the probability of not having a functional
gravity control function is less than one chance in 105 .
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Gravity-Monitor Function Reliability
The gravity monitor function employs two components not common to
the Apollo Crew Module AgaSCS. These components are the accelerometer
used for sensing the artificial-gravity force and the display used to present
the magnitude of this force. These type of components is used elsewhere in
Apollo/Saturn and these data were used in this analysis. It has been assun_ed
that knowledge of the gravity force is essential at all times while the vehicle
is in the gravity configuration. The estimated reliability of the gravity-
monitor function is 0.75957, based on 15,727 hours of operation. The chance
of failure of both components of this function is greater than one in ten;
therefore, both require some improvement in their reliabilities.
5. i. 3 Availability Analysis
Inspection of the operating times and failure rates in the gravity-
configuration reliability logic diagram (Figure 5. i) reveals the weak links
are the gravity display and the accelerometer. Two spare gravity displays
will raise the display reliability from 0.86157 to 0. 999951. Two spare
accelerometers will raise the accelerometer reliability from 0.88161 to
0. 9997O.
Considering these spares and the redundant ECA provided for a similar
function in the Ag_SCS system, the reliability of the gravity-configuration is
raised to at least 0.99907. This is sufficient to exceed the desired mission
goal and is achievable with contemporary Apollo/Saturn hardware. Replace-
ment of these components as a whole seems the most practical approach
since they are small and light and not easily disassembled.
5. I. 4 Conclusions and Recommendations on Artificial Gravity System
The analysis reveals that the control of the artificial gravity mode can
be done safely and reliably. Table 5. 1 indicates that the addition of only four
spares to contemporary systems will assure system performance with a more
than 0. 999 probability. No requirements in the control area tax the state of
art. However, none of these functions has been performed on earth or in
space, and for that reason a detailed study and test program should be initiated
to demonstrate feasability and identify both the potential design and opera-
tional problems.
Table 5. I. Spares Requirements, Artificial Gravity Control
Numbe r Weight Volume
Component Required (pounds) (cubic inches)
Accelerometer
Gravity display
Totals
2
2
4
5.2110.4
8.9] 17.8
28.2
73. 0]146
350/700
846
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5. 2 COMMUNICATIONS AND DATA SYSTEMS
(Note: Much of the data used herein was provided by the Collins
Radio Co. through Reference 5. 1. )
5.2. 1 Functional Requirements
Specific functional requirements for the baseline mission Communica-
tions and Data System (CDS) were identified in the baseline mission descrip-
tion in Reference 1. 1 and 5. 1.
The telecommunication and data management system defined by the
study efforts consists of three major subsystems: mission module communi-
cations, probe-support communications, and the earth entry module
telecommunications. Each subsystem contains several primary-function
elements that are interconnected to provide a multiplicity of functions. Life-
time, crew safety, and mission success objectives indicate the need for
multiple-redundant and backup modes of operation; each system is redundant
in itself in several ways, and each communications subsystem will, as an
alternate, backup the operation of the others.
(1) The Probe Support Communications Subsystems (PSCS) is an identical
duplicate of the MMCS and may operate in parallel or as an alternate to the
MMCS for all functions. When used for communications with probes, the
system provides the following functional capabilities:
• Probe tracking and ranging from spacecraft
• Transmission to probes of spacecraft-originated commands
• Reception of probes digital telemetry
• Reception of probes video.
Since this is a Criticality III system, no detailed analysis is devoted
to it. However, since the duplicate functions in the Mission Module (MMCS)
are analyzed, the results apply directly to these systems functions.
(Z) The EEM CDS functions are required for launch operations and earth
orbital operations support and during planetary injection, velocity changes,
and earth reentry. Requirements imposed on these functions are similar to
Apollo in every respect, and the Apollo capabilities will more than meet the
EEM mission functional requirements. A function block diagram of these
requirements is presented in Figure 5.2.
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both, of the remaining stations. Because of this feature, any two of
the stations will fulfill all the functional requirements.
The Premodulation Processor contains the circuits required to
provide for the interface connections between the spacecraft data
gathering equipment and the radio frequency transmission equipment.
It contains signal modulation and demodulation, signal mixing, and
signal switching circuits to provide the required signal paths for a
given mode of operation.
The Data Storage Equipment consists of an l 1-channel, 3-speed,
magnetic tape recorder and reproducer. In its present configuration,
it has the capability to record and reproduce two channels of digital
data and five channels of analog data. Record and reproduce electronics
are not supplied for the remaining channels. The capability to add
these channels is inherent in the design concept. This equipment com-
prises tape deck, record electronics, reproduce electronics, a signal
conversion electronics, tape motion and end-of-tape sensors, speed
detector, switching electronics, and magnetic tape.
The Pulse Code Modulation (PCM) Telemetry Equipment consists of a
combination of functional units necessary to combine various analog
and digital measurements into binary-coded digital signals. The PCM
is capable of sampling all or portions of its input signals, depending on
which of two sampling programs is remotely selected. This equipment
makes extensive use of internal redundancy to improve its reliability.
The Unified S-Band Equipment (USBE) consists of two redundant S-band,
phase-locked transponders and one FM transmitter. Each transponder
consists of a transmitter, receiver, and power supply. The FM trans-
mitter is electrically independent of the transponders. Only one
transponder is active at a given time. However, simultaneous opera-
tion of the FM transmitter and one of the transponders is possible.
The USBE will be used only in the sphere of influence of the earth at the
beginning and end of the mission.
The S-Band Power Amplifier consists of two 20-watt, traveling-wave-
tube, power amplifiers with associated power supplies, control
circuits, and a multiplexer mounted on a common chassis. It provides
for either amplified or bypass transmission in the PM mode. It also
provides for amplified, but not bypassed, FM transmission. The
multiplexer provides a receive signal from the antenna and isolates the
amplifiers so that PM and FM transmission are possible simultaneously
or separately. The PM bypass mode is construed to be for emergency
use only. The EEM subsystem is independent of the mission module
systems except for possible transfer of signals and data between the
two module s.
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Several capabilities are included for use during earth orbital,EVA, and
reentry/landing/recovery operations. The S-band equipment that normally
supports the lunar mission during the non-earth-orbit phases of the lunar
mission is not required as such for the EEM. It is, however, used in the
MM. Other equipments may be used during all phases of the mission. A
brief discussion of each piece of equipment follows
High Frequency Transceiver comprises an HF transmitter, receiver,
and power amplifier. It provides beyond-line-of-sight direction finding
and voice communications during orbital flight and postlanding phases
of the mission.
The VHF Beacon has the single function to provide line-of-sight beacon
transmission during earth landing and recovery operations. It consists
of a VHF amplitude modulated transmitter.
The VHF triplexer is a 3-channel, passive-filter device. It provides
the necessary isolation to permit single-channel or simultaneous Z- or
3-channel transmission and/or reception with a common antenna.
The VHF AM Transmitter-Receiver comprises two independent VHF/AM
transmitters and two independent VHF/AM receivers in a single pack-
age. These provide the necessary communications while in earth orbit.
One transmitter and receiver provide for transmission and reception of
voice communications on a single preassigned frequency. The other
transmitter and receiver provide for transmission and reception of voice
communications on a second preassigned frequency. This channel also
provides for the reception of data (such as EVA biomedical) at the same
frequency. External switching and the VHF triplexer permit the
receivers and transmitters to be used in any combination of the two
channels for voice communications.
The C-Band Transponder is used for near-earth tracking with ground-
based radar. It consists of four superheterodyne receivers and a
pulse transmitter and antenna switching network. These allow the
transponder to receive and reply to any one of four antennas located in
each quadrant around the EEM.
The Audio Center consists of four electrically identical sets of circuitry
(stations), which enable parallel selection, isolation, gain control, and
amplification of all spacecraft voice communications. Each station is
operated from a remote control panel, which provides each astronaut
with independent audio control of common S-Band, HF, WI--IF/AM, and
intercommunication circuits. Each astronaut is provided with individual
microphone and earphone jacks. In the event of a station failure, the
failed-station microphone and earphones may be plugged into one, but not
will fulfillall the functional requirements.
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(3) The MM CDS functions are required to support the mission
operations from post-injection to the time the crew enters the EEM for
reentry. This amounts to about 16, 800 hours of operation. However, all
the CDS functions will not be required throughout that period and none is
expected to be operated continuously.
Figure 5. 3 presents the baseline CDS for the MM in functional form.
It is designed to meet the requirements set forth in Reference 1. 1 and
Volume I of this report.
OWITN ADDED PANAll4ETNIC AMPLIFIER
Figure 5. 3. Baseline CDS for the Mission Module
The baseline MM CDS is considered to be made up of Apollo equipment as
described in the previous paragraph but with the foliowing important
exceptions :
. Low-noise, parametric amplifiers have been added to the USBE
PM transponders.
2. The audio center has four instead of three stations.
3. A single 500-watt, S-band, power amplifier has been added.
The transmitter loop, operating at 2300 mHz, has dual 20-watt and
dual 500-watt rf power amplifiers. The transmitter is 0.25 watts, PM or
FMwideband, with one to three subcarriers as well as direct carrier
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modulation. Range-code and command-code generators and detectors and a
variety of signal modulators and detectors are provided. Several phase lock
al_d FM receivers are available. In general, a patch-panel approach would
permit coupling functions as needed. The smaller equipment would have
internal triple or quadredundant circuitry; larger equipment (power ampli-
fiers) would be switchable pairs, supplemented by replaceable spares from
storage.
Other characteristics of the system can be summarized as follows:
• Parametric receiver front ends with the noise figure of
approximately 3 db.
• Variable data rates and bandwidth
• Low-gain backup antennas
• Coherent S-band transponders with a turnaround ranging channel
• Ranging and Doppler extraction circuitry
• Data and voice storage
• Audio centers and intercom.
The system is primarily intended to provide communications with
earth, but can be used as a backup or a parallel capability for communica-
tions with probes. When used for spacecraft-earth communications, the
system provides the following functional capabilities:
1. Transmission of spacecraft engineering and experiment telemetry
2. Relay to earth of probe telemetry
3. Transmission of spacecraft video
4. Relay to earth of probe video
.
6.
7.
8.
Reception of earth-originated digital commands and encoded data
Reception and transmission of duplex voice
Transmission of emergency keying
Reception and retransmission of earth-originated spacecraft
tracking and ranging signal.
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Digital telemetry and command data are transmitted through PCM/
PSK/PM. With a 210-foot-diameter ground antenna and 55 K ground-system
noise temperature, telemetry can be transmitted at approximately a miilion
bits per second at Mars encounter range and at 100 kbps at the range of
3.2 AU, with a Circuit margin of 3 db. The corresponding command and
encodedupdata rates are 70 and 7 kbps using a 10-kw transmitter and an
85-foot-diameter antenna at ground. With a 210-foot ground antenna, the
uplink rates are 400 kbps at Mars encounter and 40 kbps at 3. 2 AU.
Wideband FM is used for the transmission of video data. Assuming
a phase-lock FM demodulator at the ground and an output signal-to-noise
ratio of 35 db, video images of commercial-television-type quality can be
transmitted to earth at the rate of approximately two frames per second at
Mars encounter range and 0.2 frame per second at 3. 2 AU.
Duplex voice communications can be maintained throughout the mission
except for periods of occultation by the Sun and target planet. Voice com-
munications among crew members is provided by means of a hardwire inter-
com. For spacecraft tracking and ranging, a coherent carrier frequency
translation and a turnaround pseudo-random code are used, phase modulated
upon the carrier. The code bit rate of one megabit per second provides a
range measurement accuracy of approximately 0. 1 kilometer.
The main physical characteristics of the system are estimated to be
as follows: weight, 700 pounds; volume (excluding 19-foot-diameter antenna),
6000 cubic inches; power consumption, up to 3200 watts.
5. Z. 2 CDS Reliability Analysis
(1) The EEM CDS reliability estimates are based on the data in Table 5. 2
and the duty cycle estimates estabiished for the baseline mission in Volume I
of this report. The EEM CDS will display a reliability in excess of 0. 99 and
require no spares.
In the EEM subsystem evaluation, no consideration was made for the
use of this equipment to back up the mission module subsystem or vice versa.
The EEM CDS can be considered a backup to the mission module systems,
and, conversely, both the PSCS and MM CDS can be used to compensate for
defective EEM systems. It seems unlikely that portions of the EEM CDS
would be used except when manned for either a normai or emergency return
flight operation, and thesewill probably not exceed 100 hours.
(2) The MM CDS reIiability estimates are based on the data presented in
Table 5.4, which was, in turn, derived from demonstrated Apollo data,
except those given for the 500-watt S-band power amplifier. These estimated
values are based on experience with the 20-watt traveling-wave tubes (TWT)
amplifiers and part vendors' expected characteristics of high-power TWT's.
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Table 5.2. Apollo Block II C and D Subsystem Data
Primary Failure P_te Weight
Function Equipment (%/1000 hr) (lb)
Recovery
EVA and
near earth
Translunar,
lunar, and
transearth
HF transceiver
VHF beacon
Triplexer (Note 1)
VHF AM transmitter-receiver (Note 1)
C-band radar
Audio center (3 stations) (Note 2)
Premodulation processor (Note 2)
Data storage equipment (Note 2)
PCM (Note 2)
USBE PM transponder
FM transmitter
20-watt S-band power amplifier
3. 67
0. 109
0. 0067
1.519
6.50
0.51
0. 665
4.50
0. 111 (Note 3)
1. 94
0. 68
1.21
6.1
2.3
1.6
IZ.Z
24. 5
7.5
11.4
40
42. 7
31. 6 (Note 4)
31. 6 (Note 5)
NOTES: I. Also used for lunar communication between astronauts.
2. Also used in other phases of the mission.
3. Failure rate reflects built-in redundancy.
4. Includes two PM transponders and one FM transmitter.
5. Includes two redundant amplifiers.
Table 5. 3. EEM Subsystem Reliability Estimates
Mission Operating Probability of
As sembly Time (hr) Mission Succe s s Comments
Four stations.Audio center
VHF/AM transceiver
VHF t riplexer
HF transceiver
Premodulation processor
Unified S-band equipment
S-band power amplifier
Data storage equipment
PCM
VHF recovery beacon
C-band transponder
EEM CDS
109.5
45.0
45.5
13.5
49.0
1.5 receive
11.5 transmit
11.5
35.0
61.0
82.0
93.0
0. 99926
0. 99984
0. 99999
0. 99996
O. 99907
0. 99991
0.999999
0.99840
0.99993
0.99991
0.99397
0.99
Includes both
EEM-MSFN and
EEM- EVA links.
Assume same duty
cycles as Apollo
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Table 5.4. Mission Module Baseline Systems Equipment
Equipment
Data storage equipment
USBE: PM transponder
FM transmitter
Failure Rate
(%/1,000 hr)
PCM equipment
4.50
I. 99 (Note
0. 68
Weight
(lb)
1)
0. 11 1 (Note 3)
40. 0
3 1. 6 (Note 3)
42. 7
Premodulation proce s sor
Audio center (4 stations)
20-watt S-band power amplifier
500-watt S-band power amplifier (Note 5)
o. 655
o. 68
1.21
5. 00
11.4
i0.0
3 i. 6 (Note 4)
325.0
Total System Weight 492. 3
NOTES:
1. 0.05%/i,000 hours has been added to cover required low-noise, para-
metric amplifier.
2. Includes two PM transponders and one FM transmitter.
3. Failure rate reflects built-in redundancy.
4. Includes two redundant amplifiers.
5. Failure rates and weights estimated.
The reliability requirement for the MM CDS functions vary with the
criticality of the involved function. Establishing these requirements involved
defining critical assemblies at the subsystem level and then critical sub-
assemblies at the assembly level. Critical assembly and subassembly
definition was based on a reliability weak link and system criticaiity
assessment.
A weak link was defined as an assembly or subassembly having the
lowest probability of surviving without failure in the system or assembly
reliability configuration. The selection of weak links was further weighed by
their criticality assignment established in Volume I of this report and related
to the mission objective.
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Criticality was factored into the requirements analysis by interpreting
the probability objectives, assigned to the criticality classes, in terms of
mission failures. Thus Criticality II, having a probability objective of 0.95,
would be expected to produce only half as many failures per mission as
Criticality III equipment having an objective of 0.90. The analysis was con-
ducted with Criticality II equipment being weighted twice as heavily as
Criticality III equipment.
Table 5.5 contains the various reliability parameters used to accom-
plish the mission module communications and data subsystem requirements
analysis.
The first step in the analysis involved calculating the mission reliability
for each assembly of Table 5.5 as well as the number of expected failures for
a mission. The number of expected failures for Criticality II equipment was
then doubled in order that they could be properly weighed against
Criticality III assemblies. Results of these calculations are contained in
Table 5. 6.
This analysis indicates that the USBE, data storage, and audio center
all display a reliability far too low and results in a potential 1ViM CDS
reliability of about 0. 379.
It will be noted in Table 5. 6 that the USBE has the highest weighted
number of expected failures and is therefore the critical assembly in the path.
If the Apollo USBE had been used in the baseline system, the weighted
number of failures would have been 0. 343, which would have made the assem-
bly the second critical assembly, still a prime candidate for improvement.
5.2.3 CDS Availability Requirements Analysis
The reliability analysis revealed several weak-link functions within the
MM CDS that will not permit achievement of the mission objectives without
some form of improvement. These are analyzed herein using the availability
conc ept.
(I) The USBE displayed a potential reliability of only 0.7105 and since it is
the major link from deep space to the earth complex, it should be in excess
of 0.99. An examination of the present design concept revealed that the
design could be maintained at two levels (Figures 5.4 and 5.5), either the
major subassembly or the part level. Since this was the case and maintenance
by assembly replacement was the optimum concept for improving availability,
the spares indicated in Table 5.7 were found necessary to assure a Ps of
greater than 0.99. The USBE required only 5 spare assemblies, amounting
to only about 15 pounds.
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Table 5.5. Baseline Subsystem Reliability Parameters
Assembly Name
Failure
Rate
(%/1000 hr)
Audio center 0.17
Premodulation processor 0.655
Operating
Time
(hours)
PCM
Data storage equipment
Unified S-band equipment:
PM transponder
0.IIi
4.50
1.99
16,541
5,851
519
8,510
Criticality
Class
II
il & III
III
1II
Comments
l,'ailurc rate is for each of
four stations
Supports both communi-
cations and data functh,ns
Failure rate is an average
failure rate reflecting
extensive use of circuit
redundancy
FM transmitter
20-watt S- band power amplifier
O.68
1.21
16,540 II Failure rate is for a
single transponder
500-watt S-band amplifier 5.0
1,846
1,846
1,846
III
II Failure rate is for each of
two amplifiers considered
in a standby redundant
configuration
Table 5. 6. MM/CDS Reliability Requirements
Assembly Name
Audio center
Premodulation processor
PCM
Data storage equipment
S-band 20-w amplifier
S-band 500-w amplifier
Unified S-band equipment
Probability of
No Failure
0. 8936
0. 9624
0. 9994
0. 6821
0. 9997
0. 9118
0. 7105
Expected Failures
(Weighted)
0. 224
0. 076
0.001
0. 383
0. 022
0. 184
0. 670
System 0. 3789 .....
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Table 5.7. USBE Requirements Analysis for Optimum Availability
USBE Subas sembly
Receiver
Power supply
PM transmitter
Rf tracking
Probability
of Success
0.85657
0.90328
0.94469
0.99571
Expected
Failure s
(weighted)
0. 310
0. 204
0. 114
0. 008
Spares
Required
Parametric amplifier
FM transmitter
Mi s c e llane ou s
0.99077
0.98745
0.99681
0.016
0.012
0. 006
C ont ribution
to Ps
0. 996
0. 9950
0. 9984
0. 9957
0.991
0. 9999
Total 0. 7105 - 5 0. 990
(2) The Data Storage Equipment (DSE) did not achieve the desired reliability
goal at only 0. 682. Since it is maintainable at the major assembly level
(Figures 5.6 and 5.7), it was decided to select
though it was not required for crew comfort or
Criticality III and only associated with mission
reflects the result of maintenance provision at
the required spares even
safe return. It is in
success (Pms). Table 5.8
the assembly level. The
resulting contribution to Pros was raised from 0. 682 to more than 0.927
with only three spares, amounting to about 57 pounds. Repair to this com-
ponent, which do not require supporting spares, can lower its contribution
to Pros to better than 0.999.
(3) The Audio Center (ACE) required improvement in its contribution to crew
support requirements since its mission reliability for the four centers was
only about 0. 894. It was found that by adding one spare station as a complete
component, the contribution to Ps was raised to over 0. 994. The replacement
problem was simplified considerably since the failure hazard at lower levels
was evenly distributed and M&R at that level is possible but more complex.
This is evident from the various views presented in Figure 4.8. Much is to
be gained in terms of reliability and convenience with the spare station. It
could be wired into the system and left off until needed. It would be available
to all crewmen and controlled from its own panel, which would be placed in
the most useful location. Another possibility would be to provide each station
with its own connector on the ACE. A failure in one of the four operating
stations would be corrected by moving the appropriate cable connector to the
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Figure 5 . 7 .  Data Storage Equipment, Construction Exposed 
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Table 5.8. DSE Requirements Analysis for Mission Success
DSE Subas s embly
Transport
Power supply
Control logic
Digital circuits
Analog circuits
Erase circuits
Heads
Miscellaneous
Totals
Probability
of
Success
0. 7550
0. 9704
0. 9802
0. 9792
0. 9920
0. 9930
0. 9940
0. 9900
Expected
Failure s
(weighted)
Spares
Required
0.682
0. 281
0. 030
0.0Z0
0.021
0. 008
0. 007
0. 006
0.010
2
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
Contribution
to Pros
0. 9970
0. 9989
0. 9998
0. 9998
0. 9920
0. 9930
0. 9940
0. 9900
0. 978
spare station connector on the ACE. Emergency station sharing, as used
in Apollo, will still be provided.
(4) The 500-Watt S-Band Amplifier will probably present the most difficult
problem in terms of maintainability. Its initial reliability for the mission
is expected to be about 0.91, but since it is a new system function there is
little applicable data to verify this assessment. It is, however, known that
the traveling wave tube (TWT) will most likely contribute most of the failure
hazard, and, for that reason, replacing the TWT is expected to be the
optimum maintenance concept for this function. To raise the contribution to
Ps from 0.91 to 0.995, one spare TWT is required, or a complete spare
amplifier package will raise it to 0. 9967. Two spare TWT's will raise it to
0.9996, and two amplifiers to 0.9999. The recommended approach is to
provide at least two TWT's as spares because of the poor data base.
5. 2.4 Maintainability Inferences on the CDS
Maintenance and repair (M and R) of the CDS was shown to be a
requirement to achieve the MM system Ps objectives. The EEM system
could achieve its objective without any maintenance plans. The resulting
M and R requirement are reflected in the proposed final system configuration
of Figure 5.9.
Maintainability features of the present designs, typical of contemporary
hardware, are self-evident from the photos of Figure 5. I0 and 5. II, the PCM
telemetry and premodulation processor.
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Table 5.9. MM CDS Spares Complement
DSE
USBE
PCM
PMP
Audio center
Equipment
20-watt S-band power amplifier
500-watt S-band power amplifier
0. 967*
0. 990
0. 999
0. 982
0. 994
Spar e s
Assemblies
Transports
Power supply
Digital circuits
Control logic
Receiver
Power supply
PM transmitter
FM transmitter
None
None
Audio station
TWT
TWT
Numb e r
of
Spar e s
Weight
of
Spares
(lb)
50. 0*
2. 5*
3.5*
i. 0*
6.0
5.0
2.0
Z. 0
2.0
1.0
3.0
Totals O. 98+ 14 78. 0
":-'Not required for crew comfort or safe return.
The following changes are required to the baseline system to arrive at
a final system capability of meeting availability requirements:
i, The DSE requires changes to allow transport replacement as a
maintenance action in space. Replacement of the power supply,
digital circuits, and control logic is presently feasible, and some
changes would improve capability.
. The 20- and 500-watt amplifiers have to be designed to facilitate
replacement of the TWT's.
. The present method of securing covers should be modified to
permit rapid access to replaceable modules.
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5. 2. 5 Conclusions and Recommendations on the CDS
The study demonstrated that the CDS in the Apollo configuration could
meet the mission objective with the addition of a 500-watt S-band amplifier
and a low-noise-parametric amplifier to the USBE transporter. No modifi-
cations were required to facilitate the maintenance as recommended;
however, some changes were desirable to decrease the spares complement
required, and to permit expedient performance of the tasks. As Table 5.9
indicated, only 14 spares, amounting to 78 pounds, were required to meet
all the CDS objectives. However, only 9 of these, amounting to only 21
pounds, were required for functions affecting crew comfort, and are really
required to assure the planned operational mode.
The following are some recommendations resulting from this analysis:
. A method of thorough subsystem checkout is needed aboard the
spacecraft. This checkout can be used as a routine subsysten_
maintenance procedure such as checkout preceding critical
mission phases. If the subsystem is known to be in operating con-
dition just prior to a critical mission phase, the required
probability of completing that phase becomes realizable.
2.. Spare and redundant items should, in general, be at a functional
assembly level, or a large high-failure-rate component such as a
power amplifier tube. Simple modules should be used where
possible. This would minimize repair time and maintenance-
induced failures. It may also result in weight reduction by
eliminating the need for sophisticated tools. Where this type
packaging is not feasible (data storage equipment), it is recom-
mended that complete equipment be carried as spares.
0 The relatively poor data storage equipment should be and can be
made more reliable with a modest increase in weight. If the
spares requirement were one instead of two units, a net overall
weight reduction of 2.0 to 30 pounds would be possible.
. Definite, well founded, failure rates for the periods of inactivity
are lacking. These failure rates are assumed to be zero, and
this is the normal practice.
° Reliability figures for the 500-watt, S-band, power amplifier are
estimates. The figures used in this study are believed attainable,
but since this hardware has never been designed, built, and used,
the analyses lacks validity. The design of such a function should
start immediately because of the long development cycle required.
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.
.
The data storage equipment is the only significant maintainability
problem. This is because the present equipment does not lend
itself to in-flight maintenance, other than replacing the entire unit.
Two wired-in spares would appear impractical from a system
wiring viewpoint.
Advanced packaging techniques recommended in Appendix IV would
be desirable but not required. As a result the spares level would
be reduced considerably.
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5.3 ANTENNA SYSTEMS
Note: Much of the data used herein was provided by the Dalmo
Victor Co. through References 5.Z and 5.3.
5.3. 1 Functional Requirements
The antenna systems required to support the baseline mission fall into
three groupings: the earth entry module antenna, the mission module to
earth (MME) antenna, and the mission module to probe (MMP) antenna. The
EEM antenna requirement will be satisfied by the Apollo antenna systems,
excluding the deep space antenna. Since communications from the EEM will
be limited to near earth distances, the omniantenna will satisfy this require-
ment. See Reference 5.3 for additional data.
i. The MMP antenna is required to establish and maintain communi-
cations with the planetary probes from the time they are launched at about
planet peTigee, minus I0 days, until earth takes over control of them at
about + I0 degs. This is a noncritical (Criticality III) function. The
communication range will include distances up to that encountered on the
Apollo mission, and, for that reason, the Apollo deep space antenna (ADSA)
will perform the required functions. The antenna is expected to have about
a 28.6-db gain and a beamwidth of about 6 degree. The beamwidth will be
unsatisfactory for monitoring and controlling all the probes at the same time
and will therefore have to be operated in a modified scanning mode, time
sharing the antenna between probes in a manner not yet defined. This
antenna will also provide a backup capability to the earth link in case of
failure. A picture of the antenna is presented in Figure 5. ]Z. From it the
inherent redundancy within the design proper may be seen.
The scanning is accomplished through a two-axis gimbal that requires
no power during standby or launch and is locked in any position by removing
the electrical power. The servo system is a closed-loop system which
positions the gimbal anywhere between the +6.6 degree limits when com-
manded. The system has been demonstrated reliable on several programs.
2. The MME antenna is required to maintain communications with the
earth complex while the spacecraft is in both the zero and artificial-gravity
modes. It will require a 19-ft. dish providing about a 37. 2-db gain and about
i. 5 degrees beam width. With minor modifications, the Apollo antenna
gimbal will provide the mounting requirements. This has been demonstrated
by Dalmo Victor, (Reference 5.3). This system therefore provided the
data for the MME antenna analysis herein.
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5. 3.2 Reliability Analysis
1. The MMP Antenna, vsing the Apollo concept for probe communica-
tions only, would require no change in the design to pr{}vide commensurate
reliability or probability of mission success. This conclusion is based
simply on the duration of the proposed function. Indications are that the
duration of probe communications is 400 hours. The reliability of the Apollo
antenna configuration is based on a duration of 336 hours. Therefore, the
probability of mission success of the Apollo antenna for probe communications
is satisfactory without maintenance or repair required. That is, the contri-
butionto Pros will exceed 0.999 and, since this is a Criticality III function,
this more than meets the objective.
Z. The MME Antenna Reliability must be based on a full 16,550 hours
of operation. It is a Criticality II system and must therefore achieve a higher
probability of no uncompensable failures (Ps)" The Apollo failure rates for
the antenna functions were used and result in the reliabilities given in
Figure 5. 12_3 The resultant reliability for the baseline mission wouid be
P = P P P
S a e cu
= 0.81
This is obviously too low and must be improved considerably. From the
breakdown presented in logic of Figure 5. 13, it is evident that these are
three weak links limiting the reliability of the system.
_ Control Electronic
Unit A s s embly
0. 9969 0. 890
 un an__ Electronics Electronics0.9511 0.9307
] Antenna.
I ssembly0. 940
Gimbal_Radiator
Assembly _-_ Assembly
0. 9489 I I 0.991
Figure 5. 13. Reliability Logic, Antenna System
5.3.3 Availability Requirements Analysis
The MME antenna will require some sort of support to improve the Ps
contribution to an acceptable level. Each of the weak links previousIy
identified must be improved to equalize risk at about 0.998, which will assure
a Ps of about 0.99. Each weak link is analyzed in the following.
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l. The control unit of the antenna system provides a visual indication
of the antenna pointing direction in spacecraft coordinates and the
manual control of that pointing direction. Although the narrow
beam width of the 19-ft antenna precludes the manual control of the
antenna during the major portion of the mission, there are some
instances where this capacity is desirable. Accordingly, this
assembly was considered as a required part of the system.
The critical components of the control unit are shown in Table 5.10.
They consist of four resolvers and the terminal solder connections.
Two of the resolvers are size 15, and two are size 11. The
Apollo II failure rate is
-6
= 0.0188 x 10 , or R = 0.99685k
C
U
for the mission. Since the solder connections are to terminals and
the capability of repair is assumed, the failure rate of these con-
nections are considered negligible in the 700-day mission. It can
be seen that, even without the failure of solder connections, the
unit failure rate still exceeds the apportionment. Consequently,
the sparing considered was one each size 15 and one each size 11
resolvers. The result of this sparing is that Ps of the equivalent
unit becomes Ps >0.99999.
This is far above the requirement but sparing only one of the
resolvers would be risky since both exhibit the same failure hazard
and they are not interchangeable.
The Electronics Assembly contains the logic circuitry for the
directing and automatic control of the antenna. Because of the
previously mentioned narrow beam width of the antennae, this
automatic function becomes more critical with mission extension
attempts. The present construction of this unit is basically,
2 by 2 P/C logic modules mounted on four mother-boards.
Figure 5.14 shows that the circuits are divided into two major
groups--common and redundant. The common circuitry modules
and/or components are listed in Table 5.11. The redundant
circuits modules are listed in Table 5. 12 and in logic form in
Figure 5. 15. From these it is evident that the baseline configura-
tion contains some internal redundancy in standby operation. If a
component fails in the primary circuit, relays allow the switching
to the complete secondary circuit. This was required since no
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repairs were allowed for the lunar mission. If a different com-
ponent fails in the secondary circuit (the nonredundant circuits),
both systems have failed, and the antenna is inoperable with
respect to automatic tracking. Adhering to this mode of operation
(block redundancy), the probability of mission success is:
P = 0. 8008
s
which is too low. The reliability of the redundant circuit alone is:
P = 0. 81444
r
where
k = 33. 587O
r
for each circuit. The reliability of the common circuit is
P = 0. 993O79
c
for
k = 0.4272
C
By providing for the replacement of the electronics assembly
in toto the Ps would be raised to:
P = P P (2 -Pr)S C r
= 0. 96344
As can be seen, the attainment of the required Ps would require
the sparing of two or more of these assemblies, with the attendant
structure, for the baseline mission. However, this method of
sparing is only required when assuming zero repair capability or
when the same components or subassembly in both the primary and
secondary circuit fail; i.e., the failures are not random.
In the analysis of this assembly, the provision for maintenance and
repair no longer requires the present block redundancy operation.
Considering that a failure of a single part in a circuit does not
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Table 5.10. Antenna Control Unit
Function
A s sembly
Resolver,
pitch
Resolver,
yaw
Resolver,
size 11
Resolver,
size 15
C onnections
Total
Duty
Cycle
(hours)
16,5oo
16,500
16,500
16,500
Apollo II
A s sembly
lx 10 -6
0.004
0.004
0.004
0. 004
0. 0028
0.0188
Mars Mission
Spared Equivalent
0.000005
0.000005
0.000005
0.000005
0.000020
Spares
0
(2 out of 3
operating)
I
0
(2 out of 3
operating)
1
Table 5. Ii. Electronic Assembly, Common Circuit
Functional
Assembly
Instrument
servo, pitch
Instrument
servo, yaw
Transistor
Board No. 3
Resolver
Resolver
Inductor
Capacitors (8)
Transformers (i)
Transformers (I)
Connector s
Connections
Relays
Duty
Cycle
(M)
16,
16,
16,
16,
16,
16,
16,
16,
16,
16,
16,
16,
Apollo II
kx 10 -6
Mars Mission Report
(16,500 hr)
500 0.05130
500 O.05130
Spared Equivalent
0.000862
0.000862
500 0.01980
5OO O. OOO4
5OO O. OOO4
5OO 0.0020
500 0.0400
50O O. O50O
500 0.0500
500 0.0990
5OO O. O48O
5OO 0.0150
0.4272
0.000222
0.000400
0.000400
0.000040
0.000050
0.000050
m
0.002997
Spared Required
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Table 5. IZ_3Electronics Assembly, Redundant and Circuits
Mars Mission
Requirement
(16,500 hrs)
Functional A s s embly
Mode Switch "A"
Amplifier
Demodulator P. II
Duty C yc le
(hr)
16
16
16
Acquisition logic P. III 16
Amplifier 1 6
I 16
16
16
16
16
I 16
I 16,
16,
P. I 16,
P. II 16,
16,
16,
16,
16,
16,
16,
16,
16,
Demodulator, P.
Drive logic, P. I
Drive logic, P. II
Mode logic, P. I
Mode logic, P. II
Central logic, P.
Control logic, P.
Secret generator
Acquisition logic,
Acquisition logic,
Servo component
Servo component
400 cycle amp
+lZv req.
-6v req.
Limit logic
+5v reference
+4v rectified
,500
,500
,500
,500
,500
,500
,500
,500
,500
,500
,500
5OO
5OO
5OO
5OO
5OO
5OO
5OO
5OO
5OO
5OO
5OO
5OO
Apollo II
kx 10 -6
o. 6672
i. 0145
0. 4032
0. 9743
1.0168
2. 0754
I. 8669
I. 0680
0.3 970
0. 9479
0. 5656
0. 8218
0.73 49
i. 3 982
i. 0885
1.1615
i. 1615
0. 4769
1.3965
0. 4639
0.3328
I. 4377
0. 4956
Spared
Equivalent
0. 000082
0. 000287
0. 000018
0. OO0255
0.0OO289
0.0O2393
0. 001851
0. OO0346
0. 000235
0. 000235
0. 000050
0.00O153
0. 000110
0. 000744
0. 000354
0. O0O429
0. 00042 9
0. 000030
0. 000742
0. 000028
0. 000010
0. 000808
0. 000034
Spares
Required
Weight (lb)
i
I
i
I
I
1
i
I
I
i
I
I
i
i
I
i;:-"
i_:-"
i
I
i
i
i
i
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Table 5. IZ/13Electronics Assembly, Redundant and Circuits (Cont)
Functional Assembly
+4v Req.
Lamp driver
Power supply, R.F.
Automatic
Reacquisition, P. II
Automatic
Reacquisition, P. V
Automatic
Reacquisition, P. IV
Automatic
Reacquisition, P. I
Automatic
Reacquisition, P. III
Instrument servo, pitch
Instrument servo, yaw
Transistor board No. 1
Transistor board No. 3
Diode bridge
Transformers (5)
Transformers (i)
Transformers (I)
Connections
TOTAL
Duty Cycle
(hr)
16,500
16,500
16,500
16,500
Apollo II
kx I0 -6
0. 7578
0.3258
0.2184
0. 1174
Mars Mission
Requirement
(16, 500 hrs)
Spared
Equivalent
Spares
R equir e d
Weight (lb)
0.000120
0.000010
0.000003
0.000001
16,500 0.3260
16,500
16,500
16,500
16,500
16,500
16,500
16,500
16,500
16,500
16,500
16,500
16,500
33,5870
0.53 94
0.2978
0.5363
i. 8969
i. 8969
2.2835
0.3120
0.1984
0.2500
0.0500
0. O5OO
0. 1200
33.5870
0.000010
0.000044
0.000007
0.000043
0.001837
0.001837
0.003171
0.000008
O. OOOOO3
0.000010
0.000170
0.000170
0.017349
1
I*
1 _k
1
1
1
1
I*
I*
4Z
39;:,
;:'Common elements which, because of interchangeability, permit
reducing spares required by one.
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.
nullify the usefullness of balance of the components, the logic dia-
gram becomes redundant by part or by module. Figure 5.13 shows
the effect of considering the redundant portion of the assembly as
being redundant by module. The effective failure rate indicated is
then dependent on only one out of three modules operating when
sparing is included and based on operational redundancy. The
suggested mode of operation permits the failed section to be
repaired with the spare unit while the redundant circuit is operating.
This procedure continues until the spares are exhausted. The
assumption is that one of the two circuits then becomes a source
of spares for the other circuit. Considering the above sparing
and module redundancy, the contribution to Ps is :
P > 0. 9997
S
This is in excess of the requirement but, because of the limited
interchangeability of modules and their evenly distributed failure
rate, each module must have a spare even to exceed 0.998. This
required a total of 39 spare modules.
The Antenna Assembly consists of two major subassemblies--the
gimbal assembly and the radiating assembly. The major critical
components of these two assemblies are as shown in Table 5. 14.
The radiating assembly contains both the wide beam and narrow
beam array and the strip line and switching networks. The failure
rates of the component and/or subassemblies permit this function
to exceed its requirement; the resulting reliability is over 0. 999.
The gimbal assembly contains the drive motors and position indi-
cators of the three-axis system. Sparing, if done at all, must be
as a totai assembly replacement rather than a component replace-
ment concept. The gimbal is a complex assembly (3-axis drive
and angular indicator) designed for minimum weight (Figure 5. 16).
It is a structural key in the automatic tracking loop. The redesign
of this unit to accommodate component replacement, primarily the
motor-tach-brake sets of each axis couid possibly result in an
overall weight penalty rather than a savings because of the added
structure required to accommodate accessibility. The assembly
and disassembly are hazardous to the components; i.e., the
constituent components are susceptible to assembly or installation
failure s.
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F i g u r e  5. 16.  Initial Space G i m b a l  Mock-up (without  i n su la t ion )  
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Table 5. 14. Antenna Assen_bly (MME) Availability Requirements Analysis
Functional Assembly
R.F. Components
Feedhorn assembly (4)
Hybrid (4)
W.13. comparator
N.B. comparator
Dummy load (4)
Transfer switch
Dual diplexer
Miscellaneous
Subtotal
Gimbal Components
A -axis
B&C axis
Subtotal
Total
Duty
Cycle
(M)
16, 5OO
16,500
16,500
16,500
16,500
16,500
16,500
16,500
16,500
16,500
Apollo II
Assembly
_x 10 -6
0.009632
0.009Z00
0.006034
0.004000
0.004000
0.002020
0.001037
O. OOO6O
0.0054040
Baseline
Mis si:m
Reliabllity
0.15890
0.153185
0.312085
0.3174
R e commended
Supports
0.9999]
No spares
required
*One
spare gimbal
assembly
0.99485 0.999999
0.99477 0.99991
*Not necessarily required or recommended. Spare antenna would have
the same effect.
These data indicate that the antenna assembly would be marginal in its
capability to meet the allowable contribution to Ps; however, since the other
functions were much higher than required, the resulting antenna system Ps
contribution will still only be about 0. 994. The other alternative is to spare
the total antenna assembly, which increases the Ps to 0.9997. The elec-
tronics assembly again becomes the weaker link. This is not recommended
because of the inherent redundancy achieved by usin_ the MMP antenna as a
backup assembly; this effectively meets the system requirements.
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5.3.4 MME Antenna Maintainability Inferences
The recommended maintenance concept requires replacement of the
electronic assembly modules and the controlunit resolvers. Both of these
are expected to be easily accessibIe from inside the spacecraft. The
resulting maintenance concepts infer that onIy a minimum of redesigning and
testing is required to adapt the Apollo CSM antenna system to fuifili the
planetary mission requirements without sacrificing the existing system
reliability. The primary design change thatwould be required of the system
would be in the electronics assembly. Presently, the zero maintenance
criterion has resulted in a potted assembly. To accommodate the repairs
and maintenance referred to herein, itwould be required that the method of
potting be revised to allow the rapid or simple removal and replacement of
the 2 by 2 logic module from the motherboards: one of the three mother-
boards is shown in Figure 5. 19.
In addition, some 2 by 2 module configurations would require changing
to accommodate the repair of one circuit without disrupting the operating
circuit if this concept were adopted.
5.3.5 Conclusions and Recommendations
The Apollo antenna will meet the requirements of the mission module
to probe and earth entry module to earth functions without significant change
and without provisions for maintenance. The same antenna system with
modification will also meet the MME system requirements. Modifications
required inciude the replacement of the feed horn and dish assembly with a
single unfurlable 19-foot dish. This has been built by DaImo Victor Company
and tested by the General Electric Company.
The application of the Apollo II CSM antenna system for primary earth
communications, either as backup or concurrent with the 19-foot antenna,
requires that it be maintained and/or repaired to meet with the suggested
objectives.
The MME antenna system alone is expected to achieve a Ps of at
least 0.994with the recommended spares complement. However, to augment
this capability, the MMP antenna can be used instead of the MME in the event
of failure, but at a slower data rate.
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The result of this premise is reflected in Figure 5. 17,
probability of mission success becomes
P = 0.9999998
S
and the actual
when considered as block redundant and,
P = 0.99999999
s
when optimum commonality between the two antennas is accommodated, as
shown in Figure 5. 18. This means that there is less than one chance in 10 6
of not having a usable antenna during the baseline mission.
Table 5. 15. MME Antenna Spares Requirements
Components No. of Spares Weight (lb)
Resolvers
Electronic module s_:_
Totals
2
39
41 3.0
;:=See previous tables for breakdown
5.4 THE EXTENTION--RETRACTION SYSTEM
Note: These data used herein were derived from SD studies,
References i. 1 and 4.3.
5.4. I Functional Requirements
The operational concept is depicted by Figure 5. Z0 the baseline mission
spacecraft. Mechanical systems are provided to permit separation and
extension of the earth entry module (EEM) from the mission module for the
spin-up mode (extended position). Spin-down is accomplished by a system
of motor dirven cable drums that reel the module from the extended position
to the unextended position.
) SD 67-478-3
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Figure 5. 17. Primary Communication Antenna Logic Diagram
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Other concepts for separation and extension of the modules, including
telescoping tubes, were considered. However, the cable system, which
appears feasible from the dynamic aspect and is considerably lighter than
the other concepts, was selected as the baseline col_c:.:pt.
As the modules are separated, spin-up is started and progressively
increased until maximum separation and proper cable _ension are achieved.
Timed thruster firing is used to place the module in the spin-up mode and
estabIish the required artificial gravity condition. Despinwii1 be accom-
plished progressively in the reverse order. As a bac!_up or alternative
method to provide an artificial gravity condition, counter-rotation centri-
fuges are installed in the mission module.
The cable assembly, reflected in the reliability block diagram
(Figure 5.20), consists of three retraction cables and six stabilization
cables. Each cable is connected to a cable drum equipped with its own
driving power, gear box, clutch, and control. After separation has been
effected, the stabilization cables are piaced in tension and their drive units
remain dormant for the remainder of the spin period. However, each cable
is equipped with a dash pot to dampen and absorb vibrations due to crew
movement, etc. Redundant electric drive motors have been assumed
because of the uncertainties associated with extended space operation of
exposed rotating components. Although both ac and dc cricuits are availabie
ac motors provide a weight advantage and were selected for purposes of the
analy sis.
To limit the coning motion (wobble) associated with cable-linked space
craft, a viscous fluid damper is employed. This system makes use of the
on-board water and multiple small tubes to achieve the required damper
effect.
Following injection from earth orbit to planet trajectory, the command
module will be extended and placed in the spin mode. The number of spin-ut
and spin-downs will depend upon the number of times required for navigatio=
data acquisition and AV course correction. It has been assumed from the
established mission events (Section Z) that the spin-up and spin-down modes
will occur at least four times each on the outward and return trips of the
mission plus a test spin-up and spin-down prior to Martian injection.
Approximately 16,000 hours will be spent in the spin-up mode.
5.4. Z Reliability Analysis
The basic structural subsystem, including the separation and retracti¢
mechanism (Figure 5. 20) has a high inherent reiiability, although certain
design details remain to be resolved. Table 5. 16 lists the components and
associated operating times of the cable assembly. The operating time is
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based on 16,043 hours in the spinning mode with up to 17 spin-despin cycles
of 1. Z hour each (worse case). There are considerable redundancies in the
mechanism. For example, stabilization cables can act in lieu of a failed
retraction cable. Because of the many possibIe combinations and the current
design status, it has been assumed for simplicity that the stabilization cabIes
can act as backup to the retraction cables. Based on these assumptions, the
reliability of the overall is estimated to be 0. 9998.
Table 5.16. Components and Associated Operating Times
of Cable Assembly
Item
Motor, control, and clutch
Gear boxes
C able s
Dash pot
Drums
Number of
Unit s
18
9
9
9
9
Operating Time,
Cycles
20.4
20.4
16,043
1604"
16,043
*Assumes 10 percent total time
This will meet and exceed the Ps requirement, particularly when the
functional redundancy of section 2.2 is considered. Maintenance and/or
repair is not expected to be a requirement.
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PRECEDING PAGE BLANK NOT FILMED.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
6. 1 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
The baseline mission has been described in Volume I of this report in
functional flow form. Further details are pertinent to the subsystems and
are discussed in conjunction with the respective subsystem analysis of
Section IV.
The baseline spacecraft system was taken from NAS8-180Z5 and
expanded upon to the next level of detail. The mission spacecraft is as
depicted in Figure 6. I. It is assumed to have the artificial gravity capability
since this represents the most stringent system requirements. The mission
safety/success goals were also derived in Volume I of this report, and the
associated system level logic is given in Figure 6. Z. The first ten systems
(those in the heavy boxes) are required to assure safe return of the crew.
The up data link is included because of its contribution to the guidance and
navigation function as well as the central timing function. These systems
are considered Criticality I systems (Table 6. I) because inability to perform
any of these functions would endanger the crew.
Five of the systems contribute to the well being of the crew because,
in most circumstances resulting from a failure in these functions, the crew
could still return safely. These are included in the availability assessment
and are considered Criticality II systems (Table 6. Z). Artificial gravity
systems are included herein because they are not essential to crew survival.
The scientific systems are Criticality III systems. These include all
of the functions associated with the scientific data, either through direct
acquisition or via probes. No analysis has been devoted to those systems in
this study because of the lack of detail systems descriptions.
6. Z MISSION CAPABILITIES AND SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS
6. Z. 1 For Planetary Missions
The analysis herein demonstrates the ability of contemporary systems
to meet the challenge of extended space missions. Man becomes an integral
part of the mission systems and, through his ability to compensate for
unprogrammed events, the probability of safe return for the baseline mission
can be raised from five chances in one hundred (Ps = 0.05) to better than
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ninety-nine chances in one hundred (0. 993). As Table 6. 1 indicates, this can
be accomplished with less than 500 pounds of well chosen spares.
One of the most significant findings of the study is the identification and
verification of a concept which facilitates selection of the correct spares and
the associated maintenance and repair concept. Through application of the
availability concept, the guess work is taken out of spares provisioning and
test point selection; this is demonstrated by the comprehensive nature of the
data in the tabular results presented under the respective subsystems of
Section V.
The results of the study are summarized in Tables 6. 1 and 6.2. These
support requirements were identified by criticality class where:
Criticality I = Minimum functions required for crew
safe return.
Criticality II = Functions required to perform the trip
in the manner prescribed.
Criticality III = Functions required to perform all the
mission objectives (not considered in
this study).
The specific spares required may be found tabulated with the refer-
enced report section. It should be realized that this analysis is based on a
real, in most cases qualified, hardware design that will meet the mission
requirements. Because it was possible to be specific in terms of the design
and its reliability and because of the demonstrated veracity of much of the
data, the conclusions drawn herein may be considered creditable. These
same factors account for the seeming disparigence in the support require-
ments delineated herein and those estimated elsewhere.
These data indicate that only 167 maintenance and repair actions
requiring 438 pounds of spares will bring the crew safely home with a
probability of better than 0. 993. Further, only 258 spares weighing less
than 8 87 pounds will facilitate the conduct of the trip in the manner pre-
scribed with a probability of better than 0. 966. This means that out of
i000 baseline missions, only 36 would require a compromise in the opera-
tional concept and less than seven would encounter a problem that may result
in loss of crew.
Not all of the potential weak links could be improved through a main-
tenance or repair action. From Table 6. I, items 4. 5, 4. 6, and 4. 9 were
improved (as noted in Table 6. 3) by some form of design redundancy. Not
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Table 6. 3. Required Design Characteristics, Nonrepairable Systems
Report
Section
4.6
4.5
4.9
None
Space c raft
System
Propulsion
system
Propellant
management
(propulsion and
RCS)
Electrical power
system
(isotope source)
(Battery source)
Spacecraft
structure
I.
Zo
io
Z.
Recommended Design Characteristic
Use of a three-engine configuration
recommended for planetary flights with
at least one protected by a blowout
cover over the nozzle.
Provisions to purge lines and chamber
after use.
An extra helium supply is recommended
which would be isolated from the sys-
tems by a gate valve to prevent leak-
age. A crossover manifold should also
be included.
Provisions for isolating the pressurant
from the feed system are recommended
for use during inactive periods. This
would include isolation gate valves and
bleeder lines.
ID Provide redundant combined rotating
unit loops (3 for 7 kw system) since
these are impractical to repair.
. Provide a passive converter, such as
the thermal-electric isotope, which
would be designed to carry the emer-
gency load.
Provide dry-charged, manually activated
batteries for the reentry power. (Also
applicable to EO logistic vehicle. )
Provide an adequate design margin against
structural loads and meteroids. Meteroids
present the largest hazard but a multilayer
design with a weight of about 3. 5 pounds
per square foot reduces the risk of one
puncture to less than 1 x 10 -3 . (Ref 6. 3)
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included in the study were the detailed consideration of spacecraft structural
elements. These components have been proven to be failure-free when
provided with an adequate design margin, that is well within the state of the
art. See Space Division studies recorded in References 6. 1 and 6. Z.
6. Z. 2 Earth Orbital Mission Applications
The applicability of the data contained herein to the potential earth-
orbital missions would depend on the similarity in functional requirements,
particularly those affecting crew recovery. To this end, Space Division
performed a study under Air Force sponsorship (Reference 6. 3) wherein an
earth-orbital spacestation and an associated logistic spacecraft were defined
in detail and analyzed as to emergency characteristics. Many of the systems
normally included in the planetary spacecraft are not required for the earth-
orbital spacestation, and even the associated logistic vehicle is somewhat
less complex. Figure 6. 3 depicts (in logic form) the system functions which
affect Ps for both the spacestation and the logistics vehicle. Note that only
six subsystems affect crew safety in the spacestation and approximately the
same functions for the logistic vehicle operations. However, the logistic
vehicle duty cycles are less than 24 hours in duration with shorter dead-
storage cycles (duration of 90 days was recommended).
The comparison of such an earth orbital spacestation with the study
baseline and determining the resulting effects on the support requirements
are reflected in Table 6.4. The logistic vehicle, in many ways, is analagous
to the planetary mission earth entry vehicle and because of the low duty
cycles per mission Space Division studies, (Reference 6. 4 and 6. 5) have
shown that Apollo level technology will satisfy the requirements.
From Table 6. 3, there are less than four chances in one thousand that
the orbiting spacestation will require more than Z88 pounds of spares or
115 maintenance or repair actions to assure crew safety. There are less
than two chances in one hundred that there will be over 170 maintenance and
repair actions or over 660pounds of spares will be used throughout a two-
year spacestation cycle. Both of these estimates are based on the premise
that all systems have been qualified for the required life span. No scientific
or military systems have been included.
6. Z. 3 System Failure Inferences
The fact that failures will occur on the extended missions seems
evident from the data. However, there is no reason to believe the crew will
be overloaded with maintenance problems. In fact, the contrary seems more
evident. Interpretations of the data can facilitate a better understanding of
its meaning.
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Referring back to Table 6. 1 where the mission reliability was quoted
as 0. 05, this means that there is:
95 percent chance of one or more failures, or less than l-percent
chance of more than 167 failures.
Clearly, the crew maintenance and repair work load will be low compared to
the other tasks required.
6. 3 DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS REQUIRED
It is true that the preponderance of system functions are qualified for
the planetary missions. However, it is equally true that there are some
functions that are not qualified as yet. Again, all the recommended systems
have shown feasibility. Tables 6. 1 and 6. Z also reflect the status of the
system function in terms of their demonstrated ability to meet the require-
ments of the extended space missions. Specific system function study and/or
test requirements are listed within the system section of this report. Some
of these may be summarized as follows:
i. All system functions require some form of life test, not neces-
sarily to assure life expectancy but rather to identify life limits
and characteristics.
Z. The life support functions associated with the new functions, such
as water recovery, CO Z removal, and O Z regeneration, must be
developed and qualified.
0 The new source of electrical power, the isotope systems, must be
developed and qualified. These systems show great potential both
in terms of reliability and as an economic source of power.
. A new type of antenna system should be considered, such as the
phased array, a mechanically rigid structure, in place of a
constantly oriented device. (See Appendix 3. ) The Apollo antenna
will meet the requirements as demonstrated in Section 5. 3;
becauseofpotential EVA requirements, it may not be optimum.
. The systems associated with the extension/retraction for the arti-
ficial gravity mode must be better defined, developed, and quali-
fied. The advantages and disadvantages of this type of mode should
be studied in detail, from a systems engineering point of view as
opposed to the normal human factors approach.
. The guidance functions are notably weak links in the system's
design and, although they will meet the requirements safely, other
alternatives may prove to be much more effective (see Appendix 5).
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1 High density packaging techniques such as that described in
Appendix IV should be developed to simplify future mission main-
tenance requirements.
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APPENDIX I. OPTICAL USAGE SCHEDULE
During the planet encounter phase, the vehicle attitude must be held to
the local vertical to an accuracy equivalent to that required for the Apollo-X
mission mapping phase (450 _ maximum about any axis) when the G&N
system is controlling atttiude. Factors affecting the inertial reference
attitude are the initial alignment accuracy, the gyro drift, and some vehicle
control uncertainty. In maintaining the local vertical with respect to the
planet, the trajectory position uncertainty also becomes a factor.
The problem becomes most difficult at periapse, since the local
vertical angular error becomes a maximum for a given position uncertainty
in the local horizontal plane. For a Mars radius of approximately 1800 n. m.
and a periapse altitude of 200 n.m., a one-nautical-mile horizontal position
uncertainty would produce a local vertical uncertainty of 100 _'-eec. Combining
this with the misalignments produced by one meru gyros, one mm initial
misalignment, and some vehicle control system uncertainty, the inertial
reference must be updated at a rate of at least once per hour to maintain a
one-sigma local vertical of 150 se_.
At the start and ends of planet encounter, the vehicle distance from the
center of Mars is approximately 5 x 106 n.m. A position uncertainty of
10 n.m. would yield a negligible local vertical uncertainty of approximately
0.4 sec. Therefore, combining this with the other attitude misalignment
uncertainties as above, the inertial reference would only need to be updated
after two hours or more.
An average reference alignment update every 1.5 hours was, there-
fore, assumed for the duration of G&N attitude control during the planet
encounter phase. The gyro drift rate and the navigation uncertainty near
periapse are optimistic values, but the overall average alignment rate is
felt to be more than adequate since it is doubtful that the precise attitude
control is necessary continuously and the greatest local vertical accuracy is
probably not needed near periapse. It would seem more likely that the
greatest vertical holding accuracy would be necessary at the beginning and
end of the planet encounter phase when probes are launched and recovered.
During these periods, vehicle positional accuracy has very little effect on the
ability to hold local vertical plus the fact that ground tracking would be
available.
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An average navi:ga!ion schedule of one sighting every two hours has
been chosen for the on-board system during the planet encounter phase.
This corresponds closely to the optimum schedules determined for the
translunar and transearth phases of the lunar landing mis_ion. The total
number of sightings (230) aiso agrees closely with the number determined
from the optical sighting schedule given in Table 13-4 of NAASID-67-549-6-3.
_ 324 -
SD 67-478-3
SPACE DIVISION or NORTH AMERICAN ROCKWELL CORPORATION
APPENDIX II. MAIN ENGINE PASSIVE PHASE ANALYSIS
From Table 4.36, the coast reliability was calculated to be lower than
the desired level. The following potential major causes of failure can be
identified:
Meteoroid bombardment
Creep of metals
Materials degradation or sublimation
Propellant expos ur e
There are two aspects to the potential meteoroid problem. The first
is the possible encounter of a micrometeorite cloud, which can cause
erosive loss of the emissivity coating on the nozzle extension. The second
is the possibility of puncture of one or more parts of the engine by meteoroids.
These particles are estimated to have masses ranging from a fraction of an
ounce to as high as 1024 tons. Of equal concern are the velocities of these
particles, estimated to average about 50,000/ftsec and to range as high as
250,000 ft/sec. While some research has been performed in the field of
hypervelocity impact, much is yet to be learned about the mechanism of
impact, the effects of impact, and the best ways of shielding against impact.
However, the nozzle is the most exposed part, and it is estimated that a
puncture will have little effect on engine performance. Some additional
analysis seems desirable.
There are two primary effects of creep. One is the possible loss of
sealing capability at inter-component joints due to the elongation of the bolts,
and the other is the possible rupture of one or both of the high-pressure
pneumatic tanks or lines as a result of exceeding the creep strength of the
metal or because of stress corrosion. An analysis of the existing designs
should be made to assure an adequate design margin with respect to creep
and stress corrosion. Design changes should be made as deemed necessary.
An alternate approach for the case of bolt elongation would be to provide for
retorquing of the bolts near the ends of the coast periods. However, as
noted in the Table, retorquing of the bolts might not be satisfactory for the
metal seal used in the joint between the nozzle extension and combustion
chamber; the reason for this is that metal seals generally have to be
compressed beyond their yield points in order to achieve effective sealing
capability.
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The potential problem of materials degradation or sublimation is
applicable to three primary areas: the binder used in the combustion
chamber, the nonmetallic seals, and the electrical insulation. In general,
the long chain polymers found in the nonmetallic component materials have
vapor pressures much lower than the I0 -12 Torr pressure found in space,
ultra-violet radiation does not penetrate them deeply, and they are useful
at temperatures below 300 F. However, polymers such as nylons and
neoprenes show high decomposition rates in vacuum. On the other hand,
some commonly used elastomers, such as Teflons, silicones, and Mylar,
exhibit excelient behavior in high vacuum. Teflon has excellent lubricant
characteristics in high vacuum, but most other polymeric materials are of
doubtful value as lubricants in the environment of space.
Optical transmission of polymers will probably be seriously damaged
by unfiltered sunlight; the effects on optical absorption and emission are less
certain. Electrical and mechanical properties of polymers will probably
be unaffected by sunlight, except in the thin outer layer. In general,
exposed polymer surfaces willdeteriorate rapidly in the earth's radiation
belts and perhaps from solar particle emissions. The flexibility, strength,
and electrical characteristics of Teflon, nylon, butyl rubber, and similar
materials will be detrimentally affected in the radiation belts even through
heavy shielding. The actual changes to the materials will depend on the type
of exposure, wave length, time of exposure, and type of material. It is
there for e extr emely difficult to dr aw conclus ions without exper imentations,
especially in vacuum at elevated exposures.
In some cases, vacuum degrades polymeric systems by volatilizing
components essential to the optimum properties of the part. In others, it
improves the properties by the same volatilization mechanism wherein
impurities are outgassed. The danger of this volatilization process lies in
the contamination of electrical contacts and other surfaces that depend upon
an uncontaminated surface for essential properties. Since the combustion
chamber is the component that would be most affected by this volatilization,
it is recommended that a method be developed to seal off the nozzle and
maintain a GN 2 pressure within the chamber assembly.
Most of the organic materials used in the SPS engine are long-chain
polymeric compounds that degrade in vacuum, not by evaporation or sub-
limation, but by breakdown of the compounds into smaller, more volatile
fragments. Decomposition of organic materials occurs throughout the
material and not only on the surface. It is affected by the nature of the
particular monomer, by chain length (molecular weight), and by branching
and crosslinking of the polymer. Small amounts of impurities can also
greatly accelerate decomposition. The molecular weight of these fragments
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is not well established, and neither is the equilibrium decomposition
pressure of most polymers. It is, therefore, necessary to turn to direct
experimental studies of the weight loss of polymers in vacuum. It is risky
to extrapolate experimental data because, in most studies, exposure time
has been limited, and because the curves of weight loss versus time are
usually nonlinear. It is recommended that materials degradation informa-
tion be obtained from examination of similar materials in existing satellites,
if possible.
Prolonged exposure to the propellants has the potential for causing a
deterioration of the software seals and a formation of salts. While it is true
that the hard vacuum of interplanetary space tends to purge the engine of
propellants downstream of the bipropellant valve, the propellants will remain
trapped within and upstream of the bipropellant valve; it is also possible
that propellants adsorbed into seals downstream of the bipropellant valve
during an engine firing will remain there after the engine is shut down. Salts
can be produced in the bipropellant valve, the lines, or the main propellant
tanks, and can cause a clogging of the propellant filters or the injector
orifices. Of specific concern is the formation of ferric nitrate, Fe(NO3)3,
as the result of a reaction of nitrogen tetroxide (NzO4) and stainless steel.
Test experience has indicated that large amounts of contaminants are formed
in Z0 to 40 days with Z4-hour temperature cycles of 50 to 110 F. Further
analysis of this phenomenon is required as well as development effort to
design propellant containers and lines that will not react with NzO 4.
A review of Table Z indicates that the thrust mount is probably accept-
able without change. Components of somewhat greater concern are the
following:
Combustion chamber
Injector
G imb al
Probably immediate concern should be directed toward the following
components :
Nozzle extension
Propellant line s
Pneumatic actuation system
Bipr opellant valve
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In the case of the nozzle extension, the main concern is with possible
meteoroid impact. Peri_aps a shield shouldbe developed to protect the
nozzle extension during the long coast periods, i{owever, such a shield
would probably have to be retracted from the nozzle e>:tension during periods
of engine firing in order to achieve the full effectiveness of heat radiation.
The alternative to a protective shield is to carry a spare nozzle for instal-
lation subsequent to a failure. The primary concern in the case of the
propellant lines is the filtering capability and material storage compatibility
withN204. The design stould be carefully evaluated to assure that all
contamination can be effectively fiItered out of the propellants without
impeding the flow of propellants as a result of clogged filters. Further
development effort is necessary to resolve the N204 compatibility problem.
The probability of meteoroid damage to the propellant lines, gimbal
actuators, and harnesses could be practically eliminated by submerging the
engine approximately 12 inches further into the service module and
lowering the protective heal:shield.
In the case of the pneumatic actuation system, concern must be focused
on the tanks, lines, and valves that are continuously exposed to the high-
pressure ON 2. The design must be checked and modified as necessary with
respect to the potentially adverse effects of creep. The valving should
probably be analyzed with the objective of decreasing the chance of external
leakage. Perhaps a provision should be made for the recharge of the tanks
in the pneumatic actuation system in the event of a slow GN 2 leak. A
possible redesign utilizing electric motor actuation system instead of the
pneumatic actuation system should also be investigated.
The main areas of concern with the bipropellant valve are propellant
leakage and the above mentioned NzO 4 compatibility problem. Mono-
propellant leakage would probably result in evaporative freezing within the
flow passages of the manifold and could create flow stoppage during
subsequent startup. Loss of propellants and possible explosion are other
effects of propellant leakage. It is recommended that a design study of
possible alternative valve designs be completed with the purpose of reducing
the probability of propellant leakage and eliminating long term coast N204
incompatibility and subsequent contamination formation.
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APPENDIX III. .ALTERNATE ANTENNA CONSIDERATION
The antenna systems reliability may possibly be further enhanced by
utilizing a phased array antenna system. The quasi-redundancy inherent in
such systems allows a number of failures before serious degradation in per-
formance occurs. The validity of this assumption would be compromised,
of course, unless one takes pains in the original system design to ensure
adequate protection against the effect of failure of items that are not naturalIy
redundant, such as control devices, prime power, etc. It is also necessary
to exercise care in the design of redundant units for life commensurate with
the interplanetary missions within the necessary phase and amplitude tol-
erances. However, it appears that phase shifting techniques to accomplish
electronic inertialess beam positioning offers an intrinsically higher degree
of reliability than a servo-driven, parabolic, dish-type antenna. In order to
model such a phased array so that a quantitative evaluation of reliability may
be conducted for direct comparison with conventional methods, it will be
necessary first to define the degree of degradation which could be tolerated in
terms of the number of permissible antenna element outages, disregarding
contributions to the beam-pattern degradation of unwanted sidelobe level
effects due to phase and amplitude errors or tolerances present in the RF
signals at the antenna element. In addition, this type of system allows the
practice of in-flight (and EVA) maintenance actions, such that the failed
items in the array may be located and replaced, thus allowing for the avoid-
ance of additional outages which may occur so as to reach the permissible
outage threshold. This may be accomplished by a relatively small number
of universal on-board spares.
The model for such a determination entails the determination of system
availability given the pertinent parameters. System available for a quasi-
redundant system, assuming that sidelobe level degradation is a function of
element outage and that propagation of failure from one element to another in
the array does not occur, is given by
N N
P(x> K,i)--
i=O i=o
Pi P(x > K/i) (I)
where P(x_> K) is the probability that sidelobe level is greater than or equal
to K, where K is some minimum acceptable sidelobe level (x), and N is the
total number of array elements; thus, the availability is found by summing
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P(x Ki) the joint probability that exactly x elements are out and sidelobe
level is greater than, or equal to, K over all possible values of i, and,
similarly,
N N
P(x <K,i) = PiP(x- K/i)
i=o i=O
(2)
where P(x < K) is the probability that sidelobe level is less than K. Simple
approximations to Equation 4 and 5 are given by
and
M
P(x>_ K) - P(x >_K/M)
i=o
M
P(x'< K) - P(x < K/M)
I=O
pi (3)
pi (4)
M
when _ Pi is near unity and l:'(x > K/M) > 0.99 or, conversely,
i=o
P(x< K/M) < 0.0I. These are Conditions which may readily be placed on an
array with stringent requirements that take the following form; 99 percent of
the time the array must have a sidelobe level at least as great as K. Equa-
tion 3 is simply the product of the probability that the sidelobe level is greater
than K, given exactly M elements out, times the probability that M or less
elements are inoperable, and this result is a good approximation to the prob-
ability that the sidelobe level is greater than K.
In order to compute availability given by Equation 3, it is necessary to
compute each of the two terms involved, one a conditional probability and the
other a summation of unconditional probabilities. The conditional probability,
P(x > K/M), may be called out by the antenna system engineers who determine
some threshold value M, taking into consideration the statistical distribution
of degradation with a given outage level. The maximum number of simultan-
eous outages that can be tolerated for a given fraction of the time is repre-
sented by M; both x and M are sensitive to the geometry of element outages
in the array face and make the statistical description of the threshold neces-
.sary. Naturally, M cannot be increased to an appreciable fraction of the
total number of elements without resulting in severely degraded performance.
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In a practical high-performance array, M is usually kept sufficiently small,
relative to the total number of elements, so that beam directivity error and
the deficiency of radiated or received power are not as important contributions
to unacceptable performance as the sidelobe level degradation due to the M
outages. Considering an array face of N elements, the probability that exactly
i elements are out may be shown to be
N: i
-- a
(N-i)'
P. = ., N> 0, a>0 (5)
1 N N_
"_ (N-j),aJ1=0
where k is the failure rate per element, u the repair rate per element, and
a = k/u (load factor).
When N > 100 and Na < 1, Equation 5 simplifies to,
Pi ~ (1-Na) (Na) i, N> 100, Na < 1 (6)
This form for Pi may be used in Equation 6; however, various maintenance
procedures and system configurations would dictate the exact model. Subse-
quent studies should be directed toward establishing the quantitative values
for failure and repair rates based upon preliminary data on EVA and, together
with more refined system design concepts, a rigorous comparison may be
made between the array and dish reliabilities for manned interplanetary
missions.
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APPENDIX IV. PACKAGING CONCEPTS FOR ELECTRONICS
ON LONG-DURATION MISSIONS
This section discusses results of an SD study for effecting required
improvements in mission reliability of electronic systems through consider-
ation of packaging. Three levels of circuit integration are considered and
compared: (i) discrete circuits, using standard transistors, resistors, etc.,
(2) integrated circuits, and (3) large-scale integration (LSI) circuits.
Previous studies conducted for Apollo showed a lack of universal
modules at the subassembly or replacement level; thus, great complexity
resulted with regard to failure isolation and numbers and types of spares to
be carried. This complexity eventually led to discarding the in-flight main-
tenance concept, since added built-in redundancies could be effected at a
lesser weight penalty than that incurred by the weight and complexity of an
in-flight test system needed in conjunction with in-flight maintenance of
heterogeneously designed modules. Hence, the study was aimed toward
defining a universal modular concept, based on the state of the art expected
in the electronics industry in the 1975 to 1977 period. As shown, the highest
degree of universality can be accomplished through the selection of LSI. This
will permit multiple applications of module commonality and interchange-
ability. This, in turn, will allow a 1000-to-I reduction in total parts count
from the discrete circuit concept, allowing much more volume for sparing
electromechanical assemblies (e.g., gyros, servo torquers, synchros,
resolvers, etc.) and electronics subsystems, as well as such items in which
breakthroughs cannot be anticipated (e.g., traveling wave tubes).
While the recommendations contained herein would not allow maximum
application of Apollo-type electronic equipment, maximum increases, in con-
cert with required levels of reliability, can only be realized with the recom-
mended changes.
SD studies show that use of Apollo- and AAP-type electronics have a
predicted mission completion probability for the Mars flyby mission of less
than I percent, increased to 30 percent with selection of additional, feasible
redundancies. These results point up the need for an in-flight maintenance
concept for enhancing mission completion, as well as a packaging concept to
permit in-flight maintenance. Large-scale integration (LSI) circuits appear
to be the most favorable solution. This section delineates such factors of LSI
design as volume, failure rates, built-in passive redundancy, multiusage
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packaging, interchangeability, and circuit intraconnections to point up the
feasibility of selecting the LSI concept to realize the mission reliability
requirements for future Mars missions.
LSI Concepts
The evolution of highly complex monolithic integrated circuits has led
to refinements in component size, tolerances, and functions which make
feasible the integration of entire subsystems within one package. This
development, which has been termed "large scale integration" or LSI, pre-
sents a step from the integrated circuit to the integrated subsystem. Fur-
thermore, as circuits become more complex and integrated subsystems
become more widespread, a trend to circuit standardization and multiusage
packages (i.e., interchangeability and universal spares) is inevitable. This
has significant meaning to realistic packaging concepts for manned, long-
duration missions, where previous studies have shown a need for in-flight
maintenance as a means of assuring mission completion.
In the semiconductor industry, the trend is toward structures having
more complex arrays in which hundreds of circuit functions are intercon-
nected on a single chip. This approach provides lower power and higher
reliability. The power is reduced primarily because interconnection capaci-
tance is reduced. Reliability is primarily increased because there is an
order of magnitude reduction in components and connections. The array-
type structures of LSI are being produced in limited quantities, and specific
reliability data have been collected from Fairchild and Texas Instruments
and IBM, Refs. 4-3, 4.4.
It is expected that by the 1975-77 time period, LSI will be a common
and proven technology. Presently there are two device approaches available
which are compatible with LSI technology: metal-oxide semiconductors
(MOS) and minority charge carrier (bipolar) integrated circuits. The con-
troversy over which technique, MOS or bipolar, is superior for LSI has
continued for several years. MOS advocates claim increased circuit density,
lower power consumption, higher power supply efficiency, simplified manu-
facturing procedures, and higher reliability. Some of these claims are
controversial. For example, MOS transistors require fewer process steps,
but some of these steps may be more critical than their bipolar counterparts.
The bipolar transistor shows a clear superiority on a speed-power basis.
This results from the bipolar transistor's superior transconductance per unit
area, which in turn is a measure of the device's capability to charge and
discharge capacity. In addition, bipolar arrays will be compatible with
today's existing integrated circuit signal levels, power, and logical organi-
zation. However, for digital circuits, the MOS techniques appear to be the
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more promising, especially from the standpoint of reducing circuit com-
plexity. MOS arrays can be produced as monolithic systems or on an insu-
lating substrate {heteroepitaxial technology).
For space applications, MOS should prove to be the technology of the
future for a number of reasons. Its power drain is significantly lower than
that associated with bipolar circuits; the higher yields and much smaller size
of MOS enable MOS chip complexities to be increased over those of bipolar
chips. It is anticipated that the increase in density offers the potential of a
greater reliability, since fewer packages and intraconnections are necessary
in a given system; data tend to point to the fact that the number of packages in
a system and not the complexity of the packages have the dominant effect on
system reliability--as is shown in following paragraphs. The only present
disadvantages associated with MOS circuitry compared to bipolar circuitry
are its slower speed and lower radiation resistance. The speed difference
should be somewhat overcome by the development of complementary circui-
try; very high radiation resistance is not anticipated as a requirement for the
manned interplanetary missions. FigureA-i shows the anticipated level of
LSI complexity {Reference 4-5) over the next ten years for MOS and bipolar
arrays. As shown, the current penalty (in terms of package density) for
selecting bipolar arrays should be eliminated by the mid-1970's.
LSI Reliability Considerations
The reliability of LSI subsystems has been found (Reference 4-6) to be
a function of the number of circuit chips. For example, the overall mean-
time-between-failure (MTBF) of such a subsystem would decrease propor-
tionately to the increase in the number of chips as predicted in Figure _A-Z,
Curve A, assuming an MTBF of 108 hours for a single chip. This curve
represents a theoretical upper limit of MTBF, assuming no additional failure
mechanisms are operative as the number of chips increase; Reference 4-3
indicated that some new failure modes have been observed with LSI, but
details are considered proprietary in nature and could not be obtained. The
actual curve may fall off rapidly with an increase in the number of chips
because of the additive influence of interconnection reliability. Curve B
which predicts MTBF of multichip subsystem bonds only is derived from
Curve A, assuming that 25 percent of the failures of single chips can be
ascribed to one (or more) bond failures. Curve C predicts the MTBF of a
circuit chip as a function of the number of bonds per chip, assuming that one
bond failure amounts to a chip failure. Curve C is derived from Curves A
and B which are related to individual chips containing 14 bonds. The pre-
dicted subsystem MTBF is uniformly displaced downward as the number of
bonds per chip increases, as illustrated by Curves 2%' and B' corresponding
to I00 bonds per chip. Curve C has been observed for thermal compression
wire bonds; that is, the increased circuit chip complexity requiring n number
of bonding sites only has second order effects on the overall chip reliability.
- 335 -
SD 67-478-3
SPACE DIVISION oF NORTH AMERICAN ROCKWELL CORPORATION
u
ii
o
Z
104
103
102
1966
MOS
BIPOLAR
I
1968 1970
Figure A-I.
I I
1972 1974
YEAR
LSI Density Forecast
1976 1978
- 336 -
SD 67-478-3
SPACE DIVISION OF NORTH AMERICAN ROCKWELL CORPORATION
IO00
100
X"
__OVERALL SUBSYSTEM MTBF
A' B
\
\
MTBF OF SUBSYSTEM BONDS
14 BONDS/CHIP
..... lo0 BONDS/till P
100 BONDS/CHIP
14 BONDS/CHIP
108 109 1010 1011
Figure A-Z. Effect of Number of Interconnections on
Subsystem MTBF
u
_Zl
a.
U
U
10 I I
IO3 i@ lO5 lO6
NUklER OF INTERCONNECTIONS AMONG 1000 CIRCUITS, ALL PACKAGING LEVELS
Figure A-3. Effect of Integration Scale on Packaging Scheme
- 337 -
SD 67-478-3
SPACE DIVISION OF NORTH AMERICAN ROCKWELL CORPORATION
Thus, the simple inverse relationship shown in Curve C is realized. In
practice, no difference in reliability has been detected for chips ranging
from 10 components each to 160 components each.
A "flip-chip" bonding technique, which effects the simultaneous forma-
tion of pure metallurgical bonds between external leads and internal wire
bonding sites of a circuit chip, can be used to replace wire bonding. This
makes it possible to package several interconnected flip-chip bonded complex-
circuit chips in one package. This technique will result in curve C of
FigureA-2 being shifted upward on the MTBF axis and the MTBF of the sub-
system bonds becoming less dependent on the number c)fbonds per chip. The
shifting of curve C thus shows that the cumulative bond strength of the flip-
chip surpasses the single-bond strength of the wire bond. The overall pre-
dicted effect of using flip-chip bonding is improvement of the MTBF of the
entire system. Further improvement can be obtained by designing redun-
dancy in at the integrated circuit level, as discussed in the following
paragraphs.
It is expected that an average of 2 mils center-to-center spacing will
be used for 1975-77 MOS circuits. This gives approximately 5, 500 field-
effect transistors (FET's) per 150 mils square. A few processing break-
throughs enabling yields to be increased would make larger chips available.
For example, a 200-rail square chip (or larger) may well be usable in the
1975-77 period. Such a chip would contain 10,000 FET's. These estimates
are not critical as to whether the chip is 150 mils square or 200 mils square;
the only fact of importance is that a small chip with 5, 500 devices can be
produced with reasonable yields. MOS chips are presently packaged in
forty-lead packs. This situation should be improved with future packaging
methods. As an aid, for example, lines could be fanned out on the substrate
so that larger packages could be used. Again, it is difficult to predict the
development of the packaging technology, but it should be reasonable to
expect I00- to 150-pin packs for MOS chips in the 1975-77 period.
Figure A-3 shows the relationship between the number of interconnec-
tions and the circuits-to-pins ratio at the first level of assembly for various
integration scales from zero integration, i.e., discrete components, through
conventional IC's to LSI. Naturally, as the circuit density at the first level
increases, the number of interconnections at all levels of packaging decreases,
resulting in increased reliability.
Due to some of the inherent limitations of MOS circuits discussed
above, it can be assumed that the future will see circuits which combine the
best features of MOS and of bipolar structures so that the optimum compo-
nent number for combined (but monolithic) circuits will be between those
• given for homogeneous MOS and bipolar circuits. As FigureA-1 indicates,
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MOS circuits will have a lead over bipolar circuits as far as component num-
ber per circuit is concerned, primarily because MOS structures do not
require individual isolation.
As an example, a redundant NAND gate is shown in Figure A-4. This
may be diffused into one monolithic chip of silicon (Reference 4-?). This type
of operational redundancy is best implemented passively. Active failure
detection raises the level of complexity- by means of onboard displays as
well as a larger telemetry subsystem for monitoring system status --and
does not necessarily result in more reliable systems. Passive redundancy
is mechanized by performing the same function in parallel paths; a major
problem lies in properly combining the outputs of the parallel paths.
Multi-Usage Packing: Interchangeability
The most obvious application of LSI to the manned interplanetary
vehicles is in the on-board computer(s), since digital circuitry is generally
more amenable to LSI than linear circuits. There are three general con-
figurations for partitioning LSI for digital applications: unit logic, lead-
reduction logic, and functional logic. Ignoring the possible impact of wiring
rules, the mode used in packaging a particular machine need not alter the
logic implementation of the machine. The configurations differ in how inter-
connections are distributed between the several levels of packaging. In most
cases, these configurations are not observed in their pure form. In unit
logic, all inputs and outputs for each logic gate are brought to the next higher
package level. Early integrated circuits and the discrete component cards
used in computers of the early 1960's were packaged in this manner. In
lead-reduction logic, inputs and outputs of several circuits are combined
before penetrating the next package level. The more dense IC's which will
be available in the 1975-77 time frame can be packaged in this manner. In
functional logic, entire logic nets are completed prior to penetrating the next
package boundary. A few IC's, such as shift registers and adders, are
available today packaged in this configuration. TableA-1 presents a pre-
liminary listing of candidate equipment items, by subsystem, for circuit
changes using LSI's.
Figure A-5 shows the effect of increasing multiusage on the total num-
bers of packages in a computer subsystem {Reference 4-4). As can be seen,
the system design challenge is to define larger functional blocks which will
have multiple usage for greatest in-flight maintainability. Thus, in the
1975-77 time period, Space Division systems engineering personnel (in lieu
of component engineers) must interface with a different world than the world
of component manufacturers.
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Table A-1. LSI Candidates by Subsystem
Subsystem Candidate Equipment
1. Stabilization and Control
Z. Guidance and Navigation
3. Communications and Data
4. Instrumentation
BMAG electronics
Gyro display coupler
GPI electronics
Electronic control assemblies (three-axis)
Thrust vector servo amplifier
Entry monitor system
Power and servo assembly
PIPA electronic assembly
Electronic coupling display units
Command guidance computer
Display keyboard
Signal conditioning assembly
Pulse code modulation telemetry
Signal conditioning equipment
Central timing equipment
LSI Packaging Schemes
Connections to external leads and the final package scheme can be
accomplished by extension of current packaging techniques. In one method,
a Kovar lead frame is solder bonded to the copper-aluminum interconnection.
The assembly is then completely encapsulated in plastic. .An alternative
scheme uses a ceramic base with glassed-in leads which are lapped flush
with the ceramic surface. The terminal ends of the interconnection network
overlap the lead ends. A glassed lid is fired on to complete the package.
Material selection for packages is governed by the need of the package to
dissipate the larger amounts of thermal energy associated with the more
complex subsystem packages. Principally because of their higher thermal
conductivity, ceramics and metals are usually favored over glass and
pla s tic s.
Various module interconnection techniques have been developed
(Re£ere_ce 4-8). Figure A-6 shows the maintainable electronics component
assemblies (MECA) system produced byAMP, Inc., which is a versatile
packaging system in that it can accommodate most of the existing basic
functional circuits and is adaptable to future developments in submodule
packaging. The AMP-MECA system relies on its basic building block or cell
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Figure A-6. AMP-MECA Interconnection System
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which consists of a diallylphthalate box with no top. The circuit module is
placed in this cell with contact areas at the top. Contact to the circuitry is
made by cell contact clips that run the entire height of the cell. Connection
between cells is made by copper strips which run the length of phenolic
boards. The strips run perpendicularly to the cell contacts. Rib contacts
slide into the cell contacts and make contact with the copper strips through
holes in the phenolic boards. These rib contacts may make connections with
any combination of copper strips on the board. Preprogrammed intercon-
nection between cells may be made in this manner. Boeing has developed a
method (Reference 4-9) of modularizing flat-packs using spring-tempered,
thin gauge, phosphor bronze etched sheets; these sheets are assembled into
a rigid structure using tabs and slots --a method developed in the toy indus-
try. To install the flat packs into the modular system, it is necessary only
to insert the flat-pack into its designated compartment. The flat-pack leads
are aligned or registered with the corresponding flat-wire finger protruding
from the flat-wiring assembly. The connection methods can be either weld-
ing or pulse soldering. The electronic package which houses the modules is
constructed using the tab-and-slot concept employed in the module fabrica-
tion. The module housing consists of 0.016-inch phosphor bronze sheets
which have been etched and solder coated to allow assembly by bending the
tabs and fuzing the solder. Double walls are used to rigidize the structure.
The electronic package is designed for mounting on a cold plate; a solid
copper rim is utilized for the dual function of heat transfer and mechanical
attachment to the cold plate. Figure A-9 shows a typical module housing
with several modules installed. Other packaging schemes, such as
Westinghouse Micpak (Refererrce 4-10), Surface Advanced Development
Module (Reference 4-8), the Amelco Mema (Reference 4-ii), etc., should
be investigated in order to determine that scheme most suitable for the
manned interplanetary vehicle s.
Mission Reliability Considerations
A preliminary estimate of the effect of LSI on vehicle system relia-
bility may be made by considering, first, the contribution to the total system
failure rate of each class of discrete components for the Apollo electronics
system (The Apollo subsystems are composed of discrete components, except
for the control timing equipment), and then considering the effect of the
longer-duration missions (approximately 700 days), and the effect of
increased system complexity (approximately 50 percent) on this estimate.
These considerations are diagrammed in the histogram (Figure A-8).
Figure A-9 shows the Apollo parts count for the electronics subsys-
tems together with the projected parts counts for three concepts for the Mars
vehicle electronics. As can be seen, the use of LSI will afford a 1000-to-I
reduction in total parts count from the discrete components version, allowing
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much more volume for sparing of electromechanical assemblies (gyros,
motors, relays, traveling wave tubes).
Conclusions
Large-scale integration of the electronic subsystems provides signifi-
cant benefits to vehicle design for long-duration missions. Significant
reductions can be realized in weight, volume, numbers of inter- and intra-
connections, numbers of unique items, etc., with a corresponding allowance
for additional sparing for electromechanical and thermionic assemblies
which are inherently unreliable, and for which no significant advance in tech-
nology is anticipated in the required time period. Additionally, the reduction
in numbers of unique items will allow a maximum degree of interchangeability
for in-flight replacement of the electronic modules.
While the recommendations contained herein would not allow maximum
application of Apollo-type electronic equipment, maximum increases, in con-
cert with required levels of reliability, can only be realized with the desig-
nated change s.
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APPENDIX V. ALTERNATE G&N INERTIAL PLATFORM
One of the critical items of guidance equipment is the inertial platform.
A possible means of uprating the Apollo IMU is the gas-bearing gyro used in
the Autonetics N-17 system. This type of gyro has essentially no wearout
characteristics and a high reliability of about 100,000 hours MTBF, com-
pared with the Apollo IMU of 772 hours. The majority of failures associated
with gas-bearing gyros are related to start-up, and may be virtually elimi-
nated by continuously running them throughout the mission if the power is not
excessive; power may be conserved somewhat by running at slower speeds
during coast periods, as the operation under acceleration is impaired by
slow running speeds. The original estimate for the duty cycle of the IMU was
825 hours; thus, with continuous running in order to preclude the wearout
problems with start-up, the reliability of each gyro for the entire 16, 801 hour
mission would be:
R = -(10-5) (1.6801 x 104 ) = 0.821 (1)
compared with
-(0. 001293)(825)
R = = 0.344 (2)
for the IMU. The overall enhancement of mission reliability would be given
by the differential between two parallel (i.e., one in standby) IMU's compared
with some number of gas-bearing gyros of equivalent weight; i.e., nw, where
w is the weight of the gas-bearing gyro, and nw is the weight of the IMU,
Rdiff = 1 - (l -f l _ + Xzt2_ = 26% (3)
where % 1 and,k2 are the failure rates of the gas-bearing gyros and IMU,
respectively, and t 1 and t 2 are the respective duty factors, assuming opera-
tional redundancy for the gas-bearing gyros and standby redundancy for the
IMU, and the weight of the IMU is 42 pounds, and the gas-bearing gyros are
assumed to be 26 pounds (and n, therefore, becomes 1.6).
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An inertial platform (using gas-bearing gyros) similar to that used in
the Minuteman system may be configured for the interplanetary vehicle. The
platforms may be mounted side by side with the outer (roll) gimbal axis
aligned with the command module's reentry roll axis (i. e. , 33 deg away from
the command module's axis of symmetry). The inner gimbal axis is the pitch
axis, followed by the redundant roll gimbal axis and the yaw axis. The plat-
forms may be essentially the same as the basic Minuteman platform except
that the gimbals will have to be enlarged to accommodate two-speed synchro
readouts on the gimbal axis. Each stable element would include three
velocity meters and two gyros. Although envelope restrictions do not allow
the use of an alignment block, four separate two-axis bubble levels may be
mounted on the stable element for use in ground checkout and calibration
operations. Errors of the order of 10-second rms may be produced by this
alignment-set arrangement. The weight estimate of 26 pounds each in the
expressions derived to compare the reliability enhancement (s.v.) is based
upon the use of aluminum gimbals and platform structure. However, it may
be necessary or desirable to use beryllium in order to meet the system per-
formance objectives during the launch and reentry portions of the mission.
(It should be noted that the outer gimbal axis is 33 deg away from the major
thrust axis during the launch and coincident with the axis of drag during
reentry.) The outer roll, pitch, and yaw gimbal axes would have on-axis
mounted two-speed (electrically) synchro readouts.
It is estimated that the platform angle readouts will provide attitude
information with an accuracy of 20- to 25-second rms (this includes readout
instrument errors, gimbal axes non-orthogonality, and initial adjustment
errors). In addition to the resolvers and pick-offs for normal four axis
servo control, a resolver (on the outer roll axis) is required to put the plat-
form pitch and yaw error signals in vehicle stability axes coordinates. Also,
a fixed angle resolution of the resulting roll and yaw errors is provided
within the system electronics to convert the error signals from stability to
launch vehicle coordinates during all phases except Earth reentry. It is
anticipated that the modified platform would be 9-7/8 inches by I0- 11/16 inches
in diameter. Extensions of 9/16 inches and 4-1/4 inches on the ends of the
egg-shape (i.e., along the roll axis) would house a d-c torquer motor, the
two-speed synchro readout, and the one-speed resolver for the attitude error
signals.
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